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A Introduction 
A.1 Motivation 
The compatibility of family and career in Germany is a prevalent issue in political discourse as 
well as in economic literature (e.g., Spieß (2011), Gerlach (2008)).  
One reason for this is the demographic change the country is undergoing. Germany is facing 
one of the lowest fertility rates in Europe (e.g., European Commission (2014)). The total fertility 
rate in Germany was 1.38 children per woman in 2012, compared to 1.58 in the entire European 
Union and 2.01 in France (European Commission (2014)). Highly educated women particularly 
show lower fertility compared to less educated women (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
(2012b)). In addition, life expectancy is increasing (Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
(2009)). These two important factors largely influence the demographic structure of a country 
(European Commission (2012)). For instance, the old-age dependency ratio of Germany is 
expected to increase from 34 in 2008 to 63 resp. 67 (depending on migration) by 2060 (Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany (2009)). This ratio is defined as the number of people aged 65 
and over divided by the number of people aged 15 to 64 ((Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
(2009)). This will bear remarkable consequences for the social security system, on both the 
revenue and expenditure sides, as well as for economic growth (for a deeper discussion, see, 
for instance OECD (2014), European Commission (2012)). Therefore, the utilization of present 
labor force potentials is considered to be important for economic growth (e.g., OECD (2014)). 
Women and older employees are viewed as important labor reserves (apart from migration, e.g., 
Reinberg and Hummel (2003), OECD (2014)).  
In recent decades, the proportion of women among university graduates has been increasing 
(CEWS (2015)) and the share of women participating in the labor market also shows an upward 
trend (European Commission (2014)). Even the proportion of women in managerial positions 
is increasing, although it is still at a low level (Holst and Schimenta (2013)). Notwithstanding 
these trends, home-related work, such as housework and childcare, is still within the female 
domain of responsibility (e.g., Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2003)). In addition, a 
large share of German mothers only work part-time, indicating that the male breadwinner model 
still is prevalent (e.g., European Commission (2014)). While only about 9% of employed men 
work part-time, about 45% of employed women do so (e.g., European Commission (2014)). 
Part-time work often is considered to be incompatible with managerial positions (Holst et al. 
(2012)). There is also a remarkable difference between mothers and childless women. Childless 
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women are more often employed in full-time positions than are mothers, and family-related and 
personal obligations are most often cited as reasons for their part-time employment (e.g., Keller 
and Haustein (2013), Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2012a)). 
The compatibility of a working career and family life is a vital component for tackling the 
aforementioned challenges (for a detailed discussion, see OECD (2007, 2014)). The 
government as well as employers try to facilitate the combinability of family and working life 
for mothers, for example by offering (institutional) childcare (e.g., Spieß (2011), §24 SGB VIII, 
Gerlach (2010)). The implementation of the Elterngeld in 2007 as well as the right to daycare 
for children aged at least one year from 2013 onwards are further examples of policy 
instruments designed to strengthen maternal labor market attachment (KiFöG, German 
Bundestag (2006, 2008)). But still, while the proportion of women participating has increased, 
a large number of mothers that participate only works part-time (European Commission 
(2014)). Household chores and childcare are said to be the most prevalent reasons for part-time 
employment (Keller and Haustein (2013), Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2012a)).  
This background informs the motivation of this thesis and the issues investigated herein. The 
time used for home-related and market work seems to be one reason for the prevalent part-time 
employment of mothers (Keller and Haustein (2013), Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
(2012a)). As Wang and Bianchi (2009) state, male involvement in home-related tasks might be 
crucial to labor market outcomes of mothers. Hence, in Chapter B, we investigate how the time 
allocation within couple households changes if one partner faces an employment shock. The 
question in focus refers specifically to the change in male time devoted to home-related tasks 
and the female time devoted to market work. Since the time allocation of both men and women 
in couple households is strongly interdependent, we make use of a difference-in-differences 
approach using an exogenous employment shock. The time allocation within households 
appears to be rather rigid in the short term.  
The low representation of women in managerial positions leads to the question Chapter C 
focuses on. I investigate whether the duration of birth-related time outs from the labor market 
indicates a career penalty in terms of occupational prestige. The analysis takes account of the 
selection into employment by applying a Heckman selection correction. It investigates not only 
the prestige level per se but also the occupational mobility compared to the prestige level held 
before the birth of the first child. Mothers’ careers are destabilized after very long time outs.  
Finally, in Chapter D, the role of informal childcare for maternal labor market involvement is 
comprehensively analyzed. Again, time constraints might play an important role in the decision 
about labor market participation and working hours. Informal childcare arrangements are 
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expected to relax these constraints to some extent and thereby to support maternal labor market 
participation as well as their working hours. This includes two decisions. The analysis therefore 
faces two major econometric challenges. The first is the potential endogeneity of informal 
childcare arrangements, and the second is the selection into employment when investigating 
work hours. Both are taken into account.  
A.2 Overview and summary 
I begin with the question of rigidity of intra-family allocation of home-related work. Therefore, 
section B focuses on the intra-household allocation of time among couples. Using the German 
Socio-Economic Panel, we investigate how the time allocation changes if one of the partners is 
forced out of market work by an involuntary lay-off. We expect that he or she will spend some 
of the additional time on household chores and/or childcare. Thus, our results will give some 
indication as to whether couples allocate their time due to time constraints or due to individual 
preferences. We apply a difference-in-differences approach as well as panel methods to identify 
the effects of negative employment shocks on childcare and housework of both partners. Our 
results indicate that there is only a moderate reaction with respect to domestic work, namely 
childcare and housework. This evidence suggests that preferences determine the division of 
home-related work within families and that the intra-household time allocation is relatively 
rigid in the short term. Public policies that loosen the time constraints (e.g., public provision of 
childcare) will not have large effects on the intra-family division of household work. 
In section C, I analyze whether there is a penalty for birth-related leaves of absence in terms of 
a loss in occupational prestige upon return to the labor market. There is a broad body of research 
on the effect of motherhood on wages. Beyond wages, occupational prestige is also an important 
characteristic of a job. In this section, I ask whether there is a penalty for this as well. I use the 
SIOPS information of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to investigate this for the 
case of Germany. Since the SIOPS information is only observed for those who are working, a 
two-step model according to Heckman (1979) is used to correct for this selection. In addition, 
a strategy suggested by Wooldridge (1995) is used to account for the panel structure of the 
GSOEP. The first step estimates the probability of participation in the labor market after the 
first birth, i.e., of observing prestige information. The second step is performed for the level of 
the occupational prestige as well as for the probability of an upward or downward occupational 
move, conditional on selection. The descriptive analysis offers a preliminary indication that 
occupational mobility is higher for mothers as compared to childless women, and that it is 
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higher if the career interruption is long. This is true for upward as well as for downward 
mobility. The results reveal a prestige penalty for very long career interruptions. 
Section D analyzes the relationship between the use of informal childcare arrangements and the 
employment of mothers. It focuses on informal childcare outside the household provided by 
relatives, friends or neighbors. The aim is to investigate whether the presence of this kind of 
childcare arrangements facilitates maternal labor market involvement. I suspect that a crucial 
property of this kind of childcare might be its flexibility in contrast to formal childcare 
arrangements (also stated by Posadas and Vidal-Fernández (2012)). To analyze this question, 
the survey years 1999 through 2012 of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) are used. 
The presence of informal childcare arrangements is most likely not exogenous to employment 
status. To take this into account, an instrumental variable approach is applied. The instrument 
for informal childcare is the information about whether the grandmother is still alive. This is 
considered to have a direct effect on the probability of having an informal childcare 
arrangement, but it is not considered to influence the labor market participation of mothers 
directly. Using two-stage least squares estimation, the findings reveal that women who receive 
the support through informal childcare are more likely to participate in the labor market. Since 
working hours are only observed for those who are participating in the work force, I apply a 
selection correction to analyze the employment hours. Informal childcare arrangements also 
have a positive impact on the working hours, even though the magnitude is small. 
The last section summarizes the results and draws a conclusion. 
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B Intra-household time allocation: The effects of 
an employment shock 
 
Reinhold Schnabel   Katharina Sutter 
 
 
B.1 Introduction 
Time use in couple households remains unevenly distributed between men and women. This is 
not only true with regard to labor force participation at the intensive and extensive margins but 
also with regard to other activities such as childcare and housework. For instance, in households 
with children below age 17, men only spend 1.5 hours a weekday on childcare whereas women 
spend nearly 6 hours. Even when controlling for labor force participation, enormous differences 
remain between men and women. Understanding the reasons for this pattern of time allocation 
is interesting in itself. Moreover, the effects of economic policies intended to improve work-
life balance may heavily depend on the intra-household mechanisms. More specifically, the 
effectiveness of public childcare programs that are intended to weaken the time constraints of 
families may depend on the role of those constraints on the one side and on the role of 
preferences on the other side. If the uneven distribution of market and non-market work within 
families is a result of individual preferences, the effect of loosening time constraints might be 
limited. 
However, causal inference on the time allocation within families is difficult due to the potential 
simultaneity of the decisions, both between partners and between different time uses. In order 
to tackle this problem, we investigate how men and women respond to an exogenous variation 
in market work time. More specifically, we ask whether and to what extent men and women 
living as couples alter their time allocation in response to an involuntary reduction in working 
hours. There are many dimensions along which time uses could be adjusted. First, the person 
with “excess” time could increase his or her non-market work (childcare, housework, repairs, 
etc.). Second, the other spouse may also alter his or her market and non-market work. The 
reaction to such a shock is compelling to study because it may indicate whether the time 
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allocation prior to the shock displays couples’ preferences or whether it is mainly a result of 
time constraints. 
We contribute to the literature on time use by employing a time variation due to a plant closure 
or a dismissal in order to identify responses in time use of both partners. We prefer using plant 
closures since those should be exogenous with respect to intra-household time allocation. We 
also estimate models using dismissals. Dismissals, however, may not be fully exogenous with 
respect to other time uses if the worker has provoked a dismissal, e.g., in order to have more 
time for childcare. Using an exogenous variation is important in order to identify the 
determinants of own non-market activities and of the other partner’s time uses. We use a 
difference-in-differences approach as our main estimation strategy. Thereby, we identify the 
causal effect of a variation of one partner’s time use (namely being laid off) on his or her own 
non-market activities as well as on the partner’s decisions. The resulting estimates shed some 
light on the motives of time allocation within partnerships. Our treatment group consists of 
persons subject to a plant closure (or a dismissal); the control group consists of those persons 
who are not hit by such a shock. Thus, we do not have to rely on questionable instruments like 
some part of the literature.  
Our analysis is based on the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) using the survey years 
1992 to 2010. We can follow persons over time from employment to dismissal and to the 
adjustment of home-related work. The estimations are performed separately for men and 
women in order to identify gender differences in market and non-market time use. In addition, 
we run pooled estimations.  
We find that gender differences in time use seem to be very stable. The increase of housework 
and childcare of men, although (weakly) significant, falls short of closing the enormous gender 
gap in time use. This hints to stable gender roles that are barely altered in response to 
employment shocks and suggests that preferences rather than time constraints play an important 
role in determining time allocation within families. 
In the remainder of this chapter, we first turn to a discussion of the existing literature. In the 
third section, we describe the dataset as well as the construction of our samples. Subsequently, 
we present some descriptive statistics. Section five contains an outline of the econometric 
methods and the main results. Section six concludes. 
 
Intra-household time allocation: The effects of an employment shock 9 
 
B.2 Literature Review 
Many studies investigate couples’ time allocation (e.g., Álvarez and Miles (2006), Connelly 
and Kimmel (2009), Deding and Lausten (2006), Duguet and Simonnet (2007), García et al. 
(2009), Mancini and Pasqua (2011), Solaz (2005), Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003), Bloemen 
et al. (2010)). The studies focus on various questions, such as the influence of wages on time 
allocation (e.g., Kalenkoski et al. (2009), Bloemen and Stancanelli (2008)), the influence of 
children on parental leisure time synchronization (e.g., Barnet-Verzat et al. (2011)) or spousal 
influences on time allocation (e.g., Connelly and Kimmel (2009)). We will focus on the effect 
of a variation in one time use on the other time uses, both of oneself and of the spouse. 
Nock and Kingston (1988) explore the interdependencies between working time and time with 
children. They distinguish between different activities, e.g., playing/educating and 
housekeeping as well as between single- and dual-earner households. They conclude that 
working hours influence the time each individual spends with children, but that the extent of 
this influence seems larger in the case of activities where childcare is a secondary activity. The 
time men spend with children is more responsive to work hours than it is for women. Álvarez 
and Miles (2006) focus on the relationship between female market work and male housework 
in Spain when the husband has a paid job. They find that female labor force participation 
increases both the male share of housework and the number of hours men spend on housework. 
The effect seems to be stronger if they consider the wife’s participation to be endogenous. Anxo 
and Carlin (2004) study French time diary data and find that higher female working hours lower 
absolute male housework time but raise the male share. The results of Daunfeldt and Hellström 
(2007) indicate that more working hours result in a lower probability to do domestic work. 
Leeds and von Allmen (2004), using the year 1991 of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
find a clear difference in the behavior of working and non-working women in couples. The 
latter do not view their partners as substitutes for home production, whereas working women 
do. Husbands’ reaction to the behavior of their spouses depends on the presence of children. 
Connelly and Kimmel (2009) examine spousal influences on non-market time uses in married 
couples with children. These are the wife’s relative wage, which is often used as a proxy for 
bargaining power (e.g., Connelly and Kimmel (2009) but also Anxo and Carlin (2004), García 
et al. (2009)), spousal working time and spousal non-market time. They use the American Time 
Use Survey (ATUS, 2003-2006) and consider leisure, childcare and home production as non-
market time. Due to possible endogeneity, wages, working time and spousal non-market time 
are instrumented. They find small effects. An increased market work time of the husband seems 
to result in less home production time for the wife. On the other hand, if the wife devotes more 
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time to market work, the husband devotes a greater amount of time to care giving. They find 
some indication that leisure time is complementary for parents. 
A study by Hallberg and Klevmarken (2003) analyzes economic incentives’ effect on parental 
childcare time and also includes spousal time use variables. They use a Swedish panel dataset 
(HUS) of the years 1984 and 1993 and focus on couples with children. Their study faces the 
issue of the need to instrument time use variables. Their results indicate that parental time with 
children is mainly influenced by a change in working hours of the male parent rather than the 
female parent.  
One of the questions considered by Hamermesh (2002) concerns how an extra hour is used (this 
hour occurs every autumn when people change to standard time). If people (especially mothers 
with young children) get an “extra hour”, they mostly spend it on sleep.  
Sousa-Poza et al. (2001) focus on housework and childcare in Switzerland. They investigate 
the determinants of those two time uses as well as their monetary value by using the 1997 Swiss 
Labour Force Survey. Male childcare and housework seems to be relatively independent of 
changes in socio-economic factors. Women, on the other hand, react to the presence of children, 
marital status and wage rate.  
Mancini and Pasqua (2011) use data from the Italian Time Use Survey (1988/99 and 2002/03) 
and focus on couples with children. They explicitly discriminate between basic childcare and 
quality time with children. They find that female working time has a strong effect on childcare 
time of both spouses and that childcare is substituted within the household if the working time 
of women increases. Women exhibit a stronger reaction to the characteristics of the family than 
men do, but mothers’ work hours are less responsive in 2002 than in 1988.  
Bredtmann (2010) uses the German Time Use Survey. She focuses on factors influencing the 
way couples share their work. Since all time uses are potentially endogenous, she has to draw 
on instrumental variables. Her findings suggest a reaction of women on the time allocation of 
the partner, but not vice versa. She writes about a “first mover advantage” of men.  
Deding and Lausten (2006) test several theories concerning intra-household division of market 
and non-market work. Individual time use is estimated, including the partners’ time use as an 
explanatory factor. They also rely on instruments. Using the Danish Time Use Survey, they 
find some substitution between own and partners’ time uses. But it is significant for women 
only; that is, if the male does more paid work, the female does more unpaid work, but not vice 
versa. Their results show some evidence for the so-called assortative mating and for doing 
gender1. 
                                                 
1 These and the other theories examined are described in detail in Deding and Lausten (2006).  
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Intra-household time allocation on a weekly basis is investigated by Ettema and van der Lippe 
(2009). According to the authors, role expectations of women play an important role for the 
division of paid and unpaid work between the spouses. The presence of children results in a 
specialization of men in market work and women in unpaid work. 
We contribute to the existing literature in the following way. We take account of the possible 
endogeneity of working hours by defining the occurrence of a plant closure as an exogenous 
variation of market work time.2 In a second set of estimations, we also include dismissals as a 
treatment. In contrast to using an instrumental variable approach, we thereby do not face the 
issue of finding reasonable instruments. In addition, we use a very rich panel dataset (GSOEP). 
This offers the opportunity to examine individual reactions to such an employment shock. By 
applying a difference-in-differences approach, we get the following information: To what 
extent do men and women in the short term change their non-market work hours if their market 
work hours are exogenously reduced? If, for example, the male partner, who is affected by a 
plant closure, increases his housework or childcare significantly after the treatment occurred, 
this indicates that the reason for the time allocation prior to the treatment have been time 
constraints rather than preferences. This will yield some indication as to whether time 
constraints or preferences are the main motive for intra-household time allocation. To the best 
of our knowledge, the only study that seems to be similar to the study at hand is that of Solaz 
(2005). She analyzes whether there is an adjustment in domestic work if one partner is 
unemployed. The analysis is based on the French time use survey including one wave. 
Therefore, it is not possible to identify an adjustment process. Moreover, being in the state of 
unemployment is not the same as being laid off in a given period. Instead, by using plant 
closures or dismissals as an exogenous treatment at time t, we do not condition on still being 
unemployed in the next period, t+1. 
B.3 Data 
We use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)3 including the survey years 1992 to 2010. 
We exclude persons who are in formal education, retired, self-employed, on maternity leave, in 
short-time work, in a sheltered workshop, civil servants, and persons doing military or civil 
service, because these groups are not at risk of being laid off. The spouse is allowed to be in 
any labor status, though. One may ask why we do not exclude those who are unemployed, 
because they cannot be treated. But this is not necessarily true. The status “not employed” refers 
                                                 
2 Other papers using this exogenous variation include Schmitz (2011) and Del Bono et al. (2012). 
3 For a description of this very rich panel dataset, see Wagner et al. (2007). 
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to the time the interview took place. So, if a person is interviewed in March, and then starts 
working in May and is subject to a closure in November, we would exclude a treated individual 
from the treatment group. We exclude multigenerational households and other non-standard 
households. The sample is restricted to cohabiting couples at working age (25-59 years). This 
seems reasonable since couples that are not living together face different time constraints. In 
addition, at this age, it is unlikely that people are still attending school or are already retired. 
Since this work focuses on gender differences, we also exclude couples of the same sex. For 
families with children, we use the information about the number of children in different age 
groups living in the household. The composition of couples might change during the observed 
period, so we define a couple as a unique combination of a man and a woman. One person can 
be part of different couples over time and can switch from one household to another. This is 
necessary and plausible since living with another partner may lead to different decisions about 
time uses or different time constraints.  
We only consider time use on weekdays. This is for two reasons. First, in the GSOEP, time use 
on weekends is only included every second year. Second, time use on weekends is expected to 
be quite different from that on weekdays, because most market work is done on weekdays. In 
addition, there are expected to be differences between Saturday and Sunday. 
To perform the difference-in-differences estimation, which will be presented in detail in section 
B.5.1, a treatment group, a control group and pre- and post-treatment periods must be defined. 
Since we are using a panel dataset, in which a treatment can occur in every year from 1992 to 
2010, this raises the question of how to define these variables. First, we clean the control group. 
We drop every household from the control group that was affected by a treatment at some point 
in time. People in the control group can have lost their job due to other reasons, for example 
due to the expiration of a fixed-term contract. This is reasonable because in those cases, the 
working time is not exogenously set to zero. When investigating closures separately, we also 
exclude from the control group those who are affected by a dismissal. In addition, we do not 
include a couple if both partners are affected by a treatment at the same time. For each treatment 
definition (closures in particular or closures and dismissals), we save two distinct datasets, one 
for men and one for women at risk.  
For the definition of pre- and post-treatment period, we define the period-dummy separately for 
each two-year set and append the resulting two-year-datasets afterwards. As a result, each year, 
except for the first and the last, is included twice for each couple, as pre- and as post-treatment 
observation. This almost doubles the number of observations. Since these are only duplicates 
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(except for the period-dummy), this may result in misleading standard errors. We use cluster-
robust standard errors to take this into account. 
After restricting the data in the aforementioned way, there remain 407 (326) couples with the 
male (female) partner being affected by a plant closure. If we include dismissals as a treatment, 
there are 1,167 and 902 affected couples. The control groups have the same size in both cases, 
namely 6,839 for men and 7,709 for women. The control group is substantially larger since the 
selected treatments are rare events. Note that one couple might be treated more than once. If 
affected twice in a row, we only consider the first treatment, since we need the time use prior 
to any treatment. The couples in the control group are observed one to nineteen years, but the 
latter case is rare. The treatment group couples are in the sample for two, four, six or eight 
years. 
This work will also consider the case where there is no distinction between men and women 
being at risk. In this case, we observe 716 (1,946) couples affected by a plant closure (or also a 
dismissal). We append the two regular panel datasets for treated men and women and 
distinguish between the treated person and the partner of the treated person, which in both cases 
can be a man or a woman. The control group contains 8,189 couples. Since we appended the 
two datasets, the control group contains many observations twice, once with the man being the 
“potentially treated person”, once with the woman being the “potentially treated person”. We 
account for this via cluster-robust standard errors. 
B.4 Descriptive Analysis  
We first report some basic information about the time use of couples in our sample, which has 
been described in the previous section. Table B-1 contains the average hours per day (Monday 
through Friday) spent on different activities by men and women in the sample. Hours of market 
work reach about 8.5 per weekday for men and 4.6 for women. A regular finding is that women 
spend more time on the other reported activities than men, except for repairs. Since the numbers 
in table B-1 apply to all couple households irrespective of the presence of children, the hours 
spent on childcare are relatively low at only 3.3 for women. It is also interesting to note that 
men as well as women use slightly more than one and a half hours for their hobbies, i.e., leisure. 
The total sum of the reported activities differs between men and women. While men report an 
approximate sum of 13 and a half hours, women report 14 and a half hours, noting that sleep is 
not included.4 
                                                 
4 This is due to the fact that sleep is included as a separate question in the GSOEP questionnaire only from the year 
2008 onwards. 
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Table B-1:  average time spent on activities – with or without children 
 men women 
 mean sd se mean mean sd se mean 
paid work 8.541 3.500 0.018 4.599 3.988 0.021 
housework 0.667 0.871 0.004 2.987 1.871 0.010 
shopping etc. 0.716 0.748 0.004 1.301 0.774 0.004 
repairs, garden 0.951 1.070 0.005 0.598 0.829 0.004 
hobby 1.687 1.658 0.008 1.659 1.528 0.008 
childcare 0.834 1.638 0.008 3.255 4.988 0.025 
total  13.632 3.330 0.017 14.570 4.936 0.026 
Note: the numbers of observations vary around 38,500 depending on the variable under consideration due to 
missing values. Moreover, the number of persons differs slightly between males and females. Source: GSOEP, 
1992-2010, own calculations. 
In table B-2, we condition on the presence of children under age 17. Men with children work 
slightly more than the general population (9 compared to 8.5 hours). Women with children 
spend considerably less time on market work (3.5 compared to 4.6). For childcare and 
housework, the converse is true. While women with children spend 9.3 hours on childcare and 
housework, men only spend 2.1 hours on these two activities. Thus, in the presence of children, 
the division of labor clearly is more pronounced.  
Table B-2:  average time spent on activities – couples with children below age 17 
 men women 
 mean sd se mean mean sd se mean 
paid work 9.007 3.009 0.021 3.488 3.623 0.026 
housework 0.624 0.864 0.006 3.385 1.927 0.013 
shopping etc. 0.656 0.728 0.005 1.360 0.772 0.005 
repairs, garden 0.874 0.986 0.007 0.566 0.777 0.005 
hobby 1.464 1.459 0.010 1.451 1.371 0.010 
childcare 1.511 1.969 0.014 5.946 5.499 0.038 
total  14.333 3.199 0.023 16.322 5.433 0.038 
Note: the numbers of observations range vary around 20,500 depending on the variable under consideration due 
to missing values. Moreover, the number of persons differs slightly between males and females. Source: GSOEP, 
1992-2010, own calculations. 
The large differences between men and women on one side and between women with and 
without children on the other side may be due to differences in opportunities (e.g., time 
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constraints) or to preferences. One way to improve opportunities to work is the provision of 
public or subsidized childcare. If lack of opportunities was the main driver of the observed 
differences, a policy to increase access to childcare would increase labor force participation of 
women, reduce private childcare, and diminish the large gender differences. Using differences 
in access to public childcare to identify the causal effects of changes in opportunities (or time 
constraints) would lead to endogeneity problems if public policies were not exogenous. Thus, 
we want to look at changes in working hours that are imposed on workers in some exogenous 
manner. We first use plant closures that we deem exogenous – at least with respect to the 
variables of interest in our study. Thus, we next report changes in time use following a plant 
closure. 
Table B-3 demonstrates how little the different dimensions of time use change in response to 
such a shock. For illustrative reasons, we present the changes for persons who lost their job due 
to a plant closure and who are not employed in the next period. In the following econometric 
analysis, we will not condition on being unemployed, since this again might be endogenous. 
While the reduction in hours of paid work is large, other activities, such as childcare, change 
little. However, the total time spent on reported activities drops considerably, i.e., time spent 
on other activities that are not reported increases considerably. The reaction of the partner is 
negligible. In particular, the partner does not make up for the reduction in paid work by 
increasing his or her hours of market work. The laid-off person (male or female) does not 
increase childcare time in a substantial way. Interestingly, the patterns of changes are akin 
across gender. This first descriptive analysis indicates a strong stability of behavior even after 
a negative employment shock.  
When not conditioning on being unemployed in the period following the plant closure, the 
effects are somewhat weaker. The reason is that many persons leave unemployment (or more 
specifically, become reemployed) within a year after the plant closure.  
When it comes to the changes due to a plant closure in the pooled dataset, the values are the 
following (if not employed in the subsequent period). The treated person, on average, reduces 
market work by about seven hours. Some additional time is spent on the other time uses. The 
change in leisure time amounts to almost one extra hour. Shopping, repairs and childcare 
increase by about half an hour, and housework by about 45 minutes. The total time is reduced 
by almost three hours. The partner’s reaction is quite close to zero for all time uses. Even when 
it comes to childcare, the reaction of the partner only amounts to about 6 minutes less childcare 
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time. All in all, the extent of the changes lies, as expected, in between the male and the female 
reaction presented in table B-3. 
Table B-3:  change in time spent on activities after firm closure, not employed 
 men laid off female partner 
 mean sd se mean mean sd se mean 
paid work -8.533 3.365 0.260 -0.084 2.287 0.171 
housework 0.787 1.348 0.100 -0.005 1.556 0.115 
shopping etc. 0.672 1.039 0.077 -0.076 0.961 0.071 
repairs, garden 0.885 1.727 0.128 -0.033 0.809 0.060 
hobby 1.295 2.617 0.193 0.038 1.693 0.125 
childcare 0.565 2.795 0.206 -0.197 2.808 0.208 
total  -3.488 4.563 0.359 -0.402 4.223 0.320 
 women laid off male partner 
 mean sd se mean mean sd se mean 
paid work -5.340 3.825 0.319 0.000 2.714 0.222 
housework 0.766 2.483 0.200 0.006 1.072 0.086 
shopping etc. 0.271 1.397 0.112 0.079 0.895 0.073 
repairs, garden 0.155 1.344 0.108 0.039 1.108 0.089 
hobby 0.510 1.825 0.148 0.026 2.010 0.162 
childcare 0.532 3.036 0.245 0.000 1.069 0.086 
total  -2.128 4.742 0.399 -0.090 3.162 0.264 
Note: the numbers of observations vary around 160 depending on the variable under consideration due to missing 
values. Moreover, the number of persons differs slightly between males and females. Source: GSOEP, 1992-
2010, own calculations. 
B.5 Empirical methods and results 
B.5.1 Methods 
This work seeks to shed light on the effect of a treatment (i.e., an exogenous variation of the 
time devoted to market work) on the time use decisions of men and women living as couples. 
So basically, we ask what people use their time for if they are facing an employment shock. 
This shock, as already mentioned, can be a plant closure or a dismissal. We distinguish two 
definitions of a treatment, namely closure and closure or dismissal. We expect people affected 
by such a shock to spend their “additional” time on other liabilities, such as childcare and 
Intra-household time allocation: The effects of an employment shock 17 
 
housework. This analysis concentrates on childcare and housework, as it is specifically 
concerned with time devoted to domestic work. 
We apply a difference-in-differences approach (DID). This seems promising in ruling out the 
risk that the observed treatment effect is not due to the treatment, but due to other variable 
changes occurring during the period under consideration, as would be the case in a simple 
before-after-design (for a description, see Lee (2005)). In the DID framework, the before and 
after difference in the outcomes of a group that is not subject to the treatment – the control 
group – is compared to the time difference of the treatment group. The two differences are 
subtracted from each other to yield the difference in differences.  
In the simplest case, it is made use of two differences: the difference between one year and 
another and the difference between treatment and control group. In the basic DID, one considers 
two groups and two time periods (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). What is computed in this case 
is the following difference (the notation is adapted to be consistent here): 
 (B-1) 
1 and 2 are the time periods, B indicates the treatment group and A indicates the control group. 
Term (B-1) can be described as the difference between the time differences of the treatment and 
the control group.  
In this case, it is not so simple because there is no clear treatment period for the entire sample. 
This is due to the fact that we use 19 years of the GSOEP and a treatment can occur in every 
single year. The solution to this is explained in section B.3.  
In a first step, we estimate this regular DID model using OLS and including control variables 
such as age, number of children in different age groups, living in East Germany, years of 
education, but also year dummies. The model for repeated cross-sections is as follows 
(Wooldridge (2010)): 
 (B-2) 
In a second step, we apply this to more than two time periods (Wooldridge (2010)). In this case, 
we can use our panel datasets (in which each year is only included once) and run a pooled OLS 
estimation.  
Since we use a rich panel dataset, we also apply a panel approach as a third step. The estimation 
of the following is implemented using either first differences estimated with pooled OLS or 
fixed effects (Imbens and Wooldridge (2009)): 
 (B-3) 
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Here,  represents the treatment effect.  
The estimation of a treatment effect is subject to several assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005) as well as Lee (2005)). The first is the conditional independence assumption (Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005)). This is valid if the outcome is independent of treatment assignment, 
conditional on covariates. Random assignment will be sufficient here. This should not be a 
problem in this case since a closure (or a dismissal) can occur to anyone who is working. It is 
not an individual choice. In addition, we include several covariates to control for differences 
between the two groups. The second assumption is the matching (or overlap) assumption 
(Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). This assumption implies that for all values of the covariates, 
there are both treated and untreated individuals, but it can be relaxed under certain 
circumstances. If one is interested in the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET), the 
assumption can be relaxed in the sense that, for each treated household, there is an equivalent 
household that is not treated. According to the conditional mean assumption, the outcome does 
not define the selection into treatment (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). This is not violated as 
well. A further assumption is the common trends assumption (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). It 
assumes that time effects are the same for the treatment and the control group. Since the two 
groups are drawn from the same population and the groups for women and men are defined 
separately, we do not consider this problematic. 
This work investigates the treatment effect on childcare and housework separately as well as 
on the sum of those two (referred to as domestic work). Note that we always refer to the time 
use on a regular weekday. Separate estimations are run for the time use of those who were laid 
off and for their partners. Each model is run eight times since we define four treatment groups 
and we estimate the reaction of each spouse. We additionally run separate estimations for 
couples with and without children up to age 16, although in those cases, the treatment group 
only amounts to about half of its original size.  
As a robustness check, we “trim” the control group so as not to exceed the maximum or deceed 
the minimum (+ / - one standard deviation) of the treatment group covariates. In addition, we 
pool the datasets of treated men and women. In this case, we will distinguish between the 
reaction of the treated person and the reaction of the partner, irrespective of whether a man or 
a woman is laid off.  
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B.5.2 Results 
B.5.2.1 Difference-in-differences estimation 
Childcare 
The results obtained by the regular DID estimation are presented in tables B-4 to B-6.  
Table B-4:  Regular DID, plant closure, childcare 
Closure (men) Closure (women) 
  1 2 3 4 
childcare time of: men women men women 
treatment variable 0.193 * -0.123  0.035  0.188  
(0.115)  (0.242)  (0.094)  (0.219)  
household income (1000 €) -0.064 *** -0.142 *** -0.039 *** -0.087 *** 
(0.005)  (0.016)  (0.007)  (0.015)  
# children 0-3 0.907 *** 6.000 *** 0.933 *** 6.006 *** 
(0.031)  (0.095)  (0.032)  (0.100)  
# children 4-6 0.721 *** 3.093 *** 0.697 *** 3.116 *** 
(0.031)  (0.082)  (0.028)  (0.079)  
# children 7-12 0.519 *** 1.871 *** 0.484 *** 1.930 *** 
(0.018)  (0.048)  (0.017)  (0.046)  
# children 13-16 0.211 *** 0.617 *** 0.206 *** 0.630 *** 
(0.018)  (0.045)  (0.017)  (0.042)  
years of education (woman) 0.017 *** -0.057 *** 0.012 *** -0.059 *** 
(0.004)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.010)  
years of education  (man) -0.033 *** 0.042 *** -0.032 *** 0.029 *** 
(0.004)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.009)  
East-Germany 0.051 ** -0.650 *** 0.095 *** -0.614 *** 
(0.024)   (0.049)   (0.025)   (0.048)   
observations 53,696 53,677 59,345 59,332 
R-squared 0.218 0.513 0.202 0.5 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
The treatment effect of a plant closure affecting men is positive but only weakly significant for 
men (table B-4). The magnitude of the reaction is also small (about 12 minutes). The sign of 
the female change in childcare time is negative, but the effect is insignificant. If women are at 
risk, the effect on male childcare is not significant. The effect on women is positive but also 
insignificant. The covariates referring to the number of children in different age groups all have 
a positive effect on the childcare time of both men and women. The age group 0-3 shows the 
strongest impact, and the age group 13-16 shows the weakest. This is not surprising, since the 
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younger the child, the more care is necessary. One’s own years of education seem to be related 
to less childcare time, whereas the opposite is true for spousal education. Living in East 
Germany is significantly associated with less female childcare time both if men or women are 
at risk. This is expected, since in East Germany the use of institutional care, even for very young 
children, is much more common (and available) than in West Germany (e.g., Federal Statistical 
Office of Germany (2012)). For men, the opposite is true. They spend more time on childcare 
than do men in West Germany.  
If dismissals are included as a treatment, the effect of a shock affecting men significantly raises 
their childcare time. They spend about 22 additional minutes on childcare on weekdays. The 
effect on female childcare is negative but small and insignificant. Treatments affecting women 
do not have an impact on male childcare, but women (significantly) undertake almost an 
additional half-hour of childcare. Again, the coefficient of children in different age groups is 
smaller the older the children are. The effects of “living in East Germany” and education are 
comparable to the case of plant closures.5 
If only couples with children are included, the sample is reduced by roughly half. As expected, 
the effect of a plant closure on childcare time almost doubles to about 23 additional minutes a 
day (treatment group: men). Again, the effect is only weakly significant. It seems interesting 
that the female partners’ reaction now amounts to about 14 minutes less childcare time, but the 
effect still remains insignificant. The female years of education, in this case, raise female 
childcare time, as does male education. For men, there is a similar pattern as in the estimations 
described earlier. Women living in the east now spend more than two and a half hours less time 
on childcare, men only a few minutes. If women are potentially affected by a plant closure, their 
childcare time now increases by about 25 minutes, but this is not significant. The reaction of 
the male partners is positive and stronger than when childless couples are included, but it is not 
significant. The results concerning the covariates are comparable to those obtained if men are 
the treatment group. 
In summation, it is found that people adjust their childcare time to some extent when facing an 
employment shock. However, the change is significant and of a considerable extent only when 
dismissals are included as a treatment or if only couples with children are considered. As 
already mentioned, dismissals might be endogenous. The results gleaned if only couples with 
children are included should be interpreted with caution since, in this case, the treatment group 
is quite small.  
                                                 
5 We do not present the detailed results of those estimations since the inclusion of dismissals might cause an 
endogeneity problem. 
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What can be derived from these results? It seems that people show little change in their 
childcare time as a result of plant closures. There is some indication that people do not just 
allocate their time the way they do due to time constraints. The allocation of childcare within 
couples seems to be quite stable even if one partner has additional hours to allocate. 
Housework 
When housework is the dependent variable, the following results are found (table B-5). When 
men are the treatment group, closures significantly raise the time spent on housework. The same 
is true when including dismissals. The extent is, again, small. Men spend about 13 additional 
minutes on housework if closure is the treatment and about 22 more minutes if we include 
dismissals. In case of closures affecting men, there is almost no reaction from women; the effect 
is slightly positive but insignificant. If dismissals are included, the coefficient is small, negative 
and weakly significant. If women are the treatment group, closures do not have a significant 
effect on housework time, neither for men nor for women. If dismissals are included, the 
treatment does have an effect. Women then spend about an extra 30 minutes on housework. 
This coefficient is highly significant. Men do not show a reaction. The effect of children in 
different age groups is not as distinct as in the case of childcare. This is not surprising since the 
amount of housework does not depend on children’s needs in the same way childcare time does. 
When investigating male housework time, children seem to lower the time allocated to this 
activity. The descending order of the age groups remains when investigating the housework 
time of women though. In all cases, i.e., closures or also dismissals affecting men or women, 
female housework time is greater the younger the children. Children seem to lower male 
housework time but the extent only amounts to a maximum of about three minutes. The results 
also reveal a difference in housework time between those living in East and West Germany. 
Women who live in the east significantly spend about half an hour less on housework than do 
their counterparts in the west. The opposite is true for men, but here the coefficient is quite 
small (about 6 minutes a day).  
If we only consider couples with children below age 17, plant closures affecting men raise their 
housework time by about 9 minutes, though the effect is not significant. Men without children 
do about 19 extra minutes of housework in response to a plant closure (highly significant). The 
female partners do not show any considerable reaction to the employment shock affecting their 
male partners. If women are the treatment group, they increase their housework by 
approximately 8 minutes, but again, this is not significant. The reaction is somewhat stronger 
when only considering couples without children. At this point, it seems worth mentioning that 
in the GSOEP, there is no distinction between primary and secondary activities. It is therefore 
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possible that couples with children do some extra housework but report it as childcare time 
because they consider this to be the primary activity.6 
Table B-5:  DID estimation, plant closure, housework 
 Closure (men) Closure (women) 
  1 2 3 4 
housework time of … men women men women 
treatment variable 0.220 *** 0.035  0.057  0.195  
(0.066)  (0.108)  (0.069)  (0.141)  
household income (1000 €) -0.057 *** -0.112 *** -0.039 *** -0.053 *** 
(0.004)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.013)  
# children 0-3 -0.034 *** 1.05 *** -0.018  1.034 *** 
(0.013)  (0.028)  (0.012)  (0.029)  
# children 4-6 -0.020  0.73 *** -0.027 ** 0.749 *** 
(0.012)  (0.027)  (0.011)  (0.027)  
# children 7-12 -0.033 *** 0.635 *** -0.047 *** 0.636 *** 
(0.007)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.016)  
# children 13-16 -0.047 *** 0.529 *** -0.05 *** 0.529 *** 
(0.010)  (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.019)  
years of education (woman) 0.032 *** -0.12 *** 0.029 *** -0.132 *** 
(0.002)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.005)  
years of education  (man) -0.014 *** -0.006  -0.018 *** 0.006  
(0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.004)  
East-Germany 0.104 *** -0.586 *** 0.117 *** -0.609 *** 
(0.014)   (0.026)   (0.013)   (0.026)   
observations 53,691 53,578 59,340 59,218 
R-squared 0.025 0.228 0.026 0.209 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses       
Domestic Work 
Domestic work is defined as the sum of childcare time and housework time. Investigating the 
sum of these two seems prudent since, as discussed in the previous paragraph, both time uses 
are non-market work and one might do household chores while simultaneously supervising 
children. Designating an activity as childcare or housework is not always clear. The treatment 
effect approximately amounts to the sum of the two specific ones if men are affected by a 
closure (table B-6). They spend additional 25 minutes on domestic work. This is highly 
significant. Female partners’ reaction is still not significant and slightly negative. If women are 
                                                 
6 We do not discuss the results we get when we include dismissals as a potential treatment since those are not 
necessarily exogenous. This is discussed above. 
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at risk of facing a plant closure, the increase in domestic work by about 23 minutes is still not 
significant. The male reaction remains negligible. The other covariates limn a similar picture as 
already presented above. The numbers of children in different age groups again reveal, in a 
descending order, a positive coefficient in respect to housework time of both partners.  
Table B-6:  Regular DID, plant closure, domestic work 
 Closure (men)   Closure (women)  
  1   2   3   4   
domestic time of … men   women   men   women   
treatment variable 0.410 *** -0.105  0.092  0.382  
(0.149)  (0.284)  (0.132)  (0.286)  
household income 
(1000 €) 
-0.121 *** -0.252 *** -0.078 *** -0.139 *** 
(0.007)  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.026)  
# children 0-3 0.871 *** 7.062 *** 0.913 *** 7.054 *** 
(0.037)  (0.103)  (0.039)  (0.109)  
# children 4-6 0.703 *** 3.814 *** 0.671 *** 3.859 *** 
(0.037)  (0.091)  (0.034)  (0.088)  
# children 7-12 0.487 *** 2.509 *** 0.438 *** 2.565 *** 
(0.021)  (0.054)  (0.020)  (0.051)  
# children 13-16 0.164 *** 1.147 *** 0.156 *** 1.158 *** 
(0.022)  (0.053)  (0.021)  (0.050)  
years of education 
(woman) 
0.049 *** -0.176 *** 0.042 *** -0.191 *** 
(0.005)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.012)  
years of education  
(man) 
-0.047 *** 0.035 *** -0.049 *** 0.034 *** 
(0.005)  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.011)  
East-Germany 0.156 *** -1.237 *** 0.213 *** -1.223 *** 
(0.031)   (0.057)   (0.032)   (0.058)   
observations 53,684 53,558 59,334 59,202 
R-squared 0.147 0.503 0.142 0.483 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
The additional time spent on domestic work as an aggregate measure of home production 
amounts to almost half an hour a day. So while there is not a strong reaction to a plant closure 
in respect to the specific non-market time uses, there is a considerable reaction of men 
concerning non-market work. Since the reported effects relate to average weekdays, a reaction 
of 25 minutes a day approximately amounts to 2 hours a week, excluding weekends. But still, 
this might indicate that a main driver of intra-household time allocation are preferences. On 
average, irrespective of the current labor status, the male market work is reduced by slightly 
more than three hours in response to a plant closure. Note that those who are already working 
again are also included in this measure. Leisure time is, on average, increased by almost half 
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an hour. The total time reported is reduced by about one and a half hours, whereas those not 
affected by a treatment only show an average reduction of total time of about three minutes 
within one year. This reveals that time constraints are markedly loosened by a plant closure in 
the short term, but the additional time spent on domestic work only makes up a small part of 
the newfound time. What men use this time for remains unclear. Maybe they sleep more or use 
it for job search. The partner, however, does not react by changing his or her non-market work 
time to a noticeable extent. 
Repeated Cross-sections 
Using the repeated cross-sections model does not reveal large differences. The extent of the 
reactions is comparable to those obtained before. When dismissals are included as a treatment 
for men, the effect on female housework is highly significant. The extent is about the same. The 
effect on female domestic time is somewhat weaker but significant at the 5% level. Female 
domestic time is significantly (5%) raised in response to being laid off due to a plant closure, 
but the extent remains unchanged. 
B.5.2.2 Panel 
Childcare 
For men, closures seem to have a weak, increasing effect on childcare time on weekdays 
(table B-7). When using fixed effects and cluster-robust standard errors, the impact is weakly 
significant.  
For women, this effect is comparable but not significant. The spousal reactions are, again, weak 
and insignificant. The coefficients concerning children in different age groups also show similar 
effects as in regular DID. There is no significant effect of years of education. Still, the sign of 
the coefficients is as expected and the same as shown in the previous section. Living in the east 
also is insignificant. It is not surprising that those effects are not significant because we use 
fixed effects and those variables are not expected to vary greatly over time.  
For the model including dismissals, the results are as follows. The childcare of both men and 
women increases when affected by a treatment. The spousal reaction is not significant and very 
small in both cases. The rest of the results are similar to those of the consideration of closures 
only. Only the dummy for living in East Germany shows slightly different impacts in the case 
of men, but it is insignificant anyway. Note, again, that including dismissals might create a 
problem of endogeneity. 
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Table B-7:  Fixed Effects, plant closure, childcare7 
 Closure (men)   Closure (women)   
  1 2 3 4 
childcare time of … men women men women 
treatment variable 0.197 * -0.053  0.045  0.185  
(0.105)  (0.148)  (0.064)  (0.136)  
observations 33,985 33,971 37,862 37,851 
R-squared 0.077 0.306 0.075 0.294 
# of couples 6,721 6,719 7,452 7,451 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
If we only include those with children up to age 16, the results differ markedly. As before, this 
halves the sample size. If men are subject to plant closures, the treatment effect amounts to 
about 19 minutes (compared to 12 minutes as shown in table B-7) but it is no longer significant 
– not even weakly. Female partners insignificantly lower their childcare time by slightly more 
than nine minutes. This amount is also markedly higher than when including childless couples. 
If women are at risk of being affected by a plant closure, they do 21 additional minutes of 
childcare, but again, this is insignificant. The male reaction is also about twice as high as shown 
in table B-7, but there still is no significance. The reaction of both partners is approximately 
zero if only investigating those without young children.  
When not distinguishing between men and women being affected by a treatment, the results are 
as follows. Again, fixed effects are used. The results do not differ to a great extent from those 
obtained from the separate estimations. The treated person is the one whose reaction is 
somewhat stronger, and the partner almost does not change his or her time schedule at all. The 
effect of a closure is now significant at the 5% level, which can simply be ascribed to the larger 
treatment group. The extent of the effect is comparable, however. The coefficients of the 
included covariates show some differences. The children in different age groups reveal a 
stronger coefficient for male childcare time, but a weaker one for female childcare time. This 
is expected. For both treatment definitions, more years of education of the potentially treated 
person result in more childcare time of the partner. Solely investigating couples with children 
reveals stronger reactions, as expected. The partner affected by a closure spends about 21 
additional minutes on childcare. This effect is significant at the 5% level. The partner who is 
not treated somehow lowers his or her childcare time, but only by about 4 minutes, and the 
result is insignificant. 
                                                 
7 The complete results are presented in the appendix. 
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Housework 
Closures affecting men result in a significant rise in housework time of men, but again, they 
only spend about 14 additional minutes a day (table B-8). The female spouses do not noticeably 
change their housework time. If women are at risk of a plant closure, the treatment effect 
amounts to about 12 additional minutes of housework, but this is only weakly significant. Male 
spouses do not react noticeably by changing their housework time. If dismissals are also 
included as a treatment, male housework time is significantly raised by about 22 minutes. The 
reaction of female spouses is slightly negative and significant at the 5% level. If women are at 
risk, they significantly spend an extra half-hour on housework. Their male spouses do not vary 
their housework time. The covariates draw a similar picture as in the case of regular DID.  
Table B-8:  Fixed Effects, plant closure, housework8 
 Closure (men) Closure (women) 
  1 2 3 4 
housework time of : men women men women 
treatment variable 0.229 *** 0.047  0.060  0.201 * 
(0.063)  (0.073)  (0.053)  (0.116)  
observations 33,977 33,910 37,856 37,778 
R-squared 0.007 0.056 0.006 0.049 
# of couples 6,720 6,715 7,453 7,446 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
Solely including couples living with children up to age 16 reveals some differences. If men are 
subject to plant closures, they do an additional ten minutes of housework. This effect shows a 
weak significance. The change in housework of their female partners is negligible. If women 
are at risk, they raise their housework by about nine minutes, but again, this is not significant. 
The same is true for their partner’s reaction, which is even weaker. Again it is observed that the 
reactions are stronger when only including couples without children. As already mentioned, 
this could be due to the fact that for people with children, housework might be a secondary 
activity while they are watching the children.  
Plant closures in the pooled version result in a rise of the housework time of the treated person 
of about 13 minutes (highly significant), whereas the reaction of the partner is close to zero and 
also insignificant. Again, children in different age groups do raise the housework time of the 
treated person as well as that of the partner, but the size of the coefficient is not as large as that 
                                                 
8 The complete results are presented in the appendix. 
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in the case of childcare. Still, the younger the children, the greater the extent of the effect. One’s 
own years of education lower housework time while the partner’s education raises it, but this is 
not significant. The region in which the couple lives, as shown earlier in the case of fixed effects 
estimation, does not reveal any significant coefficient. The change in housework time if only 
couples with children are investigated is, again, smaller. An additional 10 minutes are spent on 
housework by the treated partner (weakly significant), whereas the change of the partner is 
negligible. 
Domestic work 
Adding the two time uses reveals a highly significant treatment effect of closures on male 
domestic work (table B-9). They spend additional 26 minutes on these activities. Again, this 
effect is about the same as the sum of the two separate effects. The women’s reaction is 
negligible. The effect on female domestic work if they are at risk of being laid off due a plant 
closure amounts to about 23 additional minutes. In contrast to the regular DID approach, the 
change in domestic work is weakly significant. The male partners do not display notable 
reactions.  
Table B-9:  Fixed Effects, plant closure, domestic work9 
 Closure (men) Closure (women) 
  1 2 3 4 
domestic time of:  men women men women 
treatment variable 0.427 *** -0.015  0.105  0.385 * 
(0.140)  (0.178)  (0.083)  (0.202)  
observations 33,973 33,897 37,851 37,766 
R-squared 0.048 0.31 0.047 0.293 
# of couples 6,720 6,714 7,452 7,445 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
Pooling the dataset reveals a treatment effect that lies between that for men and for women, 
which again is not surprising. The covariates do not reveal large differences to the 
aforementioned results. 
Robustness Checks 
The results concerning the treatment effect on childcare time do not essentially differ from those 
obtained by the fixed effects approach if we instead estimate in first differences. This is true for 
                                                 
9 The complete results are, again, presented in the appendix. 
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plant closures as well as for the “comprehensive” treatment. The extents slightly differ, but the 
picture drawn remains unchanged. The same is true for the estimations concerning housework 
time and domestic time. The control group is also trimmed so as not to exceed the maximum 
and not fall below the minimum (+/- one standard deviation) of the treatment group in respect 
to the covariates. Then fixed effects estimations are run. The results are comparable to those of 
the fixed effects estimation for the full sample.  
B.6 Conclusions 
This work investigates the question of how couples use their time when facing a negative 
employment shock. This shock can be a plant closure or a dismissal, noting that dismissals 
might be endogenous. The underlying question is whether people’s time allocation is due to 
time constraints or to preferences. This work concentrates on childcare and housework time as 
domestic work. Using the survey years 1992-2010 of the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP), it considers cohabiting couples at working age (25-59). We perform a difference-in-
differences approach. We also exploit the panel structure of the GSOEP and apply fixed effects 
estimations. All our results reveal that there is some reaction in the considered time uses of men 
and women, but the extent is low and the changes often are insignificant. This indicates that the 
time allocation of men and women represents their preferences to some extent. Even if men are 
facing a plant closure, they do not spend substantially more time on housework or childcare. If 
adding the two non-market time uses and analyzing the change in domestic work as an 
aggregate measure, male time devoted to non-market tasks is raised considerably. But relative 
to the total time that needs to be reallocated, this still is a small share. The female reaction 
almost always is not significant. 
The results support that male and female time allocation to domestic tasks is relatively stable if 
an employment shock occurs. On average, men have about three hours a day to reallocate if 
they have been facing a plant closure, from which they spend 25 minutes on additional domestic 
work as a reaction to this shock. Interestingly, partners do not react to a mentionable extent. 
There does not appear to be substantial substitution of domestic tasks between partners if one 
needs to reallocate his or her time. Overall, the time allocation within couples seems, in large 
part, to be the result of preferences rather than of time constraints. 
As robustness checks, we trimmed the sample and also performed first differences estimations 
instead of fixed effects. Both did not change the baseline of our results. We also pooled the 
samples of men and women. Doing this also did not result in new findings. 
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The distinction between families and childless couples reveals a stronger reaction of the treated 
person with respect to childcare, which is not surprising. The implications do not change, 
though. Childcare is not raised by more than 45 minutes a day. The effect on housework is 
weaker than when investigating families and childless couples altogether. This might be due to 
the fact that the GSOEP does not contain the information about primary and secondary 
activities. It is important to note that conditioning on the presence of children halves the sample 
sizes so that the results should be interpreted with caution.  
This analysis explores reactions in the short term. We only consider the time use in the year 
immediately after a person has been laid off. To investigate the effects in the long term, we 
would need more observations over a long time period for the treated group. We also do not 
distinguish between those already working again and those who are still unemployed. This is 
also due to data constraints since a plant closure is an infrequent event and we only observe 407 
(resp. 326) affected households in our sample. Further restrictions according to labor status 
would result in too few observations. This would also result in an endogeneity problem since 
the occupational status the year after the treatment cannot be considered exogenous. Over all, 
it is likely that we somehow underestimate the treatment effects.   
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B.7 Appendix 
Table A B-1:  Complete results – Basic Difference-in-differences, domestic work 
 Closure (men)   Closure (women)  
  1   2   3   4   
domestic time of … men   women   men   women   
treatment variable 0.410 *** -0.105  0.092  0.382  
(0.149)  (0.284)  (0.132)  (0.286)  
household income (1000 
€) 
-0.121 *** -0.252 *** -0.078 *** -0.139 *** 
(0.007)  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.026)  
# children 0-3 0.871 *** 7.062 *** 0.913 *** 7.054 *** 
(0.037)  (0.103)  (0.039)  (0.109)  
# children 4-6 0.703 *** 3.814 *** 0.671 *** 3.859 *** 
(0.037)  (0.091)  (0.034)  (0.088)  
# children 7-12 0.487 *** 2.509 *** 0.438 *** 2.565 *** 
(0.021)  (0.054)  (0.020)  (0.051)  
# children 13-16 0.164 *** 1.147 *** 0.156 *** 1.158 *** 
(0.022)  (0.053)  (0.021)  (0.050)  
years of education 
(woman) 
0.049 *** -0.176 *** 0.042 *** -0.191 *** 
(0.005)  (0.012)  (0.005)  (0.012)  
years of education  (man) -0.047 *** 0.035 *** -0.049 *** 0.034 *** 
(0.005)  (0.011)  (0.005)  (0.011)  
East-Germany 0.156 *** -1.237 *** 0.213 *** -1.223 *** 
(0.031)   (0.057)   (0.032)   (0.058)   
observations 53,682 53,556 59,332 59,200 
R-squared 0.147 0.503 0.142 0.483 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A B-2:  Results if only couples with children up to age 16 are included – effects on 
childcare time 
  Closure (men) Closure (women) 
 1 2 3 4 
childcare time of: men women men women 
treatment variable 0.380 * -0.231  0.139  0.411  
(0.217)  (0.458)  (0.180)  (0.441)  
household income (1000 €) -0.102 *** -0.226 *** -0.109 *** -0.211 *** 
(0.011)  (0.032)  (0.010)  (0.031)  
years of education (woman) 0.056 *** 0.087 *** 0.056 *** 0.093 *** 
(0.007)  (0.018)  (0.007)  (0.018)  
years of education  (man) -0.035 *** 0.190 *** -0.031 *** 0.158 *** 
(0.006)  (0.018)  (0.006)  (0.016)  
East-Germany -0.114 ** -2.660 *** -0.066  -2.61 *** 
(0.046)   (0.105)   (0.048)   (0.100)   
observations 29,449 29,434 32,084 32,075 
R-squared 0.065 0.211 0.061 0.201 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
Table A B-3:  Results if only couples with children up to age 16 are included – effects on 
housework time 
 Closure (men) Closure (women) 
  1 2 3 4 
housework time of … men women men women 
treatment variable 0.144  0.015  0.075  0.137  
(0.095)  (0.163)  (0.097)  (0.213)  
household income (1000 €) -0.048 *** -0.106 *** -0.053 *** -0.096 *** 
(0.005)  (0.014)  (0.004)  (0.011)  
years of education (woman) 0.035 *** -0.116 *** 0.031 *** -0.115 *** 
(0.003)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.007)  
years of education  (man) -0.017 *** 0.016 ** -0.013 *** 0.026 *** 
(0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.006)  
East-Germany 0.173 *** -0.89 *** 0.15 *** -0.967 *** 
(0.019)   (0.042)   (0.018)   (0.039)   
observations 29,444 29,355 32,079 31,988 
R-squared 0.027 0.092 0.029 0.090 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A B-4:  Results if only couples with children up to age 16 are included – effects on 
domestic work 
 Closure (men) Closure (women) 
  1 2 3 4 
domestic time of … men women men women 
treatment variable 0.519 * -0.237  0.213  0.547  
(0.270)  (0.531)  (0.238)  (0.553)  
household income (1000 
€) 
-0.150 *** -0.332 *** -0.161 *** -0.306 *** 
(0.014)  (0.040)  (0.012)  (0.035)  
years of education 
(woman) 
0.091 *** -0.028  0.087 *** -0.020  
(0.008)  (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.021)  
years of education  (man) -0.053 *** 0.206 *** -0.044 *** 0.184 *** 
(0.008)  (0.020)  (0.007)  (0.019)  
East-Germany 0.062  -3.549 *** 0.086  -3.571 *** 
(0.055)   (0.123)   (0.055)   (0.118)   
observations 29,437 29,339 32,073 31,977 
R-squared 0.058 0.181 0.059 0.168 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A B-5:  Results Fixed Effect – closure, childcare time 
 Closure (men)   Closure (women)   
  1 2 3 4 
childcare time of … men women men women 
treatment variable 0.197 * -0.053  0.045  0.185  
(0.105)  (0.148)  (0.064)  (0.136)  
household income (1000 €) -0.033 *** -0.128 *** -0.011 ** -0.034 ** 
(0.009)  (0.026)  (0.005)  (0.014)  
# children 0-3 0.839 *** 5.634 *** 0.882 *** 5.642 *** 
(0.041)  (0.130)  (0.043)  (0.130)  
# children 4-6 0.653 *** 2.921 *** 0.662 *** 2.946 *** 
(0.035)  (0.100)  (0.034)  (0.098)  
# children 7-12 0.524 *** 1.968 *** 0.512 *** 2.049 *** 
(0.028)  (0.071)  (0.025)  (0.068)  
# children 13-16 0.286 *** 0.964 *** 0.294 *** 1.009 *** 
(0.025)  (0.057)  (0.024)  (0.054)  
years of education (woman) 0.019  -0.014  0.016  -0.009  
(0.022)  (0.058)  (0.023)  (0.056)  
years of education  (man) -0.006  0.076 * -0.022  0.033  
(0.015)  (0.044)  (0.016)  (0.045)  
East-Germany 0.029  -0.000  0.235  -0.035  
(0.162)   (0.671)   (0.351)   (0.664)   
observations 33,985 33,971 37,862 37,851 
R-squared 0.077 0.306 0.075 0.294 
# of couples 6,721 6,719 7,452 7,451 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A B-6:  Results Fixed Effect – closure, housework time 
 Closure (men) Closure (women) 
  1 2 3 4 
housework time of : men women men women 
treatment variable 0.229 *** 0.047  0.060  0.201 * 
(0.063)  (0.073)  (0.053)  (0.116)  
household income (1000 €) -0.022 *** -0.034 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 * 
(0.006)  (0.012)  (0.004)  (0.006)  
# children 0-3 -0.035 ** 0.847 *** -0.026  0.8 *** 
(0.016)  (0.037)  (0.016)  (0.035)  
# children 4-6 -0.019  0.511 *** -0.021  0.499 *** 
(0.015)  (0.034)  (0.014)  (0.032)  
# children 7-12 -0.011  0.375 *** -0.013  0.359 *** 
(0.012)  (0.026)  (0.011)  (0.024)  
# children 13-16 -0.003  0.247 *** -0.001  0.236 *** 
(0.014)  (0.026)  (0.012)  (0.024)  
years of education (woman) -0.017  0.013  -0.008  0.002  
(0.012)  (0.022)  (0.010)  (0.021)  
years of education  (man) -0.030 *** 0.023  -0.026 *** 0.025  
(0.010)  (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.019)  
East-Germany 0.175 *** -0.137  0.212 *** -0.227  
(0.059)   (0.173)   (0.067)   (0.156)   
observations 33,977 33,910 37,856 37,778 
R-squared 0.007 0.056 0.006 0.049 
# of couples 6,720 6,715 7,453 7,446 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table A B-7:  Results Fixed Effect – closure, domestic work 
 Closure (men) Closure (women) 
  1 2 3 4 
domestic time of:  men women men women 
treatment variable 0.427 *** -0.015  0.105  0.385 * 
(0.140)  (0.178)  (0.083)  (0.202)  
household income (1000 €) -0.055 *** -0.161 *** -0.022 *** -0.043 ** 
(0.011)  (0.031)  (0.008)  (0.017)  
# children 0-3 0.804 *** 6.492 *** 0.857 *** 6.446 *** 
(0.048)  (0.144)  (0.050)  (0.143)  
# children 4-6 0.635 *** 3.427 *** 0.641 *** 3.434 *** 
(0.043)  (0.112)  (0.040)  (0.109)  
# children 7-12 0.514 *** 2.34 *** 0.499 *** 2.399 *** 
(0.034)  (0.081)  (0.030)  (0.077)  
# children 13-16 0.284 *** 1.211 *** 0.293 *** 1.24 *** 
(0.032)  (0.066)  (0.030)  (0.064)  
years of education (woman) 0.002  -0.004  0.007  -0.007  
(0.027)  (0.066)  (0.028)  (0.065)  
years of education  (man) -0.036 * 0.095 * -0.049 ** 0.056  
(0.019)  (0.051)  (0.019)  (0.053)  
East-Germany 0.204  -0.141  0.449  -0.263  
(0.176)   (0.762)   (0.360)   (0.732)   
observations 33,973 33,897 37,851 37,766 
R-squared 0.048 0.31 0.047 0.293 
# of couples 6,720 6,714 7,452 7,445 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2010, own calculations. 
robust standard errors in parentheses 
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C Occupational prestige: Is there a career 
penalty for birth-related career interruptions 
in Germany? 
 
Katharina Sutter 
 
C.1 Introduction 
The reconciliation of work and family life in Germany is a topic that is often discussed in 
economic literature and political discourse (e.g., Spieß (2011)). One reason for this is the 
demographic change Germany is experiencing. The proportion of the elderly in the population 
is increasing (e.g., European Commission (2014)). This has far reaching consequences for the 
social security system as well as for economic growth (e.g., OECD (2014), European 
Commission (2012)). Women are therefore an important source of human capital (e.g., 
Reinberg and Hummel (2003), OECD (2014)). However, a large share of mothers who are in 
the labor force only work part-time (e.g., Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2012)) and 
women only make up a minor part of executive positions while they account for approximately 
50% of university graduates today (e.g., Holst and Schimenta (2013), Holst and Wiemer 
(2010)). A female quota for those positions is often brought up in political discourse (e.g., Holst 
and Schimenta (2013)). 
Several instruments have been implemented in the recent decades to provide opportunities for 
mothers to stay attached to the labor market to a greater extent. One example is the 
implementation of the “Elterngeld” in 2007 (e.g., German Bundestag (2006)), another is the 
legal right to daycare for children aged at least one year implemented in 2013 (e.g., German 
Bundestag (2008)). All of these measures are intended to make work and family obligations 
compatible. But aside from simply participating in paid labor, there is another important aspect, 
namely occupational prestige (i.e., powerful positions) and upward occupational mobility (also 
see Mandel and Semyonov (2006)).  
The present study focuses on the following question: Is there a career penalty for employment 
interruptions linked to childbirth? In this context, the wage penalty for motherhood is often 
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discussed (e.g., Budig and England (2001)), but this is only part of the story. One might ask 
whether this wage penalty is, in part, the result of a prestige penalty. In this paper, I ask whether 
this prestige penalty exists in Germany. I investigate whether the duration of the first career 
interruption related to childbirth has an effect on occupational prestige as well as on upward 
and downward occupational mobility. The prestige is measured using the Treiman prestige 
scale (SIOPS). The study focuses on mothers at working age (20-59 years) who give birth to 
their first child during the observation period and who have been working the year prior to the 
first birth. The effect of leave length is identified using a selection model according to Heckman. 
The selection equation displays the likelihood of observing the prestige information after birth, 
i.e., the re-entry behavior, while the second step displays occupational prestige. I consider two 
versions of the second step. The first version uses the level of the occupational prestige as a 
dependent variable, the second version uses a binary variable indicating an upward/downward 
occupational move of at least 10% compared to the SIOPS level prior to the first birth or 
subsequent increases resp. declines. I use regular Heckman models as well as an approach 
suggested by Wooldridge (1995) correcting for the potential selection bias. 
I contribute to the existing literature by using the German Socio-Economic Panel (1992-2012)1 
to provide further evidence for the case of Germany and by explicitly taking selection into 
account. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section C.2 contains an 
overview of the existing literature. In the third chapter, the data and the sample are described. 
Descriptive statistics are presented in section C.4. Subsequently, the empirical strategy is 
explained and the results are discussed. The last chapter offers conclusions derived herein. 
C.2 Literature Review 
There is a broad body of literature on the wage penalty for motherhood (e.g., Kühhirt and 
Ludwig (2012), Napari (2010), Gangl and Ziefle (2009) or Budig and England (2001)) as well 
as on the re-entry behavior of mothers (e.g., Lalive et al. (2011), Burgess et al. (2008), 
Pylkkänen and Smith (2004) or Ondrich et al. (2003)). The research question of this study 
induces to focus on the literature about the career penalty in terms of occupational prestige.  
One of the most often cited papers explicitly investigating the prestige penalty for motherhood 
is that of Aisenbrey et al. (2009). They analyze Sweden, the United States and Germany using 
Hazard Rate Models (piecewise constant exponential models as well as Cox proportional hazard 
models). In the case of the United States, they find a lower upward mobility but an increased 
downward mobility following time outs. In Sweden, their results reveal a lower upward 
                                                 
1 For a description, see Wagner et al. (2007). 
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mobility if the career interruption is longer than 15 months. If career interruptions are long in 
Germany, mothers’ careers are destabilized in general. The probability of a downward or 
upward move increases with longer leaves. Focusing on Sweden, Evertsson and Duvander 
(2011) investigate the effect of the duration of maternity leave on upward occupational mobility 
(Swedish Level of Living Survey (LNU), 1991-2000). First, they estimate the probability of 
taking a leave of more than 15 months using a probit model. As a second step, they apply a 
hazard model to obtain the rate of an upward occupational move after re-entering the labor 
market. In addition, a joint model controlling for unobserved time-constant heterogeneity is 
estimated to account for the selectivity into long or short leaves. Women taking longer leaves 
are found to be less likely to experience an upward occupational move.  
In an event history framework, Jonsson and Mills (2001) examine the occupational mobility of 
Swedish mothers after they return to the labor market, but they only investigate the first 
“postbirth job”. They discuss the role of the duration of absence from work in the occupational 
career of mothers, mentioning several reasons for career penalties for long time outs, namely 
human capital depreciation, availability and social networks.2 The authors ask whether the 
duration of the absence has an influence on the occupational prestige upon return to the labor 
market. It apparently does for those who choose to take parental leave but not for those who 
choose to exit the labor market. Highly educated mothers have a higher chance of an upward 
move. The authors also mention that a causal effect might not be identified due to selection into 
longer or shorter time outs.  
Kubis et al. (2009) ask whether the wages and the occupational prestige differ between mothers 
and childless women. They use the survey years 1992-2007 of the German Socio-Economic 
Panel and apply fixed effects models. They find differences between mothers and childless 
women for both indicators. Malo and Muñoz-Bullón (2008) use the British Household Panel 
Survey and investigate whether work interruptions affect mothers’ subsequent careers using 
standard OLS regressions. In a first step, the authors do not control for endogeneity and find a 
negative effect of family-related time outs on occupational prestige. They argue that the jobs 
held prior to family-related interruptions might be chosen according to the expectations of those 
interruptions. This means that women who anticipate an interruption choose a lower-prestige 
job. Their results confirm this argument. A somewhat older paper considering data about British 
women (Social Change and Economic Life Initiative (SCELI)) is Jacobs (1997). She uses 
logistic regressions and finds that shorter career interruptions related to birth combined with 
                                                 
2 For a description, see Jonsson and Mills (2001). 
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returning to full-time work are associated with a higher probability of keeping one’s pre-birth 
occupational status. High education also is advantageous for maintaining the pre-birth status.  
Several other papers also investigate questions similar to my research question, even though 
their focus often differs. One paper that is important to mention is Evertsson and Grunow 
(2012). They investigate career interruptions not only due to childbearing but also due to 
homemaking, unemployment or other reasons using Cox proportional hazard models. The 
authors compare women with continuous careers to those with discontinuous careers in 
Germany (German Life History Study (GLHS), West) and Sweden (LNU), two countries with 
rather different family policies. They do not find an effect of career interruptions on upward 
occupational mobility in Germany, whereas in Sweden, longer family breaks (accumulated) 
decrease the likelihood of an upward move. It should be noted that overall occupational 
mobility is higher in Sweden and almost all women work, so that a longer interruption might 
have a more negative effect than in Germany. In Germany, unemployment turns out to be a 
driver of downward occupational mobility. Judiesch and Jyness (1999) investigate the 
connection between leaves of absence and the career success of managers. Their data is from a 
financial services organization (1990–1995). They run hierarchical logistic regressions with 
promotion being the dependent variable. They find that leaves, irrespective of their reason and 
of gender, are linked to fewer promotions. 
Grunow et al. (2011) investigate the reconciliation of career and family in Germany (GLHS 
West), USA (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY)) and Sweden (LNU) 
distinguishing between different levels of education. They investigate the duration of career 
interruptions, whether mothers re-enter on the same prestige level as they had prior to the birth 
and whether they are able to keep this level in subsequent years. The authors use multivariate 
Cox models. In the case of Germany, they find that highly educated mothers perform better in 
respect to keeping their prestige level as compared to low or middle educated women. 
Ochsenfeld (2012) specifically considers management positions using the HIS Graduate Panel 
of 1997. He gives two explanations for women’s underrepresentation in those occupations. The 
first is self-selection into specific paths of study and the second reason is that family obligations 
differ between genders. The author estimates Logit models as well as linear probability models 
with “having a managerial position” as the binary dependent variable. The estimations reveal 
that for women motherhood is associated with about half of the likelihood of obtaining such a 
position ten years after graduation. There is no such effect of fatherhood found for men. 
McIntosh et al. (2012) investigate the career progression of nurses in particular, a rather female-
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dominated occupation. They find career interruptions of more than two years to be detrimental 
for mothers’ career progress. 
Dex et al. (2008) analyze whether the likelihood of a downward occupational move has changed 
over time. The authors use logistic regressions. The results concerning the job after a career 
interruption indicate that downward occupational mobility has decreased over the cohorts that 
are subject to the analysis if mothers return to full-time employment but has increased if 
mothers return to part-time work. Taking longer career breaks is associated with an increasing 
downward occupational mobility over time as well. The authors also look at the occupational 
mobility after mothers have already returned to the labor market. The youngest cohort under 
examination experienced the highest probability of an upward move upon return. However, 
downward mobility did not decline over the cohorts. 
Kahn et al. (2014) examine wages, labor force participation and occupational status. They ask 
whether motherhood penalties change over mothers’ life-course. They use the National 
Longitudinal Survey of Young Women and take into account the age range of the 20s through 
the 50s. Using fixed effects models, they find that motherhood is penalized in respect to the 
three mentioned outcomes but that this penalty diminishes in the 30s and 40s.  
Downward occupational mobility in Spain is investigated in a study written by Gutierrez-
Domenech (2002) who focuses on the re-entry behavior of Spanish mothers. The lack of 
downward mobility in Spain is explained by the fact that part-time jobs are rare in Spain and 
therefore no significant downward mobility can be observed for those mothers who return to 
the labor market rather than remaining non-employed. It is worth mentioning that the author 
uses a rather rudimentary definition of occupational mobility. 
Granqvist and Persson (2005) explicitly ask about the different occupational mobility of men 
and women in Sweden (LNU). They also conduct event history analyses. The authors make use 
of a piecewise constant exponential hazard model. They do find differences between men and 
women. Men are about twice as likely to get a better job as women. The effect is not as clear if 
the employees have more than 12 years of education. Granqvist and Persson (2005) also argue 
that the difference can partly to be attributed to home-related obligations, which lower women’s 
chances on the labor market. Interestingly, parental leave does not seem to have any effect. The 
authors explain this by the fact that leave taking is common in Sweden and therefore it does not 
signal anything to a (potential) employer. They conclude that the negative effect of children 
reflects the negative effect of part-time work.  
Mandel and Semyonov (2006) ask about the role of the welfare state when it comes to women’s 
employment participation and occupational positions. They analyze 22 industrialized countries. 
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Their results show that mothers in countries with progressive welfare systems are 
underrepresented in managerial positions. 
This review reveals that, overall, birth-related career interruptions seem to destabilize mothers’ 
careers. But negative effects of time outs probably diminish with age, exist irrespective of 
whether the interruption is family-related and depend on the level of education of the women. 
The selectivity into certain occupations and into long or short leaves also seems to be relevant. 
The contribution of this paper is that it provides further evidence for possible career penalties 
for career interruptions due to childbirth in Germany. To the best of my knowledge, there has 
not been another study investigating this exact question using this data and this method. Most 
studies concerning Germany concentrate on the German Life History Study (e.g., Aisenbrey et 
al. (2009), Evertsson and Grunow (2012)). The study by Ochsenfeld (2012) uses the HIS 
Graduate Panel of 1997. I first investigate the probability of observing positive SIOPS 
information for mothers, i.e., the probability of participating in the labor market after the first 
childbirth. In the second step, I investigate the effect of leave duration on the prestige level as 
well as on the probability of experiencing an upward or downward occupational move 
compared to the SIOPS level prior the first birth. 
C.3 Data 
I use the German Socio-Economic Panel.3 For the purpose of this paper, this dataset is more 
favorable than other datasets, e.g., the German Life History Study (GLHS4). The main reason 
is that the GSOEP is not restricted to several birth cohorts. Therefore I do not only have 
information until the birth cohort of 1971 as in the GLHS, but rather until to the late 1980s. The 
HIS Graduate Panel only contains people with a degree qualifying for a profession (e.g., 
Ochsenfeld (2012)). In addition, the graduates are only interviewed three times tops up to ten 
years after graduation. The GSOEP does not have these restrictions.  
I include the survey years 1992 - 2012. The sample is restricted to women at age 20 to 59. Even 
in those cases where men take parental leave, they only take a small share of the maximum of 
14 months (e.g., Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2013)). Teenage mothers are excluded 
since they are considered special cases. New mothers are included as long as they are at working 
age. If they are older than 59 years, they are dropped. The sample contains women between the 
ages of 20 and 59 between 1992 and 2012 and who gave birth to their first child within this 
                                                 
3 For a description of this very rich panel dataset, see Wagner et al. (2007). 
4 E.g., Mayer (2008). 
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observation period. I do not observe all births for all mothers and not all returns to the labor 
market. The sample is further restricted to those for whom I observe the first return to the labor 
market.  
I want to show effects of the duration of the first time out from the labor market mothers take 
in connection with their first childbirth. For time out duration, I use the calendar information of 
the GSOEP. These provide information about leave behavior as well as about housewife and 
unemployment periods. The information is on a monthly basis. The leave variable can be 
defined in two different ways. One definition contains maternity leave periods only. The other 
also considers housewife periods, unemployment and simply “not being employed” as time out. 
I focus on this more comprehensive definition. It is important to note that the time out has to 
have started in connection with the first childbirth. I later control for the presence of subsequent 
career interruptions that might occur, e.g., due to a second childbirth.  
In the estimations, I condition on whether a mother has reported to be employed at an interview 
that took place within 12 months prior to the first birth. I include single mothers as well as 
mothers living in couples. I exclude mothers if they are in short-time work, in vocational 
training, in a sheltered workshop or near retirement. For some mothers, no interview is available 
for the year they gave birth to their first child. I have no information about any leave or its 
duration for this group, so they are not included in the sample. I also drop those for whom I 
have no information about the year of birth of the first child in the biography data. I do not keep 
mothers for whom there is a gap during the period of the time out because I cannot identify 
changes in labor status. 
The SIOPS scale is based on the ISCO88 categories of occupations (Ganzeboom and Treiman 
(1996)). A first version, developed by Treiman (1977), was based on ISCO68. He transformed 
national prestige scales into one standardized scale, the Standard International Occupational 
Prestige Scale (SIOPS) (Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996)). This scale only contains information 
about the social prestige of an occupation, not about the socio-economic factors education and 
income as does the ISEI index (e.g., Ganzeboom and Treiman (1996)).  
The sample consists of 1,588 women who became mothers during the years 1992 through 2012 
and for whom I observe the information for the year of the first birth; 1,088 of them have been 
working the year prior to the first birth. Of those, 1,087 took some leave and 838 re-entered the 
labor market at some point during the observation period. This is the estimation sample. 
Although this is not an extremely large sample, the number still is high enough to perform 
reasonable estimations.5   
                                                 
5 If childless women are included, 806 of 2,004 interrupt their career and for 294 the return is observed. 
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C.4 Descriptive Analysis  
1,376 of the 1,588 observed new mothers were living with a partner in the year of the first birth. 
Only a small share did not live with a partner. Some mothers had a partner who was not living 
in the same household. It is worth mentioning that I do not control for whether the partner living 
in the same household is the father or not. In the estimations, I control for the number of children 
in different age groups living in the household. This is reasonable since further children may 
yield further employment interruptions or postponement of re-entry into the labor market. The 
women in the sample have up to six children. 
An upward occupational move is considered to be an upward change of at least 10% in respect 
to occupational prestige prior to first birth. Accordingly, a downward move is considered a 
downward change of at least 10%. A 10% change in occupational prestige does not necessarily 
mean the same change in terms of “scale points” for all mothers. This is done for the same 
reason as mentioned by Aisenbrey et al. (2009): A change of one point does not really imply a 
change in prestige on a scale that is so strongly subdivided. Using a 10% change is common in 
the literature (e.g., Aisenbrey et al. (2009), Evertsson and Grunow (2012)). An alternative is to 
use a change of five scale points, as done in Jonsson and Mills (2001). One can use different 
points in time as a reference to define occupational mobility. The first definition is the mobility 
within one year, given the mother participates again. The second definition takes the year prior 
to the first birth as a reference point, and the third definition takes the SIOPS value of the first 
job after the time out as a reference. Another interesting point is whether mothers manage to 
keep a once gained upward move or not. I focus on the reference year “prior to first birth” and 
investigate the probability of achieving a more resp. less prestigious job upon return to the labor 
market and of further mobility of the same direction.  
The mean SIOPS of mothers amounts to 46 in the year prior to their first birth for those who 
work the year before (table C-1). If the total time out after first birth does not exceed 12 months, 
the SIOPS in the year of the return on average amounts to 47. This group consists of 196 
mothers. This is an initial indicator that those mothers returning quickly manage to keep their 
previous position. This result is not surprising since one would expect that those mothers who 
return soon after childbirth are those with a high labor market commitment and that those are 
the women who might have focused on building a career in the first place. Those who return in 
the second year after childbirth (time out of 13 – 24 months, 297 mothers) re-enter on average 
to a job with 45 points on the SIOPS scale. The 112 mothers returning between 25 and 36 
months after birth reach an average of 44 and those re-entering even later reach an average of 
42 points. If the first leave is longer than 72 months, the SIOPS at re-entry amounts to 39. When 
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looking at the SIOPS information prior to the first birth, it turns out that this value tends to be 
lower for those who take longer time outs. This indicates self-selection into certain occupations, 
which is also mentioned in some part of the literature (e.g., Evertsson and Duvander (2011), 
Jonsson and Mills (2001)). 
Table C-1:  Basic SIOPS information for mothers working the year before first birth 
  SIOPS scale 
group # mothers prior birth at return 
working, year of birth – 1 1088 46 - 
time out  12 months 196 49 47 
12 < time out  24 months 297 46 45 
24 < time out  36 months 112 46 45 
time out > 36 233 44 42 
time out > 72 62 42 39 
for comparison: # women SIOPS scale 
childless, no interruption, mean 3182 46 
…, interruption, now working, mean 1672 44 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
Table C-2 shows the occupational mobility of mothers and childless women within the 
timeframe between two interviews, which is approximately one year, as well as the 
occupational mobility in respect to the SIOPS value reported in the year prior to the first birth. 
It is worth mentioning that for childless women with an employment interruption, only the years 
they reported being employed are used in Table C-2. It turns out that about 17% of mothers re-
entering within one year after first birth experience an upward move compared to their SIOPS 
before the first birth. About 22% experience a downward move. The proportion of those 
experiencing an upward move is smaller than the share of those experiencing a downward move 
in the group that re-enters within the first year. The upward as well as the downward mobility 
of childless women who interrupt their employment is somewhat higher than that of new 
mothers who return to work within one year, noting that the difference is more distinct for 
upward mobility. It is interesting to see that among childless women who do not interrupt their 
working career, only 14% experience an upward move, while 13% experience a downward 
move within one year. Twenty-five percent (23%) of the childless women who do interrupt 
their career experience an upward (downward) move. Taking these two groups together reveals 
that only about 18% (16%) experience an upward (downward) move during the observed 
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period. If mothers re-enter within the second year after first birth, about 19% manage to make 
an upward occupational move, 23% undergo a downward move compared to the prestige prior 
to first birth. Of those re-entering in the third year, 23% (26%) move up (down) compared to 
their pre-birth level. Twenty-one percent of the mothers returning after the oldest child is in 
school, namely after more than six years, experience an upward move, while 36% of this group 
move down the prestige scale. At first glance, it appears that mobility is higher for mothers, 
irrespective of time out duration, than for childless women without any interruptions. The same 
is true for women who interrupt due to other reasons. Further, mothers whose time out exceeds 
six years show a higher downward mobility and a lower upward mobility than childless women 
with interruptions. It seems that interruptions, irrespective of their reason, seem to destabilize 
women’s careers. But those who became mothers experience an upward move less often than 
do those who have interrupted their career due to other reasons. 
Table C-2:  Occupational mobility and duration of time out 
  
mobility within one year 
mobility compared to 
SIOPS prior first birth 
group mothers  %  %  %  % 
timeout  12 196 36 18.4 40 20.4 34 17.3 43 21.9 
12 < timeout  24 297 50 16.8 52 17.5 57 19.2 67 22.6 
24 < timeout  36 112 28 25.0 21 18.8 26 23.2 29 25.9 
timeout > 72 62 13 21.0 11 17.7 13 21.0 22 35.5 
for comparison: women  %  %     
childless, no break 3182 451 14.2 406 12.8 n.a. n.a. 
childless, break 1672 419 25.1 384 23.0 n.a. n.a. 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
When investigating occupational prestige it is relevant to consider whether mothers return to 
part-time or full-time employment. Therefore, table C-3 shows some information about the 
covariates used in the estimations. Mothers are, on average, 28 years old when their first child 
is born. When they return, they are on average 31 years old. Almost 75% of all new mothers 
return to the labor market before their second child is born. Another 15% return after their 
second child is born. Only approximately 1% returns after the third or higher order birth. 
Approximately 23% live in East Germany. About 83% live with a partner the year before birth; 
when returning, this share amounts to almost 94%. In the year prior to their first birth, about 
87% of new mothers are working full-time, 8% are working part-time and only 2% are 
marginally employed. When returning, only 21% are working full-time while 55% have 
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returned to part-time work. Another 24% return to marginal employment. This offers a 
preliminary insight to the re-entry behavior of German mothers since the largest share of 
mothers return to part-time work instead of full-time work. 
Table C-3:  sample means – year before first birth, year of the first return to the labor market 
 Year before first birth6 Year of reentry 
variable mean sd N mean sd N 
age (year of first birth) 28.601 4.031 741 31.449 4.368 741 
years of education 12.987 2.580 707 13.082 2.601 717 
return after first birth 0.743 0.437 731 0.742 0.438 741 
… second birth 0.150 0.358 731 0.150 0.357 741 
… third or higher order birth 0.008 0.090 731 0.009 0.097 741 
East Germany 0.233 0.423 731 0.235 0.424 741 
partner 0.825 0.381 713 0.936 0.244 730 
working full time 0.874 0.332 731 0.212 0.409 741 
working part time 0.077 0.266 731 0.548 0.498 741 
marginal employment 0.019 0.137 731 0.240 0.428 741 
children 0-3 0.000 0.000 727 0.819 0.444 737 
children 4-6 0.003 0.052 727 0.273 0.503 737 
children 7-12 0.004 0.064 727 0.080 0.304 737 
children 13-16 0.001 0.037 727 0.011 0.103 737 
experience full time 6.207 4.109 731 7.264 4.235 741 
experience part time 0.707 1.653 731 1.320 1.846 741 
multigenerational household 0.003 0.052 731 0.009 0.097 741 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
There are no children in the youngest age group (age 0-3) living in the household the year before 
first birth. But for older age groups, the means are not zero. These children therefore are not 
biological children of the interviewed woman7. Only 0.3% of women are living in a 
multigenerational household the year prior first birth. Though this share has tripled at return, it 
still only amounts to approximately 1%. Before birth, women on average have gained about 6 
years of full-time labor market experience and about 0.7 years of part-time experience. Since 
                                                 
6 This is the calendar year prior the first birth, not the last 12 months. 
7 The variable that identifies the mother-child relationship refers to “social mothers”, who, in rare cases might not 
the biological mother (e.g., SOEP documentation).  
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these values refer to the year prior first birth, women might gain a view more months of 
experience until they start their time out due to childbirth. In addition, they might already have 
returned several months before being interviewed. 
Figure C-1 shows the SIOPS of mothers during the years after the first re-entry. I am able to 
analyze the occupational mobility of mothers after they have returned to the labor market for 
the first time. It seems that when mothers return to the labor market, they do not show a 
considerably lower SIOPS level than childless women without any interruptions. However, up 
to 10 years after return, mothers show a slightly lower level than do childless women.8 From 
this time on, mothers with one child show an increase while mothers of two or more children 
fail to keep pace with their childless counterparts.  
Figure C-1:  SIOPS after return to the labor market9 
Overall, mothers show more occupational mobility, upward as well as downward, while 
childless women without any interruptions show virtually no change over time. It is important 
to note that the group sizes for mothers are quite small after about 10 years after return to the 
labor market due to such factors as panel attrition. For example, the peak that shows up 18 years 
after first return for mothers of one child only represents two mothers.10 For childless women 
                                                 
8 Note that fertility is not completed in all cases. The biography information is only available up to the latest update.  
9 The proportion of mothers who are working can be found in the appendix (figure A C-1). 
10 The number of women represented in the graphs is shown in the appendix (table A C-2). 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations
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who interrupt their working career, there appears a greater occupational mobility after return as 
well. 
Figure C-2:  SIOPS according to maternity leave length 
A comparison of the SIOPS path according to different leave lengths is shown in Figure C-2. 
There is an obvious difference between those returning within one year and those taking a 
longer time out. In addition, a further difference becomes apparent between 13-36 months or 
37-72 months. Time outs lasting longer are associated with an even lower SIOPS value. Of 
course these are selective groups since longer leave is associated with lower labor market 
commitment and these women are expected to be less career-oriented than women who quickly 
return to the labor market. They therefore are expected to already show a lower SIOPS level 
prior to first birth. After about 16 years following the first birth, the SIOPS value of the groups 
13-36 months and 37-72 months declines further. Again, the group sizes are small, so that this 
figure should not be overly interpreted as revealing a career penalty due to leave taking.11 But 
is there a prestige penalty for longer time outs or are the displayed differences attributed to other 
factors, such as self-selection into lower prestigious jobs with the intention of taking a long time 
out after childbirth? 
                                                 
11 The numbers are again presented in the appendix (table A C-3). 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations
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Overall, this first analysis reveals what is expected. Interruptions destabilize women’s careers. 
It seems as if the career interruption itself, not the reason for the break (i.e., leave due to 
childbirth or any other reason), is the main driver of some sort of career penalty in terms of 
lower prestige.  
C.5 Empirical methods and results 
C.5.1 Methods 
The present study seeks to identify the effect of the first birth-related career interruption, and 
especially of its length, on the later career of women in respect to occupational prestige. This 
prestige penalty might be expected due to several reasons. Employers might interpret a longer 
career interruption as a lower commitment to the labor market (Evertsson and Duvander 
(2011)). Furthermore, during “inactive” times, no human capital accumulation takes place. It 
most likely even depreciates (e.g., Jonsson and Mills (2001), Evertsson and Duvander (2011)). 
Therefore, I expect a negative effect of time out duration on occupational prestige. In case of 
mobility, an increasing probability of a downward move is expected for those taking longer 
time outs.  
The research question raises several methodological issues. First, the prestige information, 
measured by the SIOPS scale, is only observed for those who are working. The decision of 
whether and when to re-enter the labor market after childbirth inherits the problem of selection. 
I address this by using a two-step model according to Heckman (Heckman (1976), Heckman 
(1979)). Figure C-3 describes the relevant points during the observation period of each mother. 
Upward resp. downward mobility is defined as follows. The dummy takes on the value 1 if the 
mother reaches a prestige level that is at least 10% above the level of the position she held 
before her first birth for the first time upon re-entry. Afterwards it is zero, unless she reaches a 
further upward move of at least 10%. The same definition is used for downward moves. I 
therefore not only investigate the prestige level according to time out duration but also the 
mobility compared to the level before the first birth as well as subsequent rises resp. declines. 
By defining mobility in this way, I investigate one dimension of occupational mobility after 
childbirth. There are many further dimensions that are not in the focus of this chapter. Another 
dimension is, for instance, mobility upon return, taking the SIOPS at re-entry as a reference. A 
further dimension would investigate whether mothers achieve and keep a higher prestige or 
whether they drop to and stay at a lower prestige level relative to their situation prior the birth 
of their first child. In this case, the aforementioned dummy would take on the value 1 in each 
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year the actual level is at least 10% higher resp. lower than the level before the first birth. The 
last dimension to be mentioned is the mobility within one year unrelated to the SIOPS held 
before first birth. A detailed investigation of all of the different kinds of occupational mobility 
in this context is beyond the scope of this analysis.  
Figure C-3:  relevant points in time 
I am interested in women who have been working prior to the birth of their first child. After 
childbirth, they take leave. In some cases this might exceed the duration of maternity leave 
entitlement. In such cases, they are not truly in maternity leave any longer but are considered 
housewives. The duration until mothers re-enter the labor market is measured in months. The 
participation decision is represented by the selection equation. I only observe SIOPS 
information for those mothers who actually re-entered. Of course then, an upward/downward 
move can only be observed for this group. Since this selection is on observables as well as 
unobservables, a selection model is needed to estimate the probability of participation. Given 
that a mother is working, I estimate the second step. This uses as a dependent variable the 
occupational prestige while the duration of the time out is used as explanatory. The duration is 
included as several dummies, each representing an interval of one year. The reference category 
is an interruption of no more than 12 months. Thereby I get the effect of leave duration on the 
level of occupational prestige compared to a very short interruption. In addition, the second step 
is also estimated as a binary outcome model. I estimate the effect of leave duration on the 
probability of achieving an upward occupational move resp. the risk of facing a downward 
move. 
months 
SIOPS 
tfirst birth tfirst return tfist birth-1 
career  
interruption 
upward / downward  
 
move compared to SIOPS  
 
before interruption? 
tprestige change 
Source: Evertsson and Grunow (2012) and Evertsson and Duvander (2011) use a similar illustration.
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The basic method according to Heckman (1979) can be described as follows (see also Greene 
(2008), Cameron and Trivedi (2005)).12 The first step contains the selection mechanism: 
 with   (C-1) 
Thus: . 
The regression model of interest is 
 (C-2) 
noting that  is observed only if . It is assumed that the errors  and  follow a bivariate 
normal distribution (Greene (2008), Cameron and Trivedi (2005)):  
 (C-3) 
Simply estimating the model of interest (C-2) via OLS leads to inconsistent estimates if the 
errors are not uncorrelated. Therefore, the estimation equation has to be corrected for selection, 
since 
 (C-4) 
  (C-5) 
which only is equal to  if the errors are uncorrelated. To correct the equation of interest for 
selection, the following procedure is performed (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). In the first 
step, a probit model is estimated where is regressed on  to obtain .  is the estimated 
inverse Mill’s ratio (IMR) which is included as an additional regressor in the second step 
equation. The IMR can be written as , with  being the 
standard normal density function (pdf) and  being the standard normal distribution function 
(cdf) (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). The resulting equation is estimated using OLS 
(Cameron and Trivedi (2005)): 
  (C-6) 
The arising problem is that the standard errors are not correct (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005)). First, the errors from equation (C-6) are heteroskedastic. Second,  is an estimate. 
Therefore the standard errors must be corrected. When correcting for sample selection 
manually, I use bootstrapped standard errors as suggested in Cameron and Trivedi (2005). The 
                                                 
12 The notation is adapted to be consistent here. 
Occupational prestige: Is there a career penalty for birth-related career interruptions in Germany? 53 
 
present study not only uses the level of occupational prestige as the dependent variable of the 
second step, it also uses a dummy indicating whether there has been an upward/downward move 
or not. Therefore, the second step needs to be a probit model as well. The first step is represented 
by the selection equation presented above (van den Ven and van Praag (1981), Heckman (1979), 
Greene (2008)). The second step no longer is as simple as in equation (C-6) since the dependent 
variable in this case is either equal to one (if an upward/downward move occurred) or equal to 
zero (if there was no change in prestige or a move in the other direction). This is considered by 
the use of the Stata-implemented model of Van den Ven and van Praag (1981), which applies 
Maximum Likelihood estimation.13  
There should be at least one variable that is included in the selection equation but not in the 
outcome equation (exclusion restriction) (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). The GSOEP 
provides a promising variable. It is whether starting a new job is possible immediately. If it is 
possible to start a new job immediately, one is more likely to return to the labor market. I include 
this variable lagged by one year. This variable is included in the selection equation but not in 
the outcome equation. I also include as an exclusion restriction the female unemployment rate 
of the federal state of residence. These values are available from the Federal Employment 
Agency (2013), but only from the year 1995 onwards, so I lose three waves of my observation 
period in the estimation. In addition, a dummy indicating whether the mother has been working 
the last year is included in the first but not the second step.  
The estimated equations for the SIOPS level are described as follows. The selection equation 
estimates the probability that a positive SIOPS value is measured after the first birth. Of course, 
this is the case only if the mother is working. The vector  from equation (C-1) contains the 
variables according to Table A C-1 in the appendix. The second step of the Heckman model 
estimates the effect of time out duration on the SIOPS level that mothers achieve during their 
employment career after their first birth. The variables used in this outcome equation are listed 
in table A C-1 as well.14  
To account for the panel structure, an approach suggested by Wooldridge (1995) is applied. 
First, for each period t, a standard probit model is estimated:15 
 (C-7) 
                                                 
13 For a further description and the detailed derivation of the model see van den Ven and van Praag (1981). 
14 I apply Stata-implemented routines and also replicate the results by manually correcting for sample selection.  
15 As above, the notation is adapted to be consistent.  
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Using this, the inverse Mill’s ratio is obtained for each period. Then a pooled OLS regression 
is run using the selected sample (Wooldridge (1995, 2010))16: 
 for all  (C-8) 
with  through  being year dummies. I bootstrap the standard errors here as well. The 
vector  contains variables that are also included in . I also include the exclusion restrictions 
discussed above in  but not in . 
C.5.2 Results 
The results are presented in tables C-4 through C-8. The results are obtained using the 
comprehensive definition of a career interruption. If only considering maternity leave duration, 
it is possible that mothers still do not work after leave has ended. This is a rather restrictive 
definition of an interruption, which is why I focus on the results derived using the 
comprehensive definition. Since the probit coefficients only contain information about sign and 
significance (e.g., Wooldridge (2010)), the average marginal effects are presented in the 
appendix.  
C.5.2.1 SIOPS level 
It appears that the time out duration is relevant in respect to the SIOPS level. The coefficients 
of time outs of 13-24, 25-36, 37-48 and 49-60 months are negative but insignificant. However, 
leaves of 61-72 months are associated with almost 7 points less on the SIOPS scale and those 
longer than 72 months are associated with more than 10 points less compared to the reference 
of up to 12 months (table C-4). The two categories are highly significant. Of course one must 
bear in mind that the groups exhibiting short resp. long interruptions are certainly selective. 
Women who take long interruptions probably select into less prestigious jobs in the first place 
since they anticipate their long interruption, e.g., because they have distinct preferences for 
staying with their children.17  
  
                                                 
16 I also estimate an alternative specification with added time averages of appropriate explanatory variables to 
specify individual effects (Wooldridge (2010), Dustman and Rochina-Barrachina (2007)). The results are 
comparable. 
17 However, if controlling for the SIOPS level held before the first birth, the results still reveal remarkable 
differences between different time out durations, even though the effects are not this strong. Since the mobility 
relative to the SIOPS score before the time out is investigated in particular later on, the results are not presented 
here. 
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Table C-4:  Heckman estimation – SIOPS level 
  SIOPS selection 
time out 13 - 24 -0.561  (0.916) -     
… 25 - 36 -0.333  (1.271) -   
… 37 - 48 -1.925  (1.238) -   
… 49 - 60 -2.150  (1.735) -   
… 61 - 72 -6.903 *** (1.990) -   
… > 72 -10.284 *** (2.102) -     
age 1.555 *** (0.545) 0.100 * (0.054) 
age squared -0.015 ** (0.007) -0.002 *** (0.001) 
years of education 2.197 *** (0.206) 0.044 *** (0.012) 
return after second birth 1.848  (1.315) -0.499 *** (0.062) 
return after third+ birth 1.037  (3.114) -0.530 *** (0.195) 
East-Germany 0.654  (0.861) 0.045  (0.102) 
partner 2.108 * (1.092) 0.078  (0.085) 
# children 0-3 -0.210  (0.882) -0.834 *** (0.061) 
# children 4-6 0.039  (0.641) 0.150 *** (0.052) 
# children 7-12 0.493  (0.628) 0.178 *** (0.060) 
# children 13-16 2.073 *** (0.751) 0.189 ** (0.088) 
experience full time -0.322 ** (0.146) 0.051 *** (0.009) 
experience part time -0.402 ** (0.183) 0.144 *** (0.018) 
full time 3.314 *** (0.913) -   
part time 4.664 *** (0.739) -   
further interruptions -2.217 *** (0.755) -0.572 *** (0.050) 
multigenerational 0.670  (1.563) -0.306 * (0.182) 
not working (t-1) -  - -0.755 *** (0.056) 
start new job now (t-1) -  - 0.172 ** (0.081) 
unemployment rate (f) -   - 0.015  (0.010) 
constant -17.676 * (9.306) -0.941  (0.893) 
 0.462 
se ( ) 0.823 
2  (for comparison) 0.313 
Prob > 2 0.576 
observations 6,999 
clusters 817 
Wald 2 534.66 
Prob > 2 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses 
Age is associated with a higher SIOPS level. Years of education show a clear and positive 
coefficient. Living in East Germany is not significant but positive. The same is true for the 
dummy living with a partner (weakly significant). The SIOPS level seems to be higher if there 
are more children at age 13-16 living in the household. The other age groups do not show 
significant coefficients. Both full-time and part-time experience have a negative coefficient, 
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both being significant at the 5% level. Both full-time and part-time employment are related to 
a higher SIOPS. This is in line with the expectations. The dummy indicating the occurrence of 
further employment interruptions is highly significant and negative. Living in a 
multigenerational household shows a positive but insignificant coefficient. Correcting for 
selection does not seem to be necessary in this case ( ). Therefore, I also perform a 
simple OLS estimation, which results in the same implications (table A C-7). 
Table C-5:  Results Panel estimation – SIOPS level
  SIOPS 
time out 13 - 24 -0.511  (0.926) 
… 25 - 36 -0.267  (1.272) 
… 37 - 48 -1.882  (1.276) 
… 49 - 60 -2.106  (1.677) 
… 61 - 72 -6.976 *** (1.986) 
… > 72 -10.316 *** (2.209) 
Inverse Mill's ratio …1995 -5.795  (6.429) 
1996 -5.130  (3.836) 
1997 2.830  (2.512) 
1998 -1.569  (2.236) 
1999 3.195  (2.480) 
2000 -3.122 * (1.772) 
2001 -0.316  (1.693) 
2002 -1.270  (1.665) 
2003 -1.717  (1.336) 
2004 -1.359  (1.631) 
2005 -0.662  (1.385) 
2006 0.408  (1.322) 
2007 0.661  (1.482) 
2008 0.596  (1.297) 
2009 0.336  (1.702) 
2010 -0.534  (1.554) 
2011 -3.498 * (2.073) 
2012 -0.765  (1.628) 
observations 4,459 
adjusted R squared 0.353 
2 (IMR's) 17.62 
Prob > 2 0.4811 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
Applying the strategy suggested by Wooldridge (1995) results in comparable implications 
concerning the influence of the duration of the first birth-related career interruption on the 
SIOPS level. The results are presented in table C-5. A duration of 61-72 months or more than 
six years shows about the same influence on the SIOPS value as the basic Heckman procedure. 
The results concerning the control variables also are the same. 
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The inverse Mill’s ratios (interacted with the year dummies as described in the last section) do 
not show any obvious pattern. Some are positive, some are negative, but all except two are 
insignificant. Testing the joint significance of the inverse Mill’s ratio does not reject the null of 
no significance.  
C.5.2.2 Occupational mobility 
Not only the level itself but also the probability of an upward move is associated with time outs 
(table C-6). The categories 13-24, 25-36, 61-72 and >72 months are not relevant for the 
probability of an upward move. A time out of 37-48 or 49-60 months is (weakly) significantly 
increasing the probability of an upward move, compared to a time out of up to 12 months. In 
table A C-4, the average marginal effects are presented. They amount to 1.4 resp. 2.5 percentage 
points, compared to time outs of up to 12 months. Since the overall occurrence of an event is 
scarce, this is a “large effect” when comparing the two groups. However, the effect is not 
considered to be large overall. Therefore, longer time outs do not reduce the probability of an 
upward change in comparison to short interruptions. The probability of a downward move is 
more distinctly associated with time out duration, only 13-24 and 25-36 months are not related 
to downward moves. All other categories are significant and positive. The strongest influence 
is found for time outs lasting more than six years. The difference between those interrupting 
their career for more than 72 months and those who interrupt up to 12 months amounts to 7.5 
percentage points (table A C-4). It must be mentioned that the extent of these results should be 
interpreted with caution due to the fact that upward resp. downward moves are rather rare events 
if defined as described above, resulting in only few positive values for the dummy of interest. 
Since the exclusions restriction of being able to start a new job immediately includes some 
missing values, some of the positive outcomes are dropped in the estimation. If this exclusion 
restriction is not included in the selection equation, the coefficient of time outs longer than 72 
months is weakly significant and positive in the model of upward moves as well, which is more 
in line with the basic probit estimation for the selected sample. The results concerning 
downward moves are not influenced by this to a noteworthy extent. Overall, long leaves are 
associated with higher occupational mobility, both upward and downward, as is in line with the 
results found by Aisenbrey et al. (2009). 
Education does not show any significant coefficient. The coefficient of the number of children 
in the youngest age group is negative and weakly significant. The opposite is true for children 
at age 4-6. For downward mobility, only the age group 7-12 years shows a weak negative 
coefficient. Living with a partner is weakly significantly associated with upward moves but is 
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not associated with downward moves. Full- and part-time experience are not significant in 
respect to upward or downward mobility. Full-time employment is related to less occupational 
mobility, with only being highly significant for downward moves. The same is true for part-
time work. Further interruptions and living in a multigenerational household are not associated 
with occupational mobility. Examining the need of the selection correction reveals that this 
correction seems to be needed in the case of occupational mobility. For comparison, the results 
of simple probit estimations are presented in the appendix. 
Table C-6:  Heckman Specification – mobility  
  upward downward 
time out 13 - 24 0.021   (0.096) 0.002  (0.095) 
… 25 - 36 0.096  (0.117) 0.117  (0.114) 
… 37 - 48 0.209 * (0.126) 0.415 (0.131) 
… 49 - 60 0.366 ** (0.173) 0.428 (0.178) 
… 61 - 72 0.222  (0.196) 0.596 (0.189) 
… > 72 0.355   (0.227) 0.751 (0.196) 
age -0.007  (0.068) 0.021  (0.066) 
age squared -0.000  (0.001) -0.001  (0.001) 
years of education -0.006  (0.020) 0.020  (0.018) 
return after second birth -0.210  (0.132) -0.361 (0.128) 
return after third+ birth -0.584  (0.417) -0.289  (0.243) 
East-Germany 0.089  (0.088) -0.128  (0.093) 
partner -0.209 * (0.108) 0.011  (0.112) 
# children 0-3 -0.183 * (0.109) -0.029  (0.095) 
# children 4-6 0.144 * (0.086) 0.073  (0.074) 
# children 7-12 -0.109  (0.088) -0.139 (0.078) 
# children 13-16 -0.036  (0.143) -0.164  (0.134) 
experience full time 0.014  (0.014) -0.000  (0.013) 
experience part time -0.021  (0.018) -0.029  (0.021) 
full time -0.205 * (0.114) -0.444 (0.103) 
part time -0.198 ** (0.094) -0.462 (0.076) 
further interruptions -0.020  (0.074) -0.075  (0.068) 
multigenerational -0.053  (0.285) -0.478  (0.396) 
constant -1.161  (1.205) -1.441  (1.127) 
rho 0.579 0.689 
2 (  = 0) 13.13 34.32 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 
observations 6,999 
number of women 817 
Wald 2 6243.39 148.88 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses 
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Taking into account the panel structure results in comparable implications (table C-7). 
Table C-7:  Results panel estimation – occupational mobility 
  Upward downward 
time out 13 – 24 0.021  (0.104) 0.024  (0.106) 
… 25 – 36 0.106  (0.136) 0.190  (0.135) 
… 37 – 48 0.215 * (0.128) 0.470 *** (0.157) 
… 49 – 60 0.367 * (0.195) 0.483 ** (0.211) 
… 61 – 72 0.253  (0.216) 0.647 *** (0.227) 
… > 72 0.361   (0.255) 0.859 *** (0.231) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio …1995 1.371  (1.096) 1.617  (1.607) 
1996 n.a.18  n.a. 0.997  (2.374) 
1997 -0.807  (0.996) 0.263  (0.495) 
1998 -0.081  (0.438) 0.683  (0.605) 
1999 0.394  (598.529) 0.655 * (0.362) 
2000 -0.282  (1.607) 0.361  (0.352) 
2001 0.701  (0.712) 0.947 ** (0.440) 
2002 0.371  (0.319) 0.828 ** (0.333) 
2003 0.524  (0.555) 0.698 ** (0.355) 
2004 0.510  (0.416) 0.765 ** (0.300) 
2005 0.814 *** (0.225) 0.731 *** (0.275) 
2006 1.080 *** (0.399) 0.670 ** (0.286) 
2007 0.337  (0.332) 0.542 * (0.298) 
2008 0.565  (0.561) 0.849 *** (0.307) 
2009 0.388  (0.369) 0.824 ** (0.395) 
2010 0.708 ** (0.312) 0.721 ** (0.316) 
2011 1.004 ** (0.418) 0.860 * (0.440) 
2012 0.335  (322.547) 0.111  (0.586) 
observations 4,414 4,459 
number of women 786 787 
2 (IMRs) 29.77 28.48 
Prob > 2 0.028 0.055 
Wald 2 183.88 248.88 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
The probability of an upward move is (weakly) significantly higher for time outs of 37-48 
months and 49-60 months than for time outs of up to 12 months.19 The probability of downward 
moves is significantly higher for leaves longer than 3 years compared to very short 
interruptions. Again, the marginal effects are presented in the appendix. The results concerning 
covariates also are comparable to those obtained via the Heckman procedure, which is why they 
                                                 
18 IMR1996  0 predicts failure perfectly. It is dropped and 45 observations are not used. 
19 Since there are no upward moves in 1996 and the probit selection model for 1995 is based on view observations, 
I also estimated the upward model without these two years. The results do not change. If the year 1995 is not 
included in the downward model, the results do not change either. 
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are presented in the appendix. For some covariates, the significance levels have changed. As 
for prestige level, the inverse Mill’s ratios do not show a distinct pattern. The test of the inverse 
Mill’s ratios hints to joint significance. Since the event of an upward move is rather rare, i.e., 
there are only few positive values contained in the dependent variable, the estimates should be 
interpreted with caution. This is less of a problem concerning downward moves. Nevertheless, 
I present linear probability models since in both cases there are few 1’s compared to zeros which 
may lead to failures in the bootstrap-replications. The results are presented in the appendix. 
They essentially deliver the same implications as the probit models presented in table C-7. In 
addition, standard random effects models are estimated and presented in the appendix. 
C.5.2.3 Selection 
Concerning the SIOPS level estimations, the exclusion restriction of the female unemployment 
rate is insignificant (table C-4). The possibility of starting a new job immediately is significant. 
It is associated with a higher probability of observing a positive SIOPS. Not working the year 
prior to the interview highly and significantly reduces the probability of observing a positive 
SIOPS value. Education is associated with a higher probability of observing a SIOPS value. 
Returning after the second, resp. third or higher order birth is associated with a lower probability 
of selection compared to returning before the second birth. Living in East Germany and living 
with a partner are not associated with participation in this sample of newly mothers. The 
coefficient of the number of children in the youngest age group is highly significant and 
negative, as expected. The other age groups also are significant but positive. Full-time and part-
time experience are positive and significant while further interruptions are associated with a 
lower probability. These results are also expected. Living in a multigenerational household has 
a negative sign but is only weakly significant.  
The first-stage results concerning mobility are presented in table C-8. The results are essentially 
the same as in the case of the standard Heckman model.  
Examining whether the sample selection is relevant for the results reveals the following. If 
investigating the SIOPS level in the standard Heckman case, the two equations might be 
independent from each other ( ). But for the binary outcomes, they do not seem to be 
independent from each other (  resp. ). If the two equations are 
independent, the model can be simplified to standard methods, which in case of occupational 
mobility is a standard probit model (e.g., Baum (2006), Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2006)). 
This is done for comparison in all cases. The results obtained by these estimations are presented 
in the appendix (tables A C-7, A C-8, A C-12 and A C-13). The results are slightly more distinct 
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than those obtained using the selection correction but are essentially the same for prestige level. 
In case of mobility, the simple models show more distinct effects of time out durations. The 
implications are unchanged, which is why the results are not discussed in detail. 
Table C-8:  pooled Heckman estimation – selection equations – mobility 
Selection – Upward Selection – Downward 
age 0.100 * (0.053) 0.102 * (0.053) 
age squared -0.002 *** (0.001) -0.002 *** (0.001) 
years of education 0.042 *** (0.012) 0.044 *** (0.012) 
return after second birth -0.490 *** (0.062) -0.495 *** (0.062) 
return after third+ birth -0.505 *** (0.193) -0.546 *** (0.188) 
East-Germany 0.023  (0.101) 0.028  (0.099) 
partner 0.075  (0.084) 0.085  (0.081) 
# children 0-3 -0.829 *** (0.060) -0.826 *** (0.061) 
# children 4-6 0.150 *** (0.051) 0.154 *** (0.051) 
# children 7-12 0.176 *** (0.059) 0.175 *** (0.058) 
# children 13-16 0.192 ** (0.087) 0.195 ** (0.087) 
experience full time 0.051 *** (0.009) 0.050 *** (0.009) 
experience part time 0.143 *** (0.018) 0.142 *** (0.018) 
further interruptions -0.562 *** (0.049) -0.560 *** (0.049) 
multigenerational household -0.307 * (0.182) -0.293  (0.181) 
not working (t-1) -0.772 *** (0.055) -0.780 *** (0.054) 
start new job now (t-1) 0.158 ** (0.080) 0.146 * (0.080) 
unemployment rate (f) 0.017  (0.010) 0.017   (0.010) 
constant -0.949  (0.880) -1.009  (0.875) 
Observations 6,999 
Clusters 817 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses 
It must be mentioned that the inverse Mill’s ratio shows a remarkable time trend. The likelihood 
of measuring a positive SIOPS value increases over time. On average, the time period between 
the first birth and the observation period increases with the observed wave and therefore it is 
more likely that a mother is working. Therefore, the inverse Mill’s ratio decreases over time 
since it basically is the “nonselection hazard” (e.g., StataCorp (2009)).  
C.5.2.4 Robustness and summary of results 
The results reported in the previous sections are essentially robust over the models that are 
implemented. The estimations result in the same implications, irrespective of whether one 
inverse Mill’s ratio or period-specific ones are calculated. In addition, I performed the same 
estimation on a sample also containing childless women who turn 40 during the observation 
period. They are not expected to become mothers in the future. Mothers whose first child is 
born before the observation period are not included. Their first birth-related interruption and 
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their SIOPS value prior to it are not observed. Including them would dilute the results since a 
possibly experienced prestige penalty could not be observed. The estimated effects are 
somewhat weaker as concerns the prestige level but more distinct in regard to mobility. This 
might be explained by the fact that birth-related interruptions are more often anticipated or 
planned. As already shown in the descriptive analysis, mothers generally re-enter the labor 
market at the same prestige level as childless women. However, after 2-3 years, their career 
paths show a slightly lower level than those of childless women who do not interrupt their 
careers. This difference is also found for childless women who interrupt their career. This 
indicates that it is the interruption itself that harms the career, not the fact that it is birth-related. 
But the descriptive analysis also reveals that mothers who only interrupt their employment for 
up to 12 months show considerably higher prestige levels during the years following the first 
birth compared to other categories. The lowest prestige level is found for mothers who take 
more than six years off.  
As discussed in the previous section, I also used standard methods to estimate the effect of 
interest. The effects turn out to be a little more distinct if selection is not corrected.  
The results reveal that, irrespective of the model used, there is a link between occupational 
prestige and very long leaves of absence. While career interruptions of up to three years do not 
significantly result in a lower prestige level than very short time outs, the opposite is true for 
very long interruptions. Occupational mobility is higher for mothers taking long leaves 
compared to those taking only up to 12 months off. This is especially true for downward 
mobility, indicating that longer career interruptions destabilize mothers’ careers. However, 
upward mobility is more likely if the time out lasted three to five years. The effect sizes of 
observing actual changes are indeed distinct in proportion to the overall probability, but since 
the events under investigation are rare ones in the estimation sample, the overall effect size is 
not considered large. One exception to this is the effect of very long time outs on downward 
moves.  
Over all, the results of a destabilized career are in line with the results found by Aisenbrey et 
al. (2009). Further investigation of other dimensions of mobility is a topic for future research. 
As discussed earlier, apart from the selection into long or short career interruptions, another 
selection mechanism might be very important, namely the self-selection into certain 
occupations that are more or less prestigious. It is likely that women with a high preference for 
family life self-select into occupations with lower prestige, anticipating that they will take long 
time outs later on (e.g., Malo and Muñoz-Bullón (2008), for a discussion considering graduates 
see e.g., Ochsenfeld (2012)). Therefore, they might not invest in their career the same way more 
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career-driven women do. This selection takes place long before the first child is born. If 
controlling for the SIOPS level prior to the first birth, the results concerning the level as well 
as upward mobility are somewhat weaker, while they are somewhat stronger for downward 
mobility. However, the implication that long rather than short leaves destabilize mothers’ 
careers remains unchanged. 
C.6 Conclusions 
This paper explores the question of whether there is a penalty in terms of occupational prestige 
and occupational mobility for maternity related career interruptions. The present study 
investigates the following question by applying selection correction models according to 
Heckman (1979): Is there a prestige penalty for child-related career interruptions in Germany? 
The GSOEP provides comprehensive panel information about households, persons, couples and 
children. I investigate women who became mothers during 1992 through 2012 and who have 
been working the year before they gave birth to their first child. The selection model estimates 
the probability of observing any SIOPS information for new mothers after the birth of their first 
child, which is the case if they have already returned to the labor market, if they are still 
participating after their first return or if they have returned after subsequent interruptions. 
Occupational mobility is defined as a 10% change on the basis of the SIOPS value prior to first 
birth as well as further increases resp. decreases of at least 10%. The descriptive analysis reveals 
that mothers show a slightly lower prestige score from after 2-3 years after their re-entry. 
Compared to childless women who report an interruption during the observation period, they 
do not face any prestige penalty. It appears that the overall occupational mobility seems to be 
slightly higher for mothers than for childless women without any interruptions. The estimations 
reveal a significant influence of the duration of the first time out connected to first birth. Long 
career interruptions result in a lower prestige score. The prestige level is negatively influenced 
by leaves longer than three years. The extent of this negative effect is, as expected, higher for 
longer breaks. If examining occupational mobility, this pattern is different. The probability of 
upward mobility is only slightly higher for time outs of three to five years than for those of up 
to one year. Downward mobility is also more likely if the time out is long.  
I used pooled versions of the standard Heckman sample selection model as well as a strategy 
suggested by Wooldridge (1995) to account for the panel structure. I tested the need of selection 
correction and additionally estimated standard models without the correction. The results 
obtained are quite similar irrespective of which method is used and of whether I correct for 
selection or not. The results are in line with those of Aisenbrey et al. (2009) and Evertsson and 
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Grunow (2012). Aisenbrey et al. (2009) find destabilized careers linked to longer leaves in 
Germany. The present work’s results point in the same direction using the GSOEP and different 
methodology. Evertsson and Grunow (2012) do not find any association between interruptions 
and upward mobility in Germany. However, they only compare leaves of less than 15 months 
and those of more than 15 months. The present study uses more categories, which makes it 
possible to understand in greater depth the effects of time out duration on occupational prestige.  
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C.7 Appendix 
Table A C-1:  Variables used to estimate the selection and the outcome equation 
variable selection outcome 
time out duration -  
age   
age squared   
years of education   
first return after second birth   
first return after third or higher order birth   
living in East-Germany   
partner in the same household   
number of children 0-3   
number of children 4-6   
number of children 7-12   
number of children 13-16   
labor market experience full time   
labor market experience part time   
subsequent employment interruptions   
working full time -  
working part time -  
year dummies   
multigenerational household   
not working (t-1)  - 
female unemployment rate  - 
possible to start a new job immediately (t-1)  - 
Data source: GSOEP, 1992-2012 
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Table A C-2:  group sizes of figure C-1 
years after first return 
mothers,  
2+ children 
mothers,  
1 child 
childless, no 
interruption 
childless with 
interruption 
0 467 371 0 725 
1 334 288 3182 461 
2 226 210 1925 331 
3 169 173 1312 268 
4 127 144 1090 207 
5 104 119 924 160 
6 79 106 790 128 
7 62 85 686 100 
8 55 62 570 44 
9 44 49 502 16 
10 37 37 439 5 
11 34 29 390 10 
12 21 21 318 2 
13 13 12 276 2 
14 9 9 180 1 
15 5 9 133 1 
16 3 7 114 0 
17 1 3 96 2 
18 0 2 85 0 
19 0 1 74 0 
20 0 0 60 0 
21 0 0 47 0 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
Table A C-3:  group sizes of figure C-2 
years after first birth <12 13-36 37-72 >72 
0 239 0 0 0 
1 153 49 0 0 
2 160 278 0 0 
3 121 306 9 0 
4 112 233 85 0 
5 97 231 114 0 
6 96 210 127 2 
7 81 189 105 23 
8 73 171 96 30 
9 60 153 83 36 
10 50 137 79 35 
11 37 114 71 31 
12 35 94 62 27 
13 23 74 55 28 
14 16 58 48 25 
15 13 45 39 23 
16 10 33 33 19 
17 8 23 23 19 
18 4 14 15 8 
19 2 11 7 7 
20 1 2 4 3 
21 0 0 0 0 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
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Table A C-4:  average marginal effects – pooled Heckman, occupational mobility 
average marginal effects upward   downward 
time out 13 – 24 0.001  (0.007) 0.000  (0.009) 
… 25 – 36 0.007  (0.008) 0.012  (0.012) 
… 37 – 48 0.014  (0.009) 0.042 ** (0.014) 
… 49 – 60 0.025 * (0.012) 0.043 * (0.019) 
… 61 – 72 0.015  (0.014) 0.060 ** (0.020) 
… > 72 0.024   (0.016) 0.075 *** (0.022) 
age -0.000  (0.005) 0.002  (0.007) 
age squared -0.000  (0.000) -0.000  (0.000) 
years of education -0.000  (0.001) 0.002  (0.002) 
return after second birth -0.014  (0.009) -0.036 ** (0.013) 
return after third+ birth -0.040  (0.028) -0.029  (0.024) 
East-Germany 0.006  (0.006) -0.013  (0.009) 
partner -0.014  (0.008) 0.001  (0.011) 
# children 0-3 -0.013  (0.007) -0.003  (0.009) 
# children 4-6 0.010  (0.006) 0.007  (0.007) 
# children 7-12 -0.007  (0.006) -0.014  (0.008) 
# children 13-16 -0.002  (0.010) -0.016  (0.014) 
experience full time 0.001  (0.001) -0.000  (0.001) 
experience part time -0.001  (0.001) -0.003  (0.002) 
full time -0.014  (0.008) -0.044 *** (0.012) 
part time -0.014  (0.007) -0.046 *** (0.009) 
further interruptions -0.001  (0.005) -0.008  (0.007) 
multigenerational household -0.004   (0.019) -0.048   (0.040) 
Observations 6,999 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A C-5:  Results of manual Heckman twostep estimation (SIOPS level)
  SIOPS selection 
time out 13 – 24 -0.563  (0.895) -  - 
… 25 – 36 -0.335  (1.233) -  - 
… 37 – 48 -1.927  (1.256) -  - 
… 49 – 60 -2.151  (1.776) -  - 
… 61 – 72 -6.906 *** (1.999) -  - 
… > 72 -10.287 *** (2.197) -   - 
age 1.557 *** (0.531) 0.102 * (0.053) 
age squared -0.015 ** (0.007) -0.002 *** (0.001) 
years of education 2.197 *** (0.208) 0.044 *** (0.012) 
return after second birth 1.845  (1.348) -0.495 *** (0.062) 
return after third+ birth 1.034  (3.202) -0.524 *** (0.194) 
East-Germany 0.655  (0.898) 0.044  (0.101) 
partner 2.108 ** (1.065) 0.075  (0.085) 
# children 0-3 -0.220  (0.942) -0.837 *** (0.061) 
# children 4-6 0.039  (0.636) 0.145 *** (0.051) 
# children 7-12 0.494  (0.670) 0.175 *** (0.059) 
# children 13-16 2.075 *** (0.763) 0.186 ** (0.088) 
experience full time -0.321 ** (0.152) 0.051 *** (0.009) 
experience part time -0.402 ** (0.190) 0.144 *** (0.018) 
full time 3.315 *** (0.921) -  - 
part time 4.665 *** (0.734) -  - 
further interruptions -2.222 *** (0.763) -0.569 *** (0.049) 
multigenerational household 0.666  (1.904) -0.314 * (0.182) 
Inverse Mill‘s ratio 0.483  (0.908) -  - 
not working (t-1) - -0.761 *** (0.055) 
start new job now (t-1) -  - 0.172 ** (0.080) 
female unemployment rate -  - 0.015  (0.010) 
constant -17.715 * (9.152) -0.960  (0.885) 
rho 0.050 
2  (for comparison) 0.283 
Prob > 2 0.595 
adjusted /Pseudo R squared 0.344 0.355 
observations 4,478 7,011 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A C-6:  Results of manual Heckman twostep estimation (mobility) 
  upward downward 
time out 13 – 24 0.001  (0.102) -0.033  (0.110) 
… 25 – 36 0.070  (0.118) 0.086  (0.138) 
… 37 – 48 0.183  (0.139) 0.387 *** (0.146) 
… 49 – 60 0.357 * (0.193) 0.397 * (0.212) 
… 61 – 72 0.195  (0.205) 0.563 *** (0.195) 
… > 72 0.328   (0.242) 0.751 *** (0.210) 
age 0.018  (0.074) 0.067  (0.079) 
age squared -0.001  (0.001) -0.001  (0.001) 
years of education 0.001  (0.022) 0.039 ** (0.018) 
return after second birth -0.283 * (0.148) -0.552 *** (0.161) 
return after third+ birth -0.641 ** (0.290) -0.494  (0.339) 
East-Germany 0.113  (0.100) -0.087  (0.098) 
partner -0.212 * (0.122) 0.046  (0.135) 
# children 0-3 -0.387 *** (0.148) -0.383 *** (0.149) 
# children 4-6 0.166 * (0.100) 0.127  (0.091) 
# children 7-12 -0.088  (0.097) -0.086  (0.086) 
# children 13-16 -0.007  (0.155) -0.098  (0.154) 
experience full time 0.025 * (0.014) 0.019  (0.016) 
experience part time 0.003  (0.021) 0.019  (0.023) 
full time -0.205 * (0.124) -0.453 *** (0.123) 
part time -0.205 * (0.106) -0.504 *** (0.084) 
further interruptions -0.120  (0.093) -0.288 *** (0.089) 
multigenerational household -0.099  (0.281) -0.623 ** (0.284) 
Inverse Mill‘s ratio 0.835 *** (0.183) 1.254 *** (0.174) 
constant -1.787   (1.855) -2.651 * (1.405) 
Wald 2 155.46 397.23 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 
Observations 4,433 4,478 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A C-7:  Results of simple OLS estimation on selected sample 
  SIOPS 
time out 13 – 24 -0.554   (0.916) 
… 25 – 36 -0.391  (1.279) 
… 37 – 48 -1.837  (1.240) 
… 49 – 60 -1.973  (1.745) 
… 61 – 72 -7.007 *** (1.985) 
… > 72 -10.247 *** (2.086) 
age 1.556 *** (0.542) 
age squared -0.015 ** (0.007) 
years of education 2.195 *** (0.203) 
return after second birth 1.839  (1.290) 
return after third+ birth 1.272  (3.118) 
East-Germany 0.756  (0.866) 
partner 2.014 * (1.087) 
# children 0-3 0.101  (0.765) 
# children 4-6 -0.040  (0.638) 
# children 7-12 0.433  (0.628) 
# children 13-16 2.056 *** (0.757) 
experience full time -0.334 ** (0.144) 
experience part time -0.421 ** (0.174) 
full time 3.111 *** (0.915) 
part time 4.583 *** (0.733) 
further interruptions -2.114 *** (0.712) 
multigenerational household 0.756  (1.574) 
constant -17.380 ** (9.142) 
F statistic 13.61 
Prob > F 0.000 
observations 4,596 
number of women 800 
R-squared 0.350 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A C-8:  results of pooled standard Probit estimations for binary outcome equations 
coefficients upward move downward move 
time out 13 – 24 0.053  (0.098) 0.072  (0.099) 
… 25 – 36 0.161  (0.122) 0.232 * (0.120) 
… 37 – 48 0.271 ** (0.129) 0.482 *** (0.138) 
… 49 – 60 0.453 *** (0.173) 0.557 *** (0.178) 
… 61 – 72 0.256  (0.204) 0.631 *** (0.196) 
… > 72 0.490 ** (0.229) 0.756 *** (0.200) 
age -0.047  (0.071) -0.029  (0.071) 
age squared 0.001  (0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 
years of education -0.006  (0.020) 0.005  (0.019) 
return after second birth -0.087  (0.129) -0.206  (0.131) 
return after third+ birth -0.520  (0.431) -0.167  (0.239) 
East-Germany 0.041  (0.089) -0.215 ** (0.101) 
partner -0.217 * (0.111) -0.002  (0.118) 
# children 0-3 0.052  (0.108) 0.247 *** (0.092) 
# children 4-6 0.128  (0.087) 0.063  (0.078) 
# children 7-12 -0.139  (0.089) -0.164 ** (0.081) 
# children 13-16 -0.075  (0.147) -0.202  (0.139) 
experience full time 0.006  (0.014) -0.014  (0.014) 
experience part time -0.047 ** (0.020) -0.068 *** (0.023) 
full time -0.239 ** (0.118) -0.522 *** (0.110) 
part time -0.201 ** (0.095) -0.539 *** (0.081) 
further interruptions 0.099  (0.072) 0.106  (0.070) 
multigenerational household 0.024  (0.301) -0.446  (0.396) 
constant -0.383  (1.272) -0.273  (1.230) 
Wald 2 115.06 223.83 
average marginal effects   
time out 13 – 24 0.004  (0.008) 0.007  (0.009) 
… 25 – 36 0.013  (0.010) 0.022  (0.011) 
… 37 – 48 0.023 * (0.011) 0.046 *** (0.013) 
… 49 – 60 0.038 ** (0.015) 0.053 ** (0.017) 
… 61 – 72 0.021  (0.017) 0.060 ** (0.019) 
… > 72 0.041 * (0.019) 0.071 *** (0.019) 
age -0.004  (0.006) -0.003  (0.007) 
age squared 0.000  (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) 
years of education -0.001  (0.002) 0.001  (0.002) 
return after second birth -0.007  (0.011) -0.019  (0.012) 
return after third+ birth -0.043  (0.036) -0.016  (0.023) 
East-Germany 0.003  (0.007) -0.020 * (0.009) 
partner -0.018  (0.009) -0.000  (0.011) 
# children 0-3 0.004  (0.009) 0.023 ** (0.009) 
# children 4-6 0.011  (0.007) 0.006  (0.007) 
# children 7-12 -0.012  (0.007) -0.016 * (0.008) 
# children 13-16 -0.006  (0.012) -0.019  (0.013) 
experience full time 0.001  (0.001) -0.001  (0.001) 
experience part time -0.004 * (0.002) -0.006 ** (0.002) 
full time -0.020 * (0.010) -0.049 *** (0.010) 
part time -0.017 * (0.008) -0.051 *** (0.008) 
further interruptions 0.008  (0.006) 0.010  (0.007) 
multigenerational household 0.002  (0.025) -0.042  (0.038) 
Observations 4,551 4,596 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
(cluster-robust) standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A C-9:  complete results panel estimation – occupational mobility 
  upward downward 
time out 13 – 24 0.021  (0.104) 0.024  (0.106) 
… 25 – 36 0.106  (0.136) 0.190  (0.135) 
… 37 – 48 0.215 * (0.128) 0.470 *** (0.157) 
… 49 – 60 0.367 * (0.195) 0.483 ** (0.211) 
… 61 – 72 0.253  (0.216) 0.647 *** (0.227) 
… > 72 0.361   (0.255) 0.859 *** (0.231) 
age -0.019  (0.074) 0.006  (0.084) 
age squared 0.000  (0.001) -0.000  (0.001) 
years of education -0.008  (0.022) 0.032  (0.021) 
return after second birth -0.121  (0.149) -0.366 ** (0.157) 
return after third+ birth -0.367  (0.310) -0.201  (0.316) 
East-Germany 0.083  (0.100) -0.155  (0.113) 
partner -0.208 * (0.120) -0.018  (0.134) 
# children 0-3 -0.219  (0.152) -0.065  (0.132) 
# children 4-6 0.112  (0.100) 0.091  (0.090) 
# children 7-12 -0.144  (0.105) -0.145  (0.091) 
# children 13-16 -0.067  (0.155) -0.165  (0.156) 
experience full time 0.022  (0.017) 0.008  (0.017) 
experience part time -0.012  (0.022) -0.014  (0.025) 
full time -0.207  (0.130) -0.480 *** (0.125) 
part time -0.218 ** (0.104) -0.506 *** (0.090) 
further interruptions 0.024  (0.087) -0.084  (0.083) 
multigenerational household 0.057  (0.323) -0.443  (0.283) 
Inverse Mill‘s ratio …1995 1.371  (1.096) 1.617  (1.607) 
1996 n.a.20  n.a. 0.997  (2.374) 
1997 -0.807  (0.996) 0.263  (0.495) 
1998 -0.081  (0.438) 0.683  (0.605) 
1999 0.394  (598.529) 0.655 * (0.362) 
2000 -0.282  (1.607) 0.361  (0.352) 
2001 0.701  (0.712) 0.947 ** (0.440) 
2002 0.371  (0.319) 0.828 ** (0.333) 
2003 0.524  (0.555) 0.698 ** (0.355) 
2004 0.510  (0.416) 0.765 ** (0.300) 
2005 0.814 *** (0.225) 0.731 *** (0.275) 
2006 1.080 *** (0.399) 0.670 ** (0.286) 
2007 0.337  (0.332) 0.542 * (0.298) 
2008 0.565  (0.561) 0.849 *** (0.307) 
2009 0.388  (0.369) 0.824 ** (0.395) 
2010 0.708 ** (0.312) 0.721 ** (0.316) 
2011 1.004 ** (0.418) 0.860 * (0.440) 
2012 0.335  (322.547) 0.111  (0.586) 
constant -1.932  (1.582) -2.086  (1.952) 
Observations 4,414 4,459 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
                                                 
20 IMR1996  0 predicts failure perfectly. It is dropped and 45 observations are not used. 
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Table A C-10: average marginal effects, panel estimation with selection correction 
  upward move downward move 
time out 13 - 24 0.002  (0.026) 0.002  (0.010) 
… 25 - 36 0.009  (0.123) 0.017  (0.012) 
… 37 - 48 0.017  (0.250) 0.043 ** (0.014) 
… 49 - 60 0.029  (0.426) 0.044 * (0.019) 
… 61 - 72 0.020  (0.293) 0.058 ** (0.021) 
… > 72 0.029   (0.418) 0.078 *** (0.021) 
age -0.002  (0.023) 0.001  (0.008) 
age squared 0.000  (0.000) -0.000  (0.000) 
years of education -0.001  (0.009) 0.003  (0.002) 
return after second birth -0.010  (0.141) -0.033 * (0.014) 
return after third+ birth -0.029  (0.425) -0.018  (0.029) 
East-Germany 0.007  (0.096) -0.014  (0.010) 
partner -0.017  (0.240) -0.002  (0.012) 
# children 0-3 -0.018  (0.254) -0.006  (0.012) 
# children 4-6 0.009  (0.129) 0.008  (0.008) 
# children 7-12 -0.012  (0.167) -0.013  (0.008) 
# children 13-16 -0.005  (0.078) -0.015  (0.014) 
experience full time 0.002  (0.026) 0.001  (0.001) 
experience part time -0.001  (0.014) -0.001  (0.002) 
full time -0.017  (0.239) -0.043 *** (0.011) 
part time -0.018  (0.252) -0.046 *** (0.008) 
further interruptions 0.002  (0.028) -0.008  (0.008) 
multigenerational household 0.005  (0.071) -0.040  (0.026) 
Inverse Mill's ratio …1995 0.110  (1.591) 0.146  (0.146) 
1996 n.a.  n.a. 0.090  (0.211) 
1997 -0.065  (0.945) 0.024  (0.045) 
1998 -0.006  (0.102) 0.062  (0.055) 
1999 0.032  (48.515) 0.059  (0.033) 
2000 -0.023  (0.353) 0.033  (0.032) 
2001 0.056  (0.817) 0.086 * (0.041) 
2002 0.030  (0.433) 0.075 * (0.031) 
2003 0.042  (0.608) 0.063 * (0.032) 
2004 0.041  (0.591) 0.069 * (0.027) 
2005 0.065  (0.942) 0.066 * (0.026) 
2006 0.087  (1.253) 0.061 * (0.026) 
2007 0.027  (0.391) 0.049  (0.027) 
2008 0.045  (0.657) 0.077 ** (0.028) 
2009 0.031  (0.449) 0.074 * (0.036) 
2010 0.057  (0.820) 0.065 * (0.029) 
2011 0.081  (1.165) 0.078  (0.040) 
2012 0.027  (26.043) 0.010  (0.053) 
Observations 4,414 4,459 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A C-11:  linear regression with period-specific inverse Mill’s ratios 
linear regression upward move downward move 
time out 13 - 24 0.001  (0.008) 0.001  (0.009) 
… 25 - 36 0.008  (0.011) 0.012  (0.011) 
… 37 - 48 0.021 * (0.013) 0.042 *** (0.015) 
… 49 - 60 0.037 * (0.021) 0.044 ** (0.021) 
… 61 - 72 0.022  (0.019) 0.059 ** (0.024) 
… > 72 0.033   (0.022) 0.071 *** (0.022) 
age -0.003  (0.006) -0.001  (0.008) 
age squared 0.000  (0.000) -0.000  (0.000) 
years of education -0.000  (0.002) 0.003 * (0.002) 
return after second birth -0.017  (0.013) -0.041 *** (0.015) 
return after third+ birth -0.036  (0.024) -0.021  (0.033) 
East-Germany 0.008  (0.008) -0.010  (0.009) 
partner -0.019 * (0.011) -0.006  (0.010) 
# children 0-3 -0.027 ** (0.011) -0.026 * (0.014) 
# children 4-6 0.013 * (0.007) 0.013 * (0.007) 
# children 7-12 -0.007  (0.006) -0.005  (0.006) 
# children 13-16 -0.005  (0.009) -0.005  (0.008) 
experience full time 0.002  (0.001) 0.002  (0.001) 
experience part time 0.000  (0.001) 0.001  (0.002) 
full time -0.019  (0.012) -0.063 *** (0.015) 
part time -0.020 ** (0.009) -0.063 *** (0.012) 
further interruptions -0.003  (0.008) -0.017 ** (0.008) 
multigenerational household 0.007  (0.051) -0.057  (0.043) 
Inverse Mill's ratio …1995 0.064  (0.089) 0.276  (0.188) 
1996 0.016  (0.013) 0.194  (0.119) 
1997 -0.052  (0.062) 0.084  (0.109) 
1998 -0.002  (0.043) 0.124 * (0.070) 
1999 0.067  (0.072) 0.147 ** (0.074) 
2000 -0.034  (0.077) 0.106 * (0.062) 
2001 0.073 * (0.040) 0.125 ** (0.053) 
2002 0.061  (0.040) 0.188 *** (0.066) 
2003 0.041 * (0.024) 0.093 ** (0.042) 
2004 0.060  (0.037) 0.164 *** (0.054) 
2005 0.089 ** (0.037) 0.105 ** (0.046) 
2006 0.125 ** (0.050) 0.095 ** (0.039) 
2007 0.071  (0.045) 0.130 *** (0.049) 
2008 0.042 * (0.025) 0.124 *** (0.046) 
2009 0.071  (0.048) 0.149 ** (0.058) 
2010 0.071 ** (0.035) 0.100 ** (0.045) 
2011 0.155 ** (0.065) 0.157 ** (0.067) 
2012 0.033  (0.042) 0.026  (0.022) 
constant 0.106  (0.117) 0.035  (0.181) 
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Table A C-11 continued       
Observations 4,459 4,459 
number of women 787 787 
2 (IMRs) 24.69 40.48 
Prob > 2 0.134 0.002 
Wald 2 164.95 202.85 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
 
  
Occupational prestige: Is there a career penalty for birth-related career interruptions in Germany? 76 
 
Table A C-12:  Results of simple Random Effects Estimation – SIOPS level 
  SIOPS 
time out 13 – 24 -0.671  (0.870) 
… 25 – 36 -1.579  (1.158) 
… 37 – 48 -2.682 ** (1.352) 
… 49 – 60 -3.919 ** (1.613) 
… 61 – 72 -7.690 *** (2.288) 
… > 72 -9.533 *** (2.097) 
age 0.255  (0.412) 
age squared -0.000  (0.005) 
years of education 2.080 *** (0.225) 
return after second birth 3.180 ** (1.288) 
return after third+ birth 1.829  (3.114) 
East-Germany -0.710  (0.757) 
partner 1.135 * (0.679) 
# children 0-3 -0.848 * (0.468) 
# children 4-6 -0.272  (0.412) 
# children 7-12 0.010  (0.394) 
# children 13-16 0.643  (0.498) 
experience full time -0.095  (0.140) 
experience part time -0.162  (0.150) 
full time 2.378 *** (0.756) 
part time 2.384 *** (0.590) 
further interruptions -1.578 ** (0.686) 
multigenerational household -1.083  (1.727) 
constant 11.969  (7.335) 
observations 4,596 
number of women 800 
Wald 2 350.36 
Prob > 2 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A C-13:  Results of simple Random Effects Probit21 
  upward move downward move 
time out 13 - 24 0.053  (0.103) 0.072  (0.099) 
… 25 - 36 0.161  (0.130) 0.232 * (0.126) 
… 37 - 48 0.271 * (0.143) 0.482 *** (0.138) 
… 49 - 60 0.453 ** (0.188) 0.557 *** (0.185) 
… 61 - 72 0.256  (0.236) 0.631 *** (0.215) 
… > 72 0.490 ** (0.229) 0.756 *** (0.217) 
age -0.047  (0.075) -0.029  (0.072) 
age squared 0.001  (0.001) 0.000  (0.001) 
years of education -0.006  (0.020) 0.005  (0.019) 
return after second birth -0.087  (0.143) -0.206  (0.136) 
return after third+ birth -0.520  (0.426) -0.167  (0.308) 
East-Germany 0.041  (0.093) -0.215 ** (0.097) 
partner -0.217 * (0.112) -0.002  (0.123) 
# children 0-3 0.052  (0.108) 0.247 ** (0.099) 
# children 4-6 0.128  (0.089) 0.063  (0.084) 
# children 7-12 -0.139  (0.089) -0.164 * (0.087) 
# children 13-16 -0.075  (0.138) -0.202  (0.149) 
experience full time 0.006  (0.015) -0.014  (0.015) 
experience part time -0.047 ** (0.020) -0.068 *** (0.019) 
full time -0.239 ** (0.119) -0.522 *** (0.109) 
part time -0.201 ** (0.094) -0.539 *** (0.082) 
further interruptions 0.099  (0.078) 0.106  (0.074) 
multigenerational household 0.024  (0.387) -0.446  (0.489) 
constant -0.383  (1.293) -0.273  (1.225) 
observations 4,569 4,596 
groups 800 800 
Wald 2 112.39 207.41 
Prob > 2 0.000 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1995-2012, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
 
  
                                                 
21 Performing a linear random effects model in both cases leads to comparable implications. 
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Figure A C-1:  proportion of mothers and childless women participating in the labor market 
Figure A C-2:  SIOPS value of mothers being full-time, part-time or marginally employed 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations
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Figure A C-3:  share of mothers employed to different extents 
Table A C-14:  group sizes of figures A C-2 and A C-3 
years after first birth full-time part-time marginal working total 
0 16 2 2 20 133 
1 62 87 53 202 838 
2 112 242 84 438 822 
3 123 246 67 436 766 
4 117 252 61 430 705 
5 121 247 74 442 655 
6 106 268 61 435 597 
7 99 240 59 398 541 
8 94 220 56 370 480 
9 76 206 50 332 420 
10 76 175 50 301 361 
11 53 158 42 253 309 
12 49 137 32 218 257 
13 41 102 37 180 207 
14 30 91 26 147 168 
15 69 26 25 120 138 
16 24 46 25 95 106 
17 17 39 17 73 77 
18 13 20 8 41 45 
19 9 15 3 27 29 
20 1 6 3 10 10 
21 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations 
 
Source: GSOEP, 1992-2012, own calculations
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D Informal childcare and maternal employment 
 
Katharina Sutter 
 
D.1 Introduction 
The labor market participation and the extent of the employment of mothers are of great interest 
in German politics (e.g., Spieß (2011), Ristau (2005)). A greater extent of maternal employment 
is a widely discussed topic in German politics (e.g., BMFSFJ (2014), BMI (2011)). This often 
is considered to be desirable due to the demographic change Germany is facing and the 
associated challenges for the economy as a whole (e.g., European Commission (2012), OECD 
(2014)). Several instruments have been implemented in recent years to make market work and 
family obligations more compatible (see for instance Gerlach (2008)). One of the instruments 
is the expansion of publicly provided childcare (e.g., 1996 - KJHG, 2005 - TAG, 2008 - 
KiföG1). The participation rate of women has been increasing in recent decades (e.g., European 
Commission (2014)), but the share of German mothers working full-time remains low (e.g., 
Keller and Haustein (2013)). The proportion of women working part-time is among the highest 
in Europe (e.g., European Commission (2014)). One reason for this behavior might be a lack 
of flexibility, which is not offered by public childcare institutions. In many cases, the office 
hours of such institutions do not meet the requirements, e.g., they are too short or not flexible 
enough, especially in West Germany (e.g., Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2012), Stöbe-
Blossey (2010), Krone and Stöbe-Blossey (2010)). Therefore, dual-earner families or single 
mothers might use additional childcare arrangements, such as grandparents, friends or 
neighbors. These people are more likely to cover the hours that are not covered by public 
childcare arrangements, e.g., early evenings. This chapter investigates the importance of such 
informal childcare arrangements for the labor market behavior of mothers, both at the extensive 
and the intensive margin.  
This study asks whether informal childcare arrangements increase maternal labor market 
participation and hours worked. It contributes to the existing literature by using the survey years 
                                                 
1 For a description of these policy instruments see for instance Gerlach (2008). KJHG: “Kinder- und 
Jugendhilfegesetz“ (Child and Youth Services Act), TAG: “Tagesbetreuungsausbaugesetz“ (Day Care Expansion 
Act), KiFöG: „Kinderförderungsgesetz“ (Law for the support of children). 
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1999-2012 of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP)2 and thereby providing further 
evidence for the case of Germany. I take into account the potential endogeneity of informal 
childcare with respect to maternal labor market participation and explicitly distinguish between 
the decision about labor market participation and the decision about the working hours by 
allowing both decisions to depend on different processes. A Heckman-type selection correction 
is performed when investigating the working hours. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section D.2 summarizes the existing 
literature. The subsequent section contains an overview of the dataset and in section D.4 some 
descriptive information about the sample is presented. After discussing the empirical strategy, 
the results are presented and discussed. Section D.6 concludes. 
D.2 Literature Review 
The literature on the relationship between childcare and maternal labor supply is broad (e.g., 
Felfe et al. (2013), Chiuri (2000), Connelly (1992), Dimova and Wolff (2008), Duncan et al. 
(2004), Hansen et al. (2006), Heckman (1974), Hofferth and Collins (2000), Kreyenfeld and 
Hank (2000)). Some studies focus on the costs of formal childcare (e.g., Connelly (1992), 
Wrohlich (2004)), others on the availability (e.g., Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000)). Some literature 
also focuses on the role of fathers (e.g., Kitterød and Pettersen (2006), Wang and Bianchi 
(2009)). The present study focuses on the relationship between informal childcare and maternal 
employment. Informal childcare can be provided within the household (partner, cohabiting 
relatives), within the family, (e.g., not cohabiting grandparents), or outside the family (e.g., 
friends or neighbors). This kind of childcare arrangement is considered to provide flexibility to 
the mother (e.g., Posadas and Vidal-Fernández (2012)). Another argument for the importance 
of informal childcare might be that mothers trust their parents even more than they trust 
childcare institutions and view this form of childcare as the best substitute for their own 
childcare (e.g., Posadas and Vidal-Fernández (2012), Wheelock and Jones (2002)). 
The role of grandparents’ childcare in maternal employment is investigated by Aassve et al. 
(2011). They control for unobserved preferences by using a simultaneous equation approach. 
To model the probability of childcare by the grandmother, they use the information about 
whether the grandmother is alive as well as the number of siblings of the mother. Grandparental 
care is included in the equation modelling the probability of mothers’ labor market 
participation. For Germany, they find a positive effect on the labor market participation of 
                                                 
2 For a description of this very rich panel dataset, see Wagner et al. (2007). 
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mothers. The same is true for France, Bulgaria and Hungary. Albuquerque and Passos (2010) 
focus on southern European countries and estimate a switching probit model. In addition, the 
authors estimate bivariate probit models and univariate probit models. They find a positive 
effect of grandparental childcare, but this depends on the model used. A recent study by Posadas 
and Vidal-Fernández (2012) analyzes the U.S. (NLSY79). Childcare provided by grandparents 
is considered to be flexible, affordable and a good substitute for parental childcare. They apply 
an instrumental variable approach, taking grandmother’s death as an instrument for 
grandparents’ childcare. The results reveal a positive impact of access to grandparental care on 
maternal labor force participation, with the effect being mostly driven by mothers from 
disadvantaged socio-economic background. Zamarro (2011) uses SHARE data. She takes into 
account the simultaneity of the decisions about participation and childcare activities as well as 
unobserved heterogeneity in care-giving decisions. For some countries, she finds a positive and 
significant effect of grandparental childcare on participation of mothers, with Germany not 
being one of those countries. In the case of sons being investigated she finds no effect. 
A study focusing on French Immigrants is written by Dimova and Wolff (2008). Apart from 
the effect of grandchild care on the labor market participation of the mother, they also consider 
the distribution of this transfer across one’s own children. As a first step, they model the supply 
of grandchild care. In case of labor market participation they also take care of the potential 
endogeneity of grandparental childcare. This is done using a bivariate probit model as well as 
2SLS, generalized 2SLS random effects IV and fixed effects IV estimation. They find a positive 
and significant effect of grandparental care on the participation of the mother. Gray (2005) also 
investigates the role of grandparental childcare in connection with maternal employment. She 
sheds some light on trends in the provision of this kind of childcare and on how it interacts with 
formal childcare arrangements. She concludes that informal care provided by grandparents 
helps mothers to enter the labor market and also to work longer hours. It must be mentioned 
that this study focuses on a descriptive view on the data. Hofferth and Collins (2000) analyze 
the influence of cost, quality as well as availability of childcare not provided by the mother on 
the probability of exiting the labor market. The authors estimate discrete time Logit models. 
They find a negative link between non-parental care arrangements and job exits. Having 
multiple arrangements turns out to be a possible strategy to combat the breakdown of one 
arrangement. They conclude that availability, cost and stability of non-parental childcare is 
strongly associated with the stability of maternal employment. Compton (2011) investigates 
family proximity and co-residence in Canada and its effect on the participation of women. She 
argues that this not only measures the effect of transferred care but also an insurance effect of 
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– as Compton (2011) calls it – “back-up” childcare. She estimates probit models for the 
participation decision and Tobit models for usual hours of work. She also instruments proximity 
in a further model. The results indicate a positive effect of proximity to one’s own mother (-in-
law) on labor force participation but a negative effect of co-residence. A similar paper is written 
by Compton and Pollak (2014). Again, the availability of childcare and its insurance effect are 
mentioned. They discuss the flexibility of grandparental care compared to market-based 
childcare arrangements, which most often include regular and anticipated childcare hours. This 
study also uses another sample (“military wives”), and still finds the association between 
grandmothers childcare and labor force participation. They also investigate the working hours 
focusing on Tobit estimations and conclude that proximity is positively associated with 
participation, but not with hours worked. Selection correction is only mentioned as a side note. 
Using SHARE data, Dimova and Wolff (2011) investigate downward time and money transfers 
and their influences on the labor market behavior of young mothers receiving those transfers. 
Ten European countries are included in the analysis. Overall, the authors find a positive effect 
of grandparental childcare on labor market participation as well as on the extent of employment 
while money transfers do not seem to matter in respect to these decisions. 
Wagner (2012) investigates whether the social networks, namely the presence of kinship, 
friends and spouses, increase maternal employment. She uses the GSOEP and applies piecewise 
constant event history models for competing risks. The author analyzes six years after a birth 
and the transitions to full-time or part-time employment. The presence of relatives raises 
transitions to both full-time as well as part-time employment of West German and migrant 
mothers. Social support seems not to be relevant for the employment of East German mothers. 
A rather early paper by Maume and Mullin (1993) investigates the influence of childcare 
arrangements in 1985 on female employment turnover by 1986. They focus on the role of 
fathers and ask whether mothers who rely on paternal childcare as the primary source of 
childcare are more likely to quit their job than women who have access to different childcare 
arrangements. They find that mothers, especially low-wage-earning mothers who rely on their 
husband’s childcare, are more likely to quit work.  
Hansen et al. (2006) investigate the use of formal and informal childcare arrangements and the 
connection of maternal employment to child outcomes. They conclude that informal care is 
important for mothers in respect to the balancing of work and family obligations for very young 
children. An article of Wheelock and Jones (2002) shows that parents often rely on informal 
care as a complementary form of childcare to formal arrangements. The authors draw 
descriptive conclusions of a study focusing on informal childcare used by employed parents. 
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Informal care is defined as care provided by relatives, friends or neighbors, but not by the 
spouse. The authors find evidence that working parents depend on complementary childcare, 
and that this type of childcare is used to a greater extent than formal childcare. The authors also 
state that not only is childcare a mainly female task, but that its organization is as well. 
Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000) explicitly look at the availability of public childcare. Their results 
do not reveal any significant influence of regional availability of day care slots on the 
participation of mothers. Kreyenfeld and Hank (2000) argue that this indicates that the West 
German day care regime is inadequate since the office hours of the facilities are limited. They 
further argue that mothers who want to participate have to rely on additional care arrangements 
(social network). 
My contribution to the literature is as follows. First, by using the German Socio-Economic 
Panel (GSOEP) I am able to use a relatively long observation period (1999-2012). In addition, 
this dataset contains very rich information about all members of the household, including 
children and the partner. For each child living in a household, it contains information about 
childcare arrangements. Second, as also stated in several of the aforementioned studies (e.g., 
Dimova and Wolff (2008), Albuquerque and Passos (2010), Kalb (2009)), there is scarce 
evidence about the research question in focus. This study provides further evidence for the case 
of Germany, using the data from as recently as 2012, resulting in very up-to-date findings. I 
include children up to the age children start secondary school. I use the same instrument as 
Aassve et al. (2011) or Posadas and Vidal-Fernández (2012) in a two-stage least-squares 
framework. But Aassve et al. (2011) use the Generations and Gender Survey of 2005, which 
only contains one wave. Posadas and Vidal-Fernández (2012) analyze the U.S. by using the 
NLSY79. As the authors mention, they are not able to exploit the panel structure due to the lack 
of data availability. I employ the panel structure of the GSOEP. Panel estimators (EC2SLS, 
G2SLS) suggested by the literature (e.g., Dimova and Wolff (2008), Baltagi (2008)) are applied 
to estimate the participation decision. Apart from participation itself, I also investigate the 
extent of employment measured by actual working hours. I take into account that this decision 
is not driven by the same process as the decision to participate and explicitly correct for this 
selection by using a Heckman selection correction (Heckman (1979)) in the model focusing on 
the working hours. I also apply a strategy suggested by Wooldridge (1995, 2010) to again 
consider the panel structure. Dimova and Wolff (2011) look at labor market involvement by 
distinguishing between no work, part-time work and full-time work. The papers of Compton 
(2011) as well as Compton and Pollak (2014) also investigate working hours, but with a focus 
on Tobit estimation. Compton and Pollak (2014) focus on proximity rather than childcare itself. 
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In addition, they only mention the selection correction as a side note. To the best of my 
knowledge, the research question of this paper has not been investigated for Germany in the 
way I do using this exact empirical strategy.  
D.3 Data 
I use the survey years 1999 through 20123 of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).4 
Before 1999, the information about childcare arrangements cannot be separated with sufficient 
clarity, and for some years, there is no information about informal childcare at all. The sample 
is restricted to women. The GSOEP contains detailed information about the childcare 
arrangements of children living in the household. I only consider women between the ages of 
20 and 59. I do not include women who are near retirement with zero working hours, who are 
in vocational training, in short-time work or in a sheltered workshop since these are special 
cases. I only consider women who live with at least one child up to the age of 12. This is 
considered a crucial age in respect to the need to being cared for by adults.5 I include single 
mothers as well as mothers who live with a partner. Childcare arrangements are distinguished 
in the following way. There are (public) institutions, e.g., kindergartens or nannies, and 
informal arrangements, e.g., family, friends or neighbors. The questionnaire explicitly focuses 
on arrangements on a regular basis, meaning that cases in which grandmothers might fill-in as 
an exception are not included. However, it does not distinguish between grandparents and other 
relatives. It must be mentioned that the question about informal arrangements only refers to 
persons outside the household. This means childcare provided by cohabiting grandparents is 
not included. Multigenerational households are a rather rare household type in the considered 
sample (about 3% of the mothers in the sample live in such a household). Nevertheless, this 
might result in an underestimation of the effect later on. Another issue when investigating the 
importance of informal childcare might be the care that the grandparents need. This is not 
considered to be an issue here, since only approximately 7% of the women in the sample spend 
time on this task. But these 7% do not all refer to grandparents who are in need, but to care in 
general. This means it is not necessarily the grandparent who is in need. 
Overall this results in a sample containing 5,995 women with at least one child up to age 12 
living in the household. 2,995 of these women use childcare provided by grandparents, friends 
or neighbors at least at some point in time, while 3,787 women use formal childcare.  
                                                 
3 The year 2003 is excluded since there is no information available about informal childcare arrangements. 
4 For a description of this very rich panel dataset, see Wagner et al. (2007). 
5 E.g., from age 13 on, German children are allowed to start working to a small extent (§ 5 JArbSchG). 
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D.4 Descriptive Analysis  
The share of women using informal childcare is somewhat smaller than the share using formal 
childcare (2,995 vs. 3,787 of 5,995). Table D-1 contains further information, and it is to be 
noted that these values are averaged over all included survey years.6 Each year, on average, 
contains 2,140 women. For the descriptive analysis, I define three age groups for the children 
living in a household. The first group includes children at the age range 0-2 years, the second 
group includes children between 3 and 5 years, and the oldest age group represents age 6 
through 12. This makes it possible to distinguish pre-school age and school age. Three years is 
the age at which children have a legal entitlement to a place in a kindergarten in Germany (Spieß 
(2011), § 24 SGB VIII). 
As presented in table D-1, on average, 29.7% of those living with a partner use some form of 
informal childcare while 44.7% use some form of formal arrangement. Almost 16% even use 
both forms. 41.3% do not report to use any of the two childcare sources; 13.8% only rely on 
informal arrangements while 29% only rely on formal arrangements. Table D-1 also reports the 
values separately according to the age of the youngest child. In the youngest age group, the 
share of those using no childcare amounts to 39.9%, in the age group 3-5 this amounts to only 
11.5% while in the oldest age group it amounts to 57.5%. This is expected since the oldest age 
group is in school, which is not included in formal childcare. For the youngest age group, the 
value is lower, but still relatively high. This might be explained by the fact that mothers take 
leave from the labor market, e.g., maternity leave, in connection with childbirth. Therefore, 
during the first months of a child’s life there is no need for regular childcare arrangement. 32.4% 
(42.4%) of the cohabiting women whose youngest child is 2 years tops use some form of 
informal (formal) childcare. If the youngest child is between 3 and 5 years old the value amounts 
to 37.2% (82.1%) and if the youngest child is at least six years old, it is 24.5% (26.8%).  
Examining women living without a partner reveals a slightly different pattern: 40.1% use 
informal childcare, 46% make use of formal childcare and 20.6% use both forms while 34.9% 
use no childcare. The difference to the women living with a partner is most distinct for informal 
childcare (more than 10% points). This indicates that informal arrangements are an important 
source of childcare. It is likely that in couple households, the partner is an important source of 
childcare that is lacking in single households. This might be one reason for the higher share of 
single women using informal childcare compared to the share of those living with a partner.  
                                                 
6 The values by survey year are presented in the appendix.  
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Table D-1:  basic sample information (averaged over the observed years)7 
youngest child group partner no partner 
all all 1888 252 
 using informal childcare 561 29.7 % 101 40.1 % 
 using formal childcare 849 44.7 % 116 46.0 % 
 using both forms 301 15.9 % 52 20.6 % 
 using none 779 41.3 % 88 34.9 % 
 only informal 260 13.8 % 49 19.4 % 
 only formal 548 29.0 % 64 25.4 % 
0-2 all 469 35 
 using informal childcare 152 32.4 % 15 42.9 % 
 using formal childcare 199 42.4 % 14 40.0 % 
 using both forms 69 14.7 % 6 17.1 % 
 using none 187 39.9 % 14 40.0 % 
3-5 all 487 61 
 using informal childcare 181 37.2 % 28 45.9 % 
 using formal childcare 400 82.1 % 51 83.6 % 
 using both forms 150 30.8 % 25 41.0 % 
 using none 56 11.5 % 7 11.5 % 
6-12 all 932 156 
 using informal childcare 228 24.5 % 59 37.8 % 
 using formal childcare 250 26.8 % 52 33.3 % 
 using both forms 82 8.8 % 22 14.1 % 
 using none 536 57.5 % 67 42.9 % 
  Source: GSOEP 1999-2012, excluding 20038, own calculations 
If the youngest child is no older than 2 years, 42.9% use informal childcare, 40% use a formal 
arrangement. The values for the age group 3-5 amount to 45.9%, resp. 83.6%. In the age group 
6-12 the shares are 37.8% and 33.3%. Even though the group sizes (averaged over time) in the 
latter cases are quite small, it must be mentioned that the vast majority of pre-school aged 
children older than 2 years are in formal childcare. This is the case for both single and 
cohabiting women and also is in line with the rates reported in official statistics (e.g., Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany (2014)). Since the youngest child can be considered the 
“bottleneck”, figure D-1 represents the extent of employment according to the age of the 
youngest child. The extent is measured by the actual working hours per week. The following 
categories are defined: not employed, up to fifteen hours a week, 16-32 hours a week and more 
than 32 hours a week. To define this, the generated information of the GSOEP about actual 
                                                 
7 Of course the values are rounded to integral numbers. 
8 The year 2003 is not included since for this year I have no information about informal childcare. 
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working hours is used. I do not use the contractual working hours since these often are not fixed 
(e.g., for the self-employed). The figure includes all mothers in the sample in all waves they are 
observed. This means that one mother can be represented in more than one age group of the 
youngest child over time, so the figure gives information about the average situation during the 
observation period. The findings are as expected. The share of mothers not working amounts to 
more than 70% if the youngest child is in the age group 0-2. If the youngest child is aged 3-5, 
part-time employment becomes common (categories 1-15, 16-32) and is even higher when the 
youngest child is at the oldest age group. Non-participation remains at a remarkable level over 
all groups, it never drops far below 30%. Full-time employment is rather low for group 1, 
amounting to somewhat more than 15% for group 2 and reaching 23% for group 3. While it 
exceeds marginal employment once the youngest child is at least three years old, it is less 
common than part-time employment in all groups. 
 Figure D-1:  share of mothers working to different extents (hour categories) by age group of 
youngest child)9  
Figure D-2 distinguishes between women who receive help through informal childcare and 
those who do not. Apart from informal childcare, formal childcare is a major source of 
childcare. For this reason, the figure further distinguishes between those who receive informal 
support in addition to formal childcare and those who solely rely on informal arrangements. For 
                                                 
9 The values contained in the figure are presented in the appendix. 
Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations
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reasons of clarity, only working women are presented in figure D-2.10 First take a look at the 
group with the youngest child aged 0-2. All categories are more strongly represented among 
the women who use informal childcare arrangements in addition to formal arrangements than 
among women who solely rely on formal arrangements. 16-32 hours is the most prevalent 
employment category, both if solely formal childcare or if additional informal childcare is used. 
If informal childcare is the only source, “16-32” and “>32” hours are less prevalent than if only 
formal childcare is used while “up to 15 hours” is more prevalent than if formal childcare is the 
only form used. Of course, if no out-of-home childcare is used, the share of mothers working 
is very small. 
 Figure D-2:  share of mothers working to different extents (hour categories, by age group of 
youngest child and combination of childcare arrangements)11 
Considering the age group 3-5 reveals the following. These children are still not attending 
school, but there is a legal right to a kindergarten spot (§ 24 SGB VIII). For those using no 
childcare arrangement, the picture is slightly different. Those who are participating mainly work 
up to 15 hours. Comparing those who only rely on informal childcare to those only using formal 
                                                 
10 A version with the women who are not working is presented in the appendix. 
11 The values contained in the figure are presented in the appendix. 
Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations
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arrangements reveals that the category 1-15 is more common among women who only use 
informal childcare while the categories 16-32 and more than 32 hours are more common among 
those only using formal arrangements. If both forms are used, all three categories are more 
prevalent. If the youngest child is at the oldest considered age group, the employment pattern 
of mothers is considerably different. Even if no childcare arrangement is used, all categories 
are more strongly represented than if the youngest child is at a younger age group. But still, 
(quasi) full-time employment (>32 hours) is low at 18.1%. The category 16-32 is much more 
strongly represented if both forms are used. The share working between 16 and 32 hours is 
7.3% points higher if informal childcare is used additionally. The difference concerning (quasi) 
full-time employment is also notable at 8.4% points. This indicates that informal childcare 
might foster participation and increase the extent of employment. 
Figure D-3 distinguishes between women living with a partner and those living without a 
partner. This does not necessarily mean they do not have one, but if they do, they are not 
cohabiting. If both forms of childcare arrangements are used, the non-participation rate of 
cohabiting and of single women are comparable. Marginal employment (1-15 hours) is 
remarkably higher for the cohabiting women, while the opposite is true for (quasi) full-time 
employment. If only informal childcare is used, the categories 1-15 and 16-32 hours are more 
prevalent among cohabiting women while (quasi) full-time employment is much more 
prevalent among singles. If the only source of childcare is the formal type, (quasi) full-time 
employment is less common among cohabiting women while marginal employment (1-15 
hours) is more common among this group. The share of women not participating is slightly 
higher among single mothers. In case women do not use any of the two sources of childcare, 
non-participation is comparable for both groups. Again, 1-15 hours are more prevalent among 
cohabiting women. The category “>32 hours” is more common if no partner is living in the 
same household. Overall, this might indicate that cohabiting women participate to a comparable 
extent as their single counterparts but that they work fewer hours. Full-time employment (or 
quasi full-time) is less common for cohabiting mothers compared to single mothers irrespective 
of the forms of childcare they do or do not use.  
Overall, the descriptive analysis indicates that informal arrangements may be an important 
source of childcare, either as the only source or as a supplement to formal childcare that might 
facilitate maternal labor market involvement. In general, single mothers and cohabiting mothers 
participate to a comparable extent, while single mothers seem to work more hours than do 
cohabiting women.  
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 Figure D-3:  extent of employment of women living with / without a partner12 
D.5 Empirical methods and results 
D.5.1 Methods 
Participating in the labor market resp. extending the working hours is a decision that underlies 
clear time constraints. The weekly time a mother can devote to market work is strictly related 
to other time uses, such as other home-related chores, leisure and childcare. Overall, the total 
time devoted to all different time uses strictly sums up to 168 hours. If the mother benefits from 
either formal childcare, childcare of the father or cohabiting relatives or informal childcare 
arrangements outside the household, her own time devoted to childcare might decrease. The 
time devoted to other chores or leisure increases as a result. The time can be used for individual 
leisure, other home-related work, or for employment.13 The data only contains information 
about whether or not informal arrangements are used, but not about its amount. Therefore, I 
investigate whether the presence of a regular informal childcare arrangement outside the 
                                                 
12 The values contained in the figure are presented in the appendix. 
13 When investigating formal childcare, its costs often are considered to raise the mothers reservation wage (e.g., 
Wrohlich (2004)). This is less likely when it comes to informal childcare. I do not consider babysitters to be a 
problem since in the GSOEP, people are explicitly asked for “carer: paid care“. 
Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations
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household results in a higher participation and in more working hours. Informal childcare is 
expected to raise maternal employment as well as working hours.  
The use of informal childcare arrangements is most likely not exogenous in respect to 
participation. Mothers might first decide to work, and because of this decision, arrange some 
informal childcare on a regular basis. This is not considered to be a severe problem when it 
comes to working hours. This would be more likely if the amount of informal childcare were 
under investigation, but not if its presence per se is the subject of investigation. Another 
challenge is that working hours are only observed for those who are actually working. The 
decision about working hours is unlikely to depend on the same process as the participation 
decision. This results in a sample that is likely characterized by selection into employment. 
While it is unlikely that both decisions are based on the same process, it also is unlikely that 
they are completely independent from each other (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). To 
account for these characteristics adequately, I divide the analysis into two models.  
Model 1 - participation 
The first model investigates the role of informal childcare arrangements in respect to 
participation. To account for the potential problem of endogeneity, I use an instrument that has 
also been mentioned in the literature (e.g., Aassve et al. (2011)), namely the information about 
whether the grandmother is still alive.14 This fact is considered to have a distinct, positive effect 
on the likelihood of receiving support through informal childcare but to have no direct effect 
on the employment decision. One might argue that care for elderly is a potential issue, but since 
I focus on families with rather young children, this is not considered to be an issue. Of the whole 
sample, only 6.8% spend time on care, 6.5% spend time on care and have a living mother. 
Overall, 2,860 women have a child in the youngest age group at some point in time, and only 
3.3% of them spend some time on care. The values amount to 4.8% for those with the youngest 
child at age 3-5 and to 8.2% for those whose youngest child is in the age group 6-12.15 In 
addition, this includes all types of care, not only the care for the own mother.  
The dummy “mother alive” almost never varies over time. And since I investigate mothers of 
rather young children, most grandmothers are still alive. This indicates that the instrument is to 
be handled with care. Therefore, I also estimate the model using an additional instrument. This 
is the lagged information about informal childcare. Since the use of such instruments is not 
undisputed (e.g., Angrist and Krueger (2001)), I do not focus on these results. 
                                                 
14 This is drawn from biography information of the GSOEP as well as from information about changes of the 
family situation. 
15 Note that due to the data being panel each mother might be contained in all of the three groups over time. 
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Participation is a binary variable ( ). The variable that has to be instrumented, namely 
informal childcare, is binary itself ( ). A general model for a binary outcome with an 
endogenous regressor can be described as follows (Wooldridge (2010), Cameron and Trivedi 
(2005))16: 
 (D-1) 
 (D-2) 
Both  and  are observed outcomes of latent variables (Cameron and Trivedi (2005)): 
 (D-3) 
 (D-4) 
Applying a two-stage least squares procedure (2SLS) to this is widely discussed in Angrist and 
Pischke (2009). An application is found in, e.g., Dimova and Wolff (2008). The advantage of 
using 2SLS is that there is no need for distributional assumptions about the error terms (Angrist 
and Pischke (2009)). They argue that a just-identified 2SLS is approximately unbiased. At least 
one variable ( ) must be included in (D-4) that is unequal to zero and not included in (D-3) 
(just-identified). If there are two or more such variables and one endogenous variable, the model 
is over-identified (e.g., Angrist and Pischke (2009), Wooldridge (2010)). As stated above, I use 
the information about whether the grandmother is still alive. According to Angrist and Pischke 
(2009), the results of 2SLS reveal what is called the local average treatment effect (LATE). I 
use cluster-robust standard errors for the pooled estimation. In addition, EC2SLS and G2SLS 
(Baltagi (2008)) results are reported.  
Model 2 – working hours 
The second step is to investigate the working hours for those who are working. As mentioned 
previously, this process neither is the same as the participation decision nor is it expected to be 
completely independent from it. This indicates that a Heckman selection correction is to be used 
(e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Heckman (1979)). As an exclusion restriction, I use the 
female unemployment rate of the federal state of residence. This variable is included in the 
participation-model but not included in the hours-model.17 The information is available from 
the Federal Employment Agency (2013). Only working women are included, which results in 
a selected sample. This even reduces the variety in the instrumental variable. Given that the 
                                                 
16 The notation is adapted to be consistent. 
17 A list of the variables included in each equation can be found in the appendix. 
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only instrumental variable is a dummy with little variation and only one exclusion restriction 
for the selection model, I apply the following procedure. For the selection correction, I estimate 
the participation equation using a basic probit model  (e.g. 
Wooldridge (2010)) to obtain the inverse Mill's ratio. In this model, the dummy “mother alive” 
is included instead of the dummy “informal childcare” (reduced form). The inverse Mill’s ratio 
then is included as an additional regressor in the estimation of the working hours for those who 
are working (Heckman selection model: e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Heckman (1979)). 
Informal childcare is treated as exogenous in this model. It is reasonable to assume that the 
endogeneity is mainly a problem in the first model. The decision to work might influence the 
probability of using some form of informal childcare. But once this decision is made, the 
number of hours likely does not influence the use of informal childcare per se, which is the only 
available information. This results in (e.g., Wooldridge (2010)): 
 (D-5) 
 represents the actual (positive) weekly working hours and  is defined as: 
 (D-6) 
with  being the standard normal density function (pdf) and  
being the standard normal distribution function (cdf) (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). The 
inverse Mill’s ratio is derived from a regular probit model of  on  and .  from the probit 
model and  in equation (D-5) should not be identical. Therefore, I include the female 
unemployment rate of the federal state of residence as an exclusion restriction in the probit 
model but not in (D-5) (e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). This is expected to influence the 
likelihood of employment but not the amount of hours worked. Additionally, as discussed by 
Wooldridge (1995, 2010), separate probit models for each year are estimated so that  may vary 
over time to take into account the panel structure.18  
Much like informal childcare, formal childcare may also be endogenous. This is not the focus 
of this analysis. However, I also estimate a pooled two-stage least squares model with both 
informal and formal childcare being considered as endogenous. The lagged existence of formal 
childcare is used as an instrument for contemporary formal childcare. Informal childcare is 
                                                 
18 I also estimate an alternative specification with added time averages of appropriate explanatory variables to 
specify individual effects (Wooldridge (2010), Dustman and Rochina-Barrachina (2007)). The results are 
comparable. 
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instrumented using the lagged information and the information of whether the mother is still 
alive. 
D.5.2 Results 
D.5.2.1 Participation 
The results concerning participation are presented in tables D-2 and D-3. They correspond with 
expectations. The use of informal childcare is expected to have a positive effect on the labor 
force participation of women. In addition to the covariates presented in the tables, I include year 
dummies, taking 1999 as the reference year.19 The estimation reveals a weakly significant and 
clearly positive effect of informal childcare on the likelihood of participation. The standard 
errors are cluster-robust. The effect resulting from the 2SLS model (0.372) is distinctly higher 
than that found using OLS estimation (0.129).20 As discussed above, the instrument has a 
weakness, namely its lack of comprehensive variation over time as well as between individuals. 
Therefore, the effect size revealed by the 2SLS should be interpreted with caution. I estimated 
the same model including another instrument: the lagged endogenous variable. The results are 
presented in the appendix. This reveals an effect of 0.184. The use of this instrument is not 
undisputed (e.g., Angrist and Krueger (2001)). Nonetheless, the 2SLS results reveal that OLS 
most likely underestimates the effect of informal childcare on the probability of maternal labor 
market participation. The effect clearly is positive and also distinct, since all estimations reveal 
an effect that is larger than 12 percentage points. This result is in line with the literature. An 
underestimation of the effect by the use of OLS is also found in other studies taking into account 
the endogeneity of informal childcare (e.g., Aassve et al. (2011), Posadas and Vidal-Fernández 
(2012)).  
The coefficients for formal childcare are positive and highly significant, both in the outcome 
equation and in the first stage equation. As mentioned earlier, formal childcare might be 
endogenous as well.21 Age is significant and positive in the 2SLS model. Years of education 
are positively associated with the probability of being employed. Living with a partner is 
negatively related to the probability of receiving out-of-home informal help, which is expected 
since the partner might be an important source of childcare, superseding other informal sources. 
                                                 
19 I do not include school attendance since it is compulsory and therefore highly correlated with the age of the 
children. However, including it does not change the results and conclusions. As expected, its coefficient is positive. 
20 The OLS results can be found in the appendix. 
21 If formal childcare is modeled to be endogenous as well, the estimated effect of informal childcare on 
participation is of the same size as if formal childcare is treated as exogenous, while the effect of formal childcare 
is slightly stronger. 
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But it shows a positive coefficient for participation. This also is expected since the partner might 
provide childcare and hence more flexibility. Living in a multigenerational household is 
insignificant in both stages. 
Table D-2:  results of 2SLS estimation22 
  participation informal cc  
informal childcare 0.372 * (0.192) -   
formal childcare 0.169 *** (0.014) 0.064 *** (0.007) 
age 0.020 *** (0.006) 0.008  (0.006) 
age squared -0.001 *** (0.000) 0.000 *** (0.000) 
years of education 0.027 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.002) 
living with a partner 0.061 ** (0.024) -0.111 *** (0.015) 
multigenerational household -0.005  (0.032) -0.039  (0.030) 
age of youngest child 0.056 *** (0.002) -0.006 *** (0.002) 
number of children 0-12 -0.019 ** (0.008) -0.029 *** (0.007) 
experience part-time 0.048 *** (0.003) 0.014 *** (0.001) 
experience full-time 0.028 *** (0.002) 0.011 *** (0.001) 
East-Germany 0.046 ** (0.020) 0.033  (0.023) 
German citizenship -0.026  (0.021) 0.079 *** (0.015) 
unemployment rate (f) -0.006 *** (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) 
mother alive -   0.086 *** (0.015) 
constant -0.557 *** (0.121) 0.286 ** (0.107) 
observations 24,527 
number of women 5,010 
R-squared 0.327 0.068 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 61.405 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses 
The age of the youngest child in the household shows a positive coefficient in the participation 
equation, indicating that participation is more prevalent among mothers of older children. This 
is in line with the descriptive analysis. The coefficient is negative in the first stage, which is 
expected since older children need less care. The number of children has a negative coefficient 
in both stages. Experience, either part-time or full-time, is positively associated with informal 
childcare as well as with participation. Living in East Germany shows a positive coefficient in 
the second stage. German citizenship is associated with a higher probability of using informal 
childcare but seems not to be related to the participation probability. This is in line with 
expectations because, for those women, it is more likely that their mothers live nearby. The 
female unemployment rate shows what is expected: a higher rate is associated with a lower 
                                                 
22 The results of the instrumental variable estimations are obtained using the Stata command ivreg2, provided by 
Baum et al. (2010). 
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likelihood of participation. The dummy indicating whether the mother is still alive is highly 
significantly associated with a higher likelihood of using informal childcare. 
In addition, I estimate a bivariate probit model. The bivariate probit accounts for both 
indicators, namely participation and the use of informal childcare, being binary. The bivariate 
probit model is discussed in Wooldridge (2010) and Angrist and Pischke (2009). The results 
obtained via 2SLS and bivariate probit cannot be directly compared in their magnitude, since 
2SLS gives the LATE, while with the bivariate probit model, it is easy to calculate the average 
treatment effect (ATE) or the average treatment effect on the treated (TOT), assuming a 
bivariate normal distribution (Angrist and Pischke (2009)). If a bivariate probit is applied, the 
baseline remains unchanged. I focus on the 2SLS estimation for the reason of weaker 
assumptions (e.g., Angrist and Pischke (2009)). The results of the bivariate probit model are 
presented in the appendix. 
Table D-3:  results EC2SLS and G2SLS – participation 23  
 EC2SLS G2SLS 
  participation informal cc participation informal cc 
informal childcare 0.380 *** -  0.394 *** -  
 (0.054)    (0.125)    
formal childcare 0.165 *** 0.016  0.163 *** 0.066 *** 
 (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.006)  
mum alive -  0.076 *** -  0.084 *** 
   (0.011)    (0.011)  
observations 24,527 
number of clusters 5,010 
Wald 2 11,977.19 11,829.99 
Cragg-Donald Wald F24 5.48 53.89 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
Employing the panel methods reveals the results presented in table D-3. The results of the two 
estimators are essentially the same. I focus on the G2SLS results. The presence of informal 
childcare arrangements leads to a significantly higher probability of being in the labor force. 
The coefficient of the G2SLS is slightly higher than that obtained using the EC2SLS. The 
EC2SLS is a weighted version of the within estimator and the between estimator (Baltagi 
(2008)). The results are comparable to those obtained by the pooled 2SLS estimation, which is 
why they are not discussed in detail.  
                                                 
23 The complete results are presented in the appendix. Note that the EC2SLS transforms each variable twice in the 
first stage. The complete results of the first stage are also presented in the appendix. 
24 Statistic obtained using xtoverid, provided by Schaffer and Stillman (2010). 
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To sum up, the estimations, irrespective of the choice of the empirical model, reveal a positive 
impact of informal childcare arrangements on the likelihood of female labor force participation. 
However, the precise size of this effect requires further research, e.g. by the use of stronger 
resp. less controversially discussed instruments. 
D.5.2.2 Working hours 
Deciding whether to participate in the labor market is only one facet of maternal employment. 
This section investigates the effect of informal childcare arrangements on the working hours of 
mothers. Therefore, only working mothers are included. As discussed above, I use a Heckman 
selection correction to correct for the selection into employment. Since I use the inverse Mill’s 
ratio (IMR) obtained from the selection equation as an additional regressor, I use bootstrapped 
standard errors (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). The IMR is derived from a probit model in 
which the endogenous regressor informal childcare is replaced by its instrument, namely 
mother alive (reduced form). The estimation is implemented using the Stata-implemented 
Heckman’s two-step procedure (Heckman (1979)). Again, a set of year dummies is also 
included. The results are presented in tables D-4 and D-5.  
The coefficient of informal childcare is positive and highly significant. However, the extent of 
the effect is quite small, amounting to slightly more than one hour each week. This result 
indicates that informal childcare does not facilitate maternal full-time instead of part-time 
employment. Since I refer to actual rather than contractual working hours, the results imply that 
informal childcare makes it easier for mothers to work overtime or to stay at work longer than 
they could otherwise.25 For example, if mothers must pick up their children at some childcare 
institution, the grandmother might instead collect the children so that the mother can stay at 
work. This result is in line with the findings of Compton and Pollack (2014) regarding 
proximity. They also find a positive impact on the participation decision, but not on the hours-
decision. Formal childcare also shows a highly significant and positive coefficient, which is 
considerably higher than that of informal childcare. This is expected, since informal childcare 
is often an additional source of childcare beyond formal arrangements. Age is slightly 
negatively related to working hours. Years of education are positively associated with working 
hours, which is clearly expected. Women living with a partner seem to work less hours than 
their single counterparts, which is in line with the descriptive analysis. The age of the youngest 
child and the number of children show expected signs, age is positively associated with the 
                                                 
25 If instead the agreed working hours are investigated, this leads to an even smaller effect. 
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working hours while the number of children shows a negative coefficient. Labor market 
experience, both full-time and part-time, is related to slightly more hours. East German women 
work more hours. This is expected since full-time employment with even young children in the 
household is much more common in East Germany than in West Germany (e.g., Keller and 
Haustein (2013)). German citizenship seems to be negatively correlated with working hours. 
The inverse Mill’s ratio is significant and positive.  
Table D-4:  results of Heckman two-step estimation – working hours26 
  hours working 
informal childcare 1.178 *** (0.201)  
formal childcare 3.696 *** (0.319) 0.644 *** (0.022) 
age -0.717 *** (0.167) 0.039 *** (0.015) 
agesq 0.000  (0.002) -0.002 *** (0.000) 
years of education 1.211 *** (0.051) 0.113 *** (0.004) 
partner -3.471 *** (0.298) 0.096 *** (0.031) 
multigenerational 0.828  (0.786) -0.050  (0.071) 
age of youngest child 1.260 *** (0.072) 0.196 *** (0.004) 
number of children 0-12 -1.818 *** (0.172) -0.116 *** (0.016) 
experience part-time 0.139 *** (0.060) 0.223 *** (0.004) 
experience full-time 0.963 *** (0.041) 0.117 *** (0.003) 
East-Germany 8.219 *** (0.245) 0.242 *** (0.046) 
German citizenship -2.905 *** (0.366) 0.019  (0.033) 
inverse Mill's ratio 4.074 *** (0.665) -   
unemployment rate (f) -   -0.026 *** (0.005) 
mother alive -   0.149 *** (0.038) 
constant 22.278 *** (3.347) -2.670 *** (0.264) 
observations 24,084 
Wald 2 5,251.07 
2 ( ) 37.50 
Prob > 2 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
Using probit models for each year reveals the results presented in table D-5. For each period, a 
probit model is estimated to derive the inverse Mill’s ratio. These estimates therefore are not 
presented. According to Wooldridge (1995, 2010), a pooled OLS is then run on the selected 
sample. One can draw the same conclusion from these results as from those obtained by the 
                                                 
26 The Stata-implemented Heckman two-step procedure only allows for cluster-robust inference if using the 
bootstrap. If this is done, or the Maximum Likelihood estimation or manual selection correction is applied, the 
results remain unchanged. 
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standard Heckman model. The covariates also show comparable coefficients. All inverse Mill’s 
ratios are positive and also (highly) significant.27  
Table D-5:  working hours – selection with Probit model for each year28 
  hours 
informal childcare  1.164 *** (0.266)   
inverse Mill's ratio…1999  6.392 *** (1.332)  
2000  2.735 ** (1.177)  
2001  3.447 *** (1.103)  
2002  2.821 ** (1.151)  
2004  4.045 *** (1.200)  
2005  4.290 *** (1.302)  
2006  3.626 *** (1.109)  
2007  3.289 *** (1.130)  
2008  3.482 *** (1.319)  
2009  3.484 ** (1.535)  
2010  4.360 *** (1.422)  
2011  3.596 *** (1.350)  
2012  4.513 *** (1.475)  
constant  21.886 *** (5.684)   
observations 14,083 
R-squared 0.293 
2 (IMR's) 31.32 
Prob > 2 0.003 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
Overall, the analysis of working hours reveals a positive impact of informal arrangements. 
However, the extent is rather small. The analysis gives no proof that informal childcare might 
facilitate maternal full-time employment rather than part-time employment.  
D.5.2.3 Robustness and summary of results 
There are several requirements for a variable to be considered a valid instrument. First, an 
instrument must be uncorrelated with the residuals of the equation of interest, i.e., 
 (e.g., Wooldridge (2010)). Assuming that whether the mother is still alive 
directly influences the likelihood to receive help in the form of informal childcare without 
influencing the likelihood of being employed through any other channel than childcare 
availability is reasonable. Second, the instrument must be relevant, meaning the coefficient of 
 is unequal to zero ( , e.g., Wooldridge (2010)). The first-stage estimates 
                                                 
27 Including time averages as discussed in Wooldridge (1995, 2010) doesn’t change the results either. 
28 The complete results are presented in the appendix. 
Informal childcare and maternal employment 102 
 
indicate that this requirement is met by the chosen instrument as well. Nonetheless, the 
instrument has a weakness. It is a dummy and it does not vary greatly over time and between 
individuals. Most grandmothers are still alive since I investigate a sample of rather young 
women with children in the age group 0-12. Considering only working women even reduces 
the extent to which the instrumental variable varies. Therefore, I do not overwork the instrument 
and the analysis of working hours focuses on the results derived by the probit model(s) and the 
selection model, especially since endogeneity is most likely a severe problem in the 
participation model rather than in the hours model. This is reasonable since employment hours 
might be relevant for the amount of childcare used, not necessarily for the use itself. I also 
estimate the participation model using the lagged endogenous dummy as an additional 
instrument. Since this practice is discussed controversially in the literature (e.g., Angrist and 
Krueger (2001)), I do not focus on this specification. The literature uses several instruments. 
However, as Compton and Pollack (2014) discuss in respect to their instrument for informal 
childcare, namely proximity, these may have weaknesses as well.  
However, the results concerning the participation decision indicate a positive effect of the 
presence of informal childcare arrangements on the probability of participating in the labor 
market. This is true irrespective of what specification is used. The 2SLS estimates show a 
remarkably higher coefficient, indicating that OLS underestimates the effect. When including 
the lagged dummy about informal childcare as an additional instrument, the coefficient is closer 
to that of the OLS estimation and is highly significant, but the effect is still is of a greater extent 
than that obtained via OLS.29 The true effect most likely amounts to an extent somewhere in 
between the OLS result and the 2SLS result presented above. However, it is reasonable to 
conclude that informal childcare seems to clearly facilitate maternal employment. This is in line 
with previous literature (e.g., Aassve et al. (2011)).  
Concerning working hours, I account for the selection into employment since the hours are 
observed only for those who are working. I use a Heckman approach as well as an approach 
suggested by Wooldridge (1995, 2010), which accounts for the panel structure. The results are 
comparable for both models. If informal childcare of the last year is included in the selection 
equation of the standard Heckman model as well, the coefficient of informal childcare in the 
hours equation is slightly higher at 1.408 hours. If it is included in the period-specific probit 
models, the coefficient of informal childcare amounts to 1.378 hours and is still highly 
significant. Nevertheless, the effect is small in all applied estimations. The presence of informal 
childcare is found to raise work time by about 1.3 hours a week, which may indicate that 
                                                 
29 The results are presented in detail in the appendix. 
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informal childcare does not facilitate maternal full-time employment instead of part-time 
employment. Since I refer to actual rather than contractual working hours, the results imply that 
informal childcare makes it easier for mothers to work overtime or to stay at work slightly 
longer.30 For example, if mothers must pick up their children at some childcare institution, this 
is a fixed time that cannot be extended easily. Grandmothers or other forms of informal 
childcare might assume this task so that the mother can stay at work longer. But, as already 
mentioned, the results do not imply that informal childcare facilitates full-time rather than part-
time employment of mothers. 
D.6 Conclusions 
Maternal labor market participation as well as employment hours are of great interest in German 
politics (e.g., Spieß (2011), Ristau (2005)). The demographic change Germany is facing and 
the challenges for the economy wrought by this change (e.g., European Commission (2012), 
OECD (2014)) have led to the extent of market work of mothers being a widely discussed topic 
in German political discourse (e.g., BMFSFJ (2014), BMI (2011)). This analysis investigates 
whether maternal employment and working hours are increased by the presence of informal 
childcare arrangements. Two problems when solely relying on formal arrangements might be 
the lack of flexibility and the inability to cover irregular time slots (Posadas and Vidal-
Fernández (2012), Compton (2011), Compton and Pollak (2014)). A grandmother might 
assume tasks spontaneously, i.e., if the child is sick, or they might take on other obligations on 
a regular basis, such as collecting the children at some institution or covering certain time slots 
that are not covered by formal institutions. This is much more complicated if one only relies on 
formal arrangements. 
One empirical challenge when investigating this question is the potential endogeneity of 
informal childcare arrangements with respect to participation. Informal childcare is 
instrumented using information about whether the mother of the woman is still alive. This is 
expected to have a direct influence on the likelihood of having access to informal childcare, but 
it is not expected to influence the participation of the woman through any other channel. A 
challenge in the estimation of the effect on working hours is the selection into employment in 
the first place. The decision about whether to participate might depend on another process than 
the decision about hours (e.g., Cameron and Trivedi (2005)). This selection is taken into account 
                                                 
30 If the agreed working hours are investigated, this leads to an even smaller effect. 
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when investigating the working hours using a Heckman-type correction (Heckman (1979), 
Wooldridge (1995, 2010)).  
Overall, informal childcare seems to be an important factor that supports mothers in combining 
market work and family life. The results concerning labor market participation are in line with 
expectations and with previous literature. Maternal employment is more likely when mothers 
have support through social networks outside the household.  
Informal childcare also seems to have a positive influence on working hours once a mother has 
decided to participate in the labor market. The extent of this effect is small. Using a Heckman 
selection correction reveals an effect of slightly more than an hour. Therefore, the results do 
not indicate that informal childcare arrangements are crucial for full-time employment instead 
of part-time employment. The presence of informal childcare arrangement rather seems to 
provide more flexibility within a certain work arrangement, for instance, the flexibility to stay 
at work slightly longer because someone else can pick up the children from a childcare 
institution. 
Since only out-of-home childcare is investigated, this may lead to an underestimation of the 
importance of informal childcare. The contribution of fathers as well as cohabiting relatives is 
not investigated. This is done for two reasons. First, including fathers’ contribution to childcare 
would lead to many further methodological challenges, since the time use of partners is most 
likely interdependent. Second, when it comes to other cohabiting relatives, e.g., grandparents, 
these are not only a possible source of childcare but might also be in need of care themselves. 
This would not relax the mothers’ time constraints, it would instead further tighten them. To 
include all of these other kinds of informal childcare is an issue for further research. The present 
study is a further step towards the investigation of this source of childcare dealing with 
endogeneity as well as with selection. It further illustrates the positive effects of informal 
childcare on maternal participation in the labor market. 
  
Informal childcare and maternal employment 105 
 
D.7 Appendix 
Table A D-1:  Sample by observation year 
 group with partner without partner 
1999  1,771 
 all 1,582 189 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 31.7 39.7 
 using formal childcare 38.5 39.2 
 using both forms 14.3 15.3 
 using none 44.1 36.5 
 only informal 17.4 24.3 
 only formal 24.2 23.8 
2000  2,968 
 all 2,657 311 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 27.9 40.2 
 using formal childcare 40.1 38.9 
 using both forms 13.4 19.3 
 using none 45.4 40.2 
 only informal 14.5 20.9 
 only formal 26.6 19.6 
2001  2,635 
 all 2,361 274 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 32.4 40.5 
 using formal childcare 42.1 39.8 
 using both forms 15.9 19.7 
 using none 41.3 39.4 
 only informal 16.6 20.8 
 only formal 26.3 20.1 
2002  2,663 
 all 2,394 269 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 35.4 41.3 
 using formal childcare 43.1 42.8 
 using both forms 17.5 21.9 
 using none 39.0 37.9 
 only informal 17.9 19.3 
 only formal 25.6 20.8 
2003  2,450 
 all 2,189 261 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare n.a.31 n.a. 
 using formal childcare 43.5 42.5 
 using both forms n.a. n.a. 
 using none n.a. n.a. 
 only informal n.a. n.a. 
 only formal n.a. n.a. 
  
                                                 
31 This type of childcare was not included in the 2003 questionnaire. 
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Table A D-1 continued:    
2004  2,313 
 all 2,059 254 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 32.2 44.9 
 using formal childcare 44.7 49.2 
 using both forms 17.5 24.4 
 using none 40.6 30.3 
 only informal 14.7 20.5 
 only formal 27.2 24.8 
2005  2,174 
 all 1,899 275 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 25.6 34.2 
 using formal childcare 44.5 46.9 
 using both forms 15.2 18.2 
 using none 45.0 37.1 
 only informal 10.4 16.0 
 only formal 29.4 28.7 
2006  2,329 
 all 2,025 304 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 26.9 40.1 
 using formal childcare 43.3 49.0 
 using both forms 14.4 21.7 
 using none 44.2 32.6 
 only informal 12.5 18.4 
 only formal 28.9 27.3 
2007  2,150 
 all 1,870 280 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 26.6 33.9 
 using formal childcare 44.2 44.6 
 using both forms 14.9 17.9 
 using none 44.0 39.3 
 only informal 11.8 16.1 
 only formal 29.4 26.8 
2008  1,936 
 all 1,668 268 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 28.1 38.8 
 using formal childcare 44.9 42.2 
 using both forms 15.0 18.3 
 using none 42.0 37.3 
 only informal 13.1 20.5 
 only formal 29.9 23.9 
2009  1,959 
 all 1,690 269 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 29.9 43.9 
 using formal childcare 50.2 53.9 
 using both forms 17.9 23.4 
 using none 37.8 25.7 
 only informal 12.0 20.4 
 only formal 32.2 30.5 
  
Informal childcare and maternal employment 107 
 
Table A D-1 continued:    
2010  1,735 
 all 1,499 236 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 28.2 40.3 
 using formal childcare 52.2 48.7 
 using both forms 17.7 18.6 
 using none 37.3 29.7 
 only informal 10.5 21.6 
 only formal 34.6 30.1 
2011  1,654 
 all 1,465 189 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 31.9 41.3 
 using formal childcare 52.3 52.9 
 using both forms 18.8 27.0 
 using none 34.5 32.8 
 only informal 13.2 14.3 
 only formal 33.5 25.9 
2012 2000 1,530 
 all 1,369 161 
percentage reporting… using informal childcare 27.6 44.7 
 using formal childcare 52.9 54.7 
 using both forms 16.8 28.0 
 using none 36.3 28.6 
 only informal 10.8 16.8 
 only formal 36.1 26.7 
 Source: GSOEP 1999-2012, own calculations 
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Table A D-2:  mean of different employment statuses, cohabiting or single 
age of youngest child  extent of employment all 
with 
partner 
without 
partner 
0-2 zero hours 0.728 0.722 0.809 
 1-15 hours 0.093 0.096 0.046 
 16-32 hours 0.096 0.098 0.069 
 >32 hours 0.072 0.072 0.069 
3-5 0 0.414 0.408 0.466 
 1-15 0.143 0.150 0.095 
 16-32 0.257 0.260 0.233 
 >32 0.166 0.163 0.192 
6-12 0 0.273 0.270 0.289 
 1-15 0.163 0.177 0.078 
 16-32 0.310 0.315 0.283 
 >32 0.231 0.215 0.329 
Bold values: figure D-1 Source: GSOEP 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
Table A D-3:  number of observations (tables A D-4 – A D-6) 
youngest child  all formal informal none both 
all 27,817 7,948 4,007 11,263 4,599 
0-2 6,553 1,780 1,181 2,608 984 
3-5 7,124 3,591 453 815 2,265 
6-12 14,140 2,577 2,373 7,840 1,350 
cohabiting      
all 24,538 7,122 3,375 10,124 3,917 
0-2 6,092 1,684 1,073 2,432 903 
3-5 6,334 3,252 408 728 1,946 
6-12 12,112 2,186 1,894 6,964 1,068 
single      
all 3,279 826 632 1,139 682 
0-2 461 96 108 176 81 
3-5 790 339 45 87 319 
6-12 2,028 391 479 876 282 
Bold values: figure D-1 Source: GSOEP 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
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Table A D-4:  mean of different employment statuses 
youngest child  extent  all formal informal none both 
all zero hours 0.416 0.443 0.333 0.482 0.281 
 1-15 hours 0.141 0.127 0.151 0.149 0.140 
 15-32 hours 0.246 0.236 0.282 0.213 0.314 
 >32 hours 0.177 0.175 0.213 0.138 0.247 
0-2 0 0.728 0.670 0.656 0.871 0.542 
 1-15 0.093 0.090 0.155 0.051 0.132 
 16-32 0.096 0.130 0.113 0.035 0.177 
 >32 0.072 0.097 0.063 0.035 0.138 
3-5 0 0.414 0.441 0.428 0.757 0.246 
 1-15 0.143 0.135 0.219 0.110 0.154 
 16-32 0.257 0.250 0.210 0.070 0.346 
 >32 0.166 0.154 0.113 0.053 0.237 
6-12 0 0.273 0.290 0.154 0.324 0.150 
 1-15 0.163 0.141 0.136 0.185 0.123 
 16-32 0.310 0.289 0.380 0.287 0.362 
 >32 0.231 0.258 0.306 0.181 0.342 
Bold values: figure D-
2 
Source: GSOEP 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
Table A D-5:  mean of different employment statuses– cohabiting 
youngest child  extent  all formal informal none both 
all zero hours 0.418 0.440 0.338 0.481 0.282 
 1-15 hours 0.150 0.134 0.164 0.157 0.148 
 16-32 hours 0.247 0.236 0.287 0.214 0.319 
 >32 hours 0.166 0.170 0.187 0.130 0.234 
0-2 0 0.722 0.669 0.639 0.866 0.534 
 1-15 0.096 0.092 0.166 0.053 0.138 
 16-32 0.098 0.131 0.118 0.036 0.183 
 >32 0.072 0.096 0.063 0.037 0.134 
3-5 0 0.408 0.431 0.424 0.745 0.240 
 1-15 0.150 0.142 0.225 0.120 0.157 
 16-32 0.260 0.254 0.211 0.071 0.350 
 >32 0.163 0.152 0.108 0.054 0.234 
6-12 0 0.270 0.277 0.149 0.320 0.144 
 1-15 0.177 0.155 0.150 0.197 0.140 
 16-32 0.315 0.290 0.399 0.291 0.375 
 >32 0.215 0.256 0.275 0.170 0.316 
Bold values: figure D-
3 
Source: GSOEP 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
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Table A D-6:  mean of different employment statuses– single 
youngest child  extent  all formal informal none both 
all zero hours 0.405 0.472 0.305 0.487 0.279 
 1-15 hours 0.078 0.063 0.078 0.079 0.094 
 16-32 hours 0.240 0.231 0.256 0.208 0.290 
 >32 hours 0.260 0.213 0.348 0.207 0.323 
0-2 0 0.809 0.698 0.824 0.943 0.630 
 1-15 0.046 0.052 0.046 0.034 0.062 
 16-32 0.067 0.115 0.065 0.023 0.111 
 >32 0.069 0.115 0.056 0.000 0.185 
3-5 0 0.466 0.537 0.467 0.862 0.282 
 1-15 0.095 0.065 0.156 0.034 0.135 
 16-32 0.233 0.204 0.200 0.057 0.317 
 >32 0.192 0.177 0.156 0.046 0.254 
6-12 0 0.289 0.361 0.173 0.358 0.174 
 1-15 0.078 0.064 0.077 0.092 0.057 
 16-32 0.283 0.284 0.305 0.260 0.312 
 >32 0.329 0.269 0.432 0.265 0.440 
Bold values: figure D-3 Source: GSOEP 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
Figure A D-1:  figure D-2 including the category “zero hours” 
Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations
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Table A D-7:  list of variables used in each equation 
 Model 1 Model 2 
variable working informal cc hours working 
informal childcare  -  - 
formal childcare     
age     
age squared     
years of education     
partner in the same household     
multigenerational household     
age of youngest child     
# of children 0-12     
experience part-time     
experience full-time     
living in East Germany     
German citizenship     
year dummies     
inverse Mill’s ratio(s) - -   
female unemployment rate   -  
mother alive -  -  
informal childcare (t-1) - -/  - -/  
Data source: GSOEP, 1999-2012 
 
  
Informal childcare and maternal employment 112 
 
Table A D-8:  results simple OLS
  participation hours 
informal childcare 0.129 *** (0.007) 1.027 *** (0.273) 
formal childcare 0.180 *** (0.006) 2.486 *** (0.276) 
age 0.023 *** (0.005) -1.004 *** (0.267) 
agesq -0.001 *** (0.000) 0.007 * (0.004) 
years of education 0.028 *** (0.002) 1.011 *** (0.075) 
partner 0.034 *** (0.011) -3.529 *** (0.479) 
multigenerational -0.010  (0.027) 0.558  (1.074) 
age of youngest child 0.054 *** (0.001) 0.922 *** (0.063) 
number of children 0-12 -0.027 *** (0.006) -1.566 *** (0.263) 
experience part-time 0.052 *** (0.001) -0.192 *** (0.056) 
experience full-time 0.030 *** (0.001) 0.756 *** (0.043) 
East-Germany 0.056 *** (0.017) 8.205 *** (0.418) 
German citizenship -0.003  (0.013) -3.085 *** (0.691) 
unemployment rate (f) -0.006  (0.002) -   
constant -0.490 *** (0.094) 34.245 *** (4.827) 
observations 26,767 15,252 
R-squared 0.371 0.286 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses 
Table A D-9:  results bivariate Probit estimation 
  participation informal cc  
informal childcare 1.423 *** (0.093)    
formal childcare 0.489 *** (0.033) 0.190 *** (0.022) 
age 0.024  (0.022) 0.050 ** (0.020) 
agesq -0.001 *** (0.000) -0.002 *** (0.000) 
years of education 0.092 *** (0.008) 0.026 *** (0.007) 
partner 0.241 *** (0.043) -0.325 *** (0.041) 
multigenerational 0.016  (0.107) -0.113  (0.092) 
age of youngest child 0.186 *** (0.007) -0.017 *** (0.005) 
number of children 0-12 -0.057 *** (0.022) -0.075 *** (0.023) 
experience part-time 0.178 *** (0.011) 0.048 *** (0.005) 
experience full-time 0.091 *** (0.006) 0.039 *** (0.004) 
East-Germany 0.175 *** (0.067) 0.082  (0.070) 
German citizenship -0.104 ** (0.048) 0.264 *** (0.050) 
unemployment rate (f) -0.021 *** (0.007) -0.005  (0.007) 
mother alive -   0.321 *** (0.056) 
constant -2.802 *** (0.383) -1.134 *** (0.346) 
observations 24,527 
Wald 2 6936.53 
Wald test  = 0 46.25 
Prob > 2 0.000 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A D-10:  results EC2SLS and G2SLS estimators – participation 
 EC2SLS G2SLS 
  participation informal cc participation informal cc 
informal childcare 0.380 *** -  0.394 *** -  
 (0.054)    (0.125)    
formal childcare 0.165 *** 0.016  0.163 *** 0.066 *** 
 (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.010)  (0.006)  
age 0.019 *** 0.010 ** 0.022 *** 0.006  
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
agesq -0.001 *** -0.000 *** -0.001 *** 0.000 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
years of education 0.027 *** 0.008 *** 0.027 *** 0.008 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
partner 0.061 *** -0.100 *** 0.063 *** -0.111 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.009)  
multigenerational -0.004  -0.001  -0.002  -0.049 ** 
 (0.020)  (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.022)  
age of youngest child 0.056 *** -0.012 *** 0.056 *** -0.005 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
# children 0-12 -0.019 *** -0.044 *** -0.019 *** -0.026 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
experience part-time 0.048 *** 0.013 *** 0.047 *** 0.014 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
experience full-time 0.027 *** 0.009 *** 0.027 *** 0.010 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
East-Germany 0.047 *** 0.024 * 0.045 *** 0.033 ** 
 (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
German citizenship -0.026 ** 0.074 *** -0.025 * 0.079 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.010)  
unemployment rate (f) -0.006 *** -0.001  -0.006 *** -0.002  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
mum alive -  0.076 *** -  0.084 *** 
   (0.011)    (0.011)  
constant -0.533 *** -0.201 *** -0.600 *** 0.318 *** 
  (0.077)  (0.076)  (0.084)  (0.078)  
observations 24,527 
number of clusters 5,010 
Cragg-Donald Wald F32 5.48 53.89 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
 
  
                                                 
32 Statistic obtained using xtoverid, provided by Schaffer and Stillman (2010). 
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Table A D-11:  Complete list of instruments used for the EC2SLS estimator – participation 
 EC2SLS 
  within transformation between transformation 
formal childcare 0.063 *** 0.016  
 (0.007)  (0.012)  
age 0.017 ** 0.010 ** 
 (0.007)  (0.005)  
agesq -0.000  -0.000 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
years of education 0.007  0.008 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.001)  
partner -0.092 *** -0.100 *** 
 (0.016)  (0.010)  
multigenerational -0.142 *** -0.001  
 (0.042)  (0.023)  
age of youngest child 0.006 *** -0.012 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
# children 0-12 0.006  -0.044 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.006)  
experience part-time -0.005  0.013 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.001)  
experience full-time 0.004  0.009 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.001)  
East-Germany 0.131 ** 0.024 * 
 (0.052)  (0.014)  
German citizenship 0.048  0.074 *** 
 (0.043)  (0.010)  
unemployment rate (f) -0.004  -0.001  
 (0.003)  (0.001)  
mum alive 0.049  0.076 *** 
 (0.034)  (0.011)  
constant -0.201 *** 
  (0.076)   
observations 24,527 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A D-12:  selection correction using Probit models for each year – hours  
  hours 
informal childcare  1.164 *** (0.266)   
formal childcare  3.568 *** (0.390)  
age  -0.727 ** (0.292)  
agesq  0.001  (0.004)  
years of education  1.189 *** (0.080)  
partner  -3.497 *** (0.483)  
multigenerational  0.887  (1.132)  
age of youngest child  1.224 *** (0.094)  
number of children 0-12  -1.797 *** (0.283)  
experience part-time  0.107  (0.089)  
experience full-time  0.942 *** (0.062)  
East-Germany  8.238 *** (0.427)  
German citizenship  -2.897 *** (0.704)  
inverse Mill's ratio…1999  6.392 *** (1.332)  
2000  2.735 ** (1.177)  
2001  3.447 *** (1.103)  
2002  2.821 ** (1.151)  
2004  4.045 *** (1.200)  
2005  4.290 *** (1.302)  
2006  3.626 *** (1.109)  
2007  3.289 *** (1.130)  
2008  3.482 *** (1.319)  
2009  3.484 ** (1.535)  
2010  4.360 *** (1.422)  
2011  3.596 *** (1.350)  
2012  4.513 *** (1.475)  
constant  21.886 *** (5.684)   
observations 14,083 
adjusted R-squared 0,291 
2 (IMR's) 31.32 
Prob > 2 0.003 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
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Results if “informal childcare in t-1” is included as an instrument 
Table A D-13:  pooled 2SLS – participation 
  participation informal cc  
informal childcare 0.184 *** (0.017)  
formal childcare 0.171 *** (0.008) 0.014  (0.007) 
age 0.026 *** (0.007) 0.003  (0.005) 
agesq -0.001 *** (0.000) -0.000 ** (0.000) 
years of education 0.030 *** (0.002) 0.005 *** (0.001) 
partner 0.046 *** (0.013) -0.062 *** (0.011) 
multigenerational -0.019  (0.036) -0.004  (0.030) 
age of youngest child 0.052 *** (0.002) -0.010 *** (0.001) 
number of children 0-12 -0.033 *** (0.007) -0.038 *** (0.005) 
experience part-time 0.051 *** (0.002) 0.007 *** (0.001) 
experience full-time 0.030 *** (0.001) 0.006 *** (0.001) 
East-Germany 0.066 *** (0.019) 0.022  (0.015) 
German citizenship -0.013  (0.016) 0.052 *** (0.010) 
unemployment rate (f) -0.007 *** (0.002) -0.002  (0.002) 
mother alive -   0.041 *** (0.011) 
informal childcare (t-1) -   0.454 *** (0.009) 
constant -0.537 *** (0.121) 0.251 ** (0.089) 
observations 17,614 
number of women 4.216 
R-squared 0.363 0.273 
Cragg-Donald Wald F 2,370.83 
Hansen J statistic (p-value) 0.489 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
cluster-robust standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A D-14:  EC2SLS / G2SLS – participation  
 EC2SLS G2SLS 
  participation informal cc participation informal cc 
informal childcare 0.154 *** -  0.191 *** -  
 (0.011)    (0.015)    
formal childcare 0.169 *** -0.028 ** 0.167 *** 0.016 ** 
 (0.007)  (0.012)  (0.007)  (0.007)  
age 0.022 *** 0.000  0.027 *** 0.003  
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
agesq -0.001 *** -0.000  -0.001 *** -0.000 *** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
years of education 0.030 *** 0.002  0.030 *** 0.005 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
partner 0.042 *** -0.017 * 0.047 *** -0.065 *** 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  
multigenerational -0.021  0.024  -0.019  -0.009  
 (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.025)  
age of youngest child 0.051 *** -0.009 *** 0.052 *** -0.010 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
# children 0-12 -0.035 *** -0.025 *** -0.033 *** -0.038 *** 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
experience part-time 0.051 *** 0.001  0.050 *** 0.007 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
experience full-time 0.03 *** 0.002 ** 0.030 *** 0.007 *** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
East-Germany 0.068 *** 0.015  0.065 *** 0.022  
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  
German citizenship -0.011  0.013  -0.012  0.055 *** 
 (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.012)  
unemployment rate (f) -0.007 *** -0.001  -0.007 *** -0.002  
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
mum alive -  0.009  -  0.043 *** 
   (0.011)    (0.012)  
informal childcare (t-1) -  0.812 *** -  0.424 *** 
   (0.008)    (0.007)  
constant -0.448 *** 0.511 *** -0.558 *** 0.277 *** 
  (0.089)  (0.113)  (0.084)  (0.088)  
observations 17,641 
number of women 4,216 
Wald 2 9,429,36 9,357.98 
Cragg-Donald Wald F33 202.88 2,001.38 
Sargan Hansen (p-value) 0.000 0.235 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
                                                 
33 Both the Cragg-Donald Wald F and the Sargan-Hansen statistic are obtained using the Stata command xtoverid, 
provided by Schaffer and Stillman (2010). 
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Table A D-15:  complete first stage of EC2SLS – participation  
 EC2SLS 
  within transformation between transformation 
formal childcare 0.041 *** -0.028 ** 
 (0.007)  (0.012)  
age -0.005  0.000  
 (0.008)  (0.005)  
agesq -0.000  -0.000  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  
years of education -0.009  0.002  
 (0.012)  (0.001)  
partner -0.084 *** -0.017 * 
 (0.016)  (0.009)  
multigenerational -0.137 *** 0.024  
 (0.046)  (0.024)  
age of youngest child 0.003  -0.009 *** 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  
# children 0-12 -0.008  -0.025 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.005)  
experience part-time -0.003  0.001  
 (0.003)  (0.001)  
experience full-time 0.004  0.002 ** 
 (0.004)  (0.001)  
East-Germany 0.162 *** 0.015  
 (0.052)  (0.013)  
German citizenship 0.087 ** 0.013  
 (0.043)  (0.009)  
unemployment rate (f) -0.005  -0.001  
 (0.003)  (0.001)  
mum alive 0.019  0.009  
 (0.032)  (0.011)  
informal childcare (t-1) 0.031 *** 0.812 *** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  
constant 0.511 ***  
   (0.112)   
observations 17,614 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses 
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Table A D-16:  pooled Heckman – both instruments in the selection equation (reduced form) – 
hours34  
  hours working 
informal childcare 1.408 *** (0.231)  
formal childcare 3.270 *** (0.339) 0.601 *** (0.028) 
age -0.795 *** (0.194) 0.046 ** (0.019) 
agesq 0.003  (0.003) -0.002 *** (0.000) 
years of education 1.143 *** (0.056) 0.116 *** (0.005) 
partner -3.521 *** (0.331) 0.156 *** (0.036) 
multigenerational 0.268  (0.947) -0.042  (0.091) 
age of youngest child 1.134 *** (0.074) 0.191 *** (0.005) 
number of children 0-12 -1.822 *** (0.196) -0.150 *** (0.019) 
experience part-time 0.016  (0.063) 0.224 *** (0.005) 
experience full-time 0.865 *** (0.044) 0.119 *** (0.003) 
East-Germany 8.513 *** (0.272) 0.296 *** (0.053) 
German citizenship -2.916 *** (0.414) -0.018  (0.039) 
inverse Mill's ratio 2.174 *** (0.699) -   
unemployment rate (f) -   -0.030  (0.006) 
mother alive -   0.124 *** (0.046) 
informal childcare (t-1) -   0.300 *** (0.026) 
constant 25.621 *** (3.916) -2.880 *** (0.335) 
observations 17,302 
Wald 2 4131.13 
2 ( ) 9.68 
Prob> 2 0.002 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
standard errors in parantheses       
 
  
                                                 
34 The Stata implemented Heckman two-step procedure only allows for cluster-robust inference if using the 
bootstrap. If this is done the results do not change. 
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Table A D-17:  selection with Probit model for each year – working hours 
hours 
informal childcare  1.378 *** (0.320)   
formal childcare  3.206 *** (0.429)  
age  -0.803 ** (0.330)  
agesq  0.003  (0.005)  
years of education  1.131 *** (0.100)  
partner  -3.543 *** (0.569)  
multigenerational  0.312  (1.413)  
age of youngest child  1.116 *** (0.107)  
number of children 0-12  -1.801 *** (0.288)  
experience part-time  0.000  (0.097)  
experience full-time  0.854 *** (0.073)  
East-Germany  8.512 *** (0.495)  
German citizenship  -2.940 *** (0.854)  
inverse Mill's ratio…2000  1.997  (1.398)  
2001  2.150 * (1.157)  
2002  1.599  (1.178)  
2005  2.883 ** (1.231)  
2006  2.097 ** (1.066) 
2007  1.648  (1.139)  
2008  2.005  (1.499)  
2009  2.294  (1.804)  
2010  2.788 * (1.635)  
2011  -0.048  (1.549)  
2012  2.121  (1.538)  
constant  26.153 *** (6.658)  
observations 10,738 
number of women 3,159 
R-squared 0.298 
2 (IMR's) 11.43 
Prob > 2 0.408 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Source: GSOEP, 1999-2012, excluding 2003, own calculations 
bootstrapped standard errors in parantheses 
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E Conclusions 
Germany is facing demographic changes in the form of an ageing society. A low fertility rate 
together with an increasing life expectancy influence the demographic structure (European 
Commission (2012, 2014), Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2009)). The old-age 
dependency ratio of Germany is increasing (Federal Statistical Office of Germany (2009)). This 
has remarkable consequences for the social security system, on both the revenue and 
expenditure sides, as well as for economic growth (e.g. OECD (2014), European Commission 
(2012)). In this context, a broader female labor market involvement is a desirable goal of politics 
(e.g., OECD (2014), Reinberg and Hummel (2003)). One important requirement for this goal 
to be achieved is the compatibility of family life and working career. 
This dissertation investigates three questions regarding this compatibility. The first relates to 
intra-household time allocation. To examine male involvement in home-related work, this 
dissertation investigates how men react if they have time to do engage in this work. The second 
question regards the career penalty of birth-related career interruptions of women. This goes 
beyond wages by explicitly taking into account the occupational prestige. The third question 
relates to the role of informal childcare in respect to maternal employment.  
Chapter B asks how couples allocate their time to home-related work if they are facing an 
employment shock. This question is informed by the unequal division of these tasks in couple 
households and the question about whether this is due to time constraints or to preferences. We 
use the survey years 1992 – 2010 of the German Socio-Economic Panel. Since the time 
allocation within couples is strongly interdependent, we use a difference-in-differences (DID) 
approach to identify the effect of an employment shock in form of a plant closure. We also 
exploit the panel structure of the GSOEP and apply fixed effects estimations. The results reveal 
some reaction in the considered time uses of men and women. The effects are small and mostly 
insignificant. This indicates that preferences are an important reason for prevalent time 
allocation. The time men devote to housework or childcare is not increased considerably after 
facing an employment shock. Even the sum of both home-related chores is not increased 
remarkably relative to the total time that needs to be reallocated. The female reaction is almost 
always insignificant. The robustness checks did not alter the results. It must be borne in mind 
that this analysis displays the reaction in the short term. We only consider the time uses the year 
immediately after a person has been laid off. To investigate the effects in the long term, we 
would need more observations over a long time period for the treated group.  
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Chapter C investigates whether the duration of the career interruption after the first birth is 
detrimental to a woman’s career. Since the prestige level is only observed if a woman is 
working, a Heckman selection model is applied to correct for the selection into employment. 
Regardless of the model used, the results reveal a link between prestige and leaves longer than 
three years. The analysis of occupational mobility compared to the prestige level prior the first 
birth indicates destabilized careers in case of long time outs instead of short ones. If childless 
women are included in the analysis, the effects become somewhat weaker in respect to the 
SIOPS level, but stronger for mobility. Apart from the selection into employment after 
childbirth, the self-selection into certain occupations that are more or less prestigious might be 
another source of selection in this context. This selection takes place long before the first child 
is born. If controlling for the SIOPS level prior to the first birth, the results concerning the level 
are less distinct while those concerning downward mobility are slightly more distinct. However, 
the analysis only investigates one dimension of occupational mobility, namely achieving at least 
one upward resp. facing at least one downward move of at least 10% on the SIOPS scale. 
Chapter D investigates the role of informal childcare arrangements in maternal labor market 
involvement. The analysis takes into account the endogeneity of informal childcare 
arrangements. When investigating working hours, I correct for the selection into employment. 
Informal childcare is instrumented using the information about whether the mother of the 
woman is still alive. Informal childcare seems to facilitate the combination of labor market 
participation and family life. I find a positive influence of the use of informal childcare on the 
likelihood of women to participate, even though the effect size depends on the instruments used. 
Using a Heckman selection correction when investigating the effect of the presence of informal 
childcare arrangements on the working hours reveals a positive effect of slightly more than an 
hour. Therefore, the results do not indicate that informal childcare arrangements are crucial for 
full-time employment instead of part-time employment. The presence of informal childcare 
arrangement seems to provide some more flexibility within a certain work arrangement. 
Overall, this thesis gives some insights into the prevalent situation of mothers concerning the 
compatibility of a working career and family life. The intra-household allocation of time seems 
to be pretty stable in Germany, at least in the short term, indicating that preferences are an 
important determinant of the prevalent intra-household time allocation. This thesis also offers 
indication that mothers’ careers are not per se destabilized by childbirth, but the length of career 
interruptions is probably an important factor in this respect. The analysis in chapter C reveals 
that short time outs of up to three years show no distinct destabilizing effect. In addition, 
interruptions due to other reasons seem to be at least as important for the career path as birth-
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related interruptions. One important factor in labor market participation seems to be the 
presence of informal childcare arrangements. The most prevalent argument for this is that 
informal childcare, e.g., grandparental supervision, provides flexibility to the mother and is 
associated with more trust than is institutional childcare (e.g., Posadas and Vidal-Fernández 
(2012), Compton (2011), Compton and Pollack (2014)). Even though this dissertation could 
not reveal the precise size of this effect, it clearly indicates a distinct, positive effect, since all 
estimations reveal a remarkable effect size. Therefore, as also mentioned in some part of the 
literature, policies that provide the aforementioned flexibility might facilitate maternal 
employment. While the thesis reveals a positive impact on participation, the effect on working 
hours is small. Informal childcare arrangements may therefore promote maternal labor market 
participation, but are probably not the crucial determinant in the choice of full-time over part-
time employment. It is to be noted, however, that this thesis only investigates the presence of 
these arrangements per se and not the amount of informal childcare.  
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